AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE MINNEAPOLIS POLICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

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Global Rights for Women (GRW) is a Minnesota-based organization that collaborates with partners around the world to promote women’s human rights to equality and freedom from violence. GRW works to achieve these values through legal reform and systems change in partnership with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, and other national/international organizations to develop and enforce laws, create sustainable training initiatives, build local advocacy and public support, and monitor implementation of laws, policies, and practices.

The GRW team, with decades of experience in legal and systemic reform initiatives to end gender-based violence, offers assessments of inter-agency responses to violence against women, research, review of laws, and training of advocates, law enforcement, legal professionals, governments, and NGOs. Each project is customized to both the local and global context of violence against women. The work is grounded in research and tested strategies from around the world. For more information on GRW’s work, training, resources, publications, and reports, see GRW’s website at https://globalrightsforwomen.org/.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An assessment of the Minneapolis Police Department’s response to domestic violence identified practices that put survivor safety at risk and did not hold violent offenders accountable.

In 2017, a study by the Police Conduct Oversight Commission on the police response to domestic violence (DV) cases in Minneapolis documented that police officers wrote reports or made arrests in only 20% of DV calls from 2014-2016. During that time, the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) received over 43,000 DV-related calls. Concern about the findings from the Office of Police Conduct’s review 2017 report led the Office of Police Conduct Review (OPCR) to request that Global Rights for Women (GRW), in coordination with local advocacy agencies, conduct an assessment of MPD’s response to DV cases.

With a length of experience in international work on violence against women as a human rights issue, the GRW team is keenly aware that domestic violence is the most common form of gender-based violence around the world. No country or community is free from this crisis, including Minneapolis.

Globally, an estimated 736 million women - almost one in three - have been subjected to physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence, non-partner sexual violence, or both at least once in their life.\(^1\) A woman or girl is killed every 11 minutes in their home.\(^2\)

An average of 24 people per minute are victims of rape, physical violence or stalking by an intimate partner in the United States - more than 12 million women and men over the course of a single year.\(^3\) The majority of domestic violence was committed against women by men. Most violence against women is perpetrated by current or former husbands or intimate partners. Much of this violence goes unreported, and when it is reported perpetrators are often not held accountable – resulting in their ability to carry out violence with impunity.

In Minnesota, at least 26 people were killed due to intimate partner homicide in 2021 – intimate partners, children, friends, parents, and neighbors.\(^4\)

In Minneapolis, between 01/01/2019 and 12/31/2022, a third of all aggravated assaults were domestic aggravated assaults. According to the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, felony domestic violence cases from MPD are second in number only to drug cases in the percentage of entire MPD caseload received by the County Attorney’s Office. And in Hennepin County Court, domestic abuse-related family cases were the most frequent type of filing in of all 9 types of family case filings in all 5 years from 2018 – 2022.

Of the 26 women killed in the state of Minnesota in 2021, 45% were separated or trying to leave their intimate partner. We know that these deaths are not solely the result of individual acts of violence, but a culmination of failures across multiple systems\(^5\).

When OPCR requested that GRW assess MPD’s response to DV cases, GRW agreed to provide project leadership with the support of local DV advocacy and direct service agencies, and successfully secured a grant from the Minneapolis Foundation for this effort.

GRW proposed conducting an Institutional Assessment, a methodology developed by Praxis International, that is used by GRW staff and consultants in their efforts to address intimate partner violence around the world. This approach engages justice system practitioners, DV advocacy providers, and community members affected by the system’s response in the analysis. GRW obtained agreements from relevant agencies involved in DV cases to appoint representatives to serve on a DV Workgroup, which provided a broad, multi-disciplinary view of the processing of these cases and assisted GRW in connecting with survivors for their input. GRW engaged with members of the MPD, the OPCR, and leadership of MPD’s Violent Crimes Investigations Division in a collaborative effort to investigate the gaps between what victims experience and what the system provides, and effectively develop strategies to ensure those gaps are filled.

### Methodology

An Institutional Assessment is a problem-solving tool for communities interested in more effective interventions in gender-based violence. An Institutional Assessment is different from other assessments of organizational functioning in that the key factor evaluated is the institution’s effectiveness in meeting the needs of the people it is intended to serve, not the quantity or efficiency of case processing. Additionally, it seeks to discover if the problems are


experienced across the board, or disproportionately impact specific members of the community.

The analysis pays attention to primary methods that institutions use in standardizing actions across disciplines, agencies, levels of government, and jobs: agency mission and purpose, concepts and theories on domestic violence causation and intervention, agency rules and regulations, administrative procedures, linkages among intervening agencies, allocation of resources, training, and accountability mechanisms.

This MPD assessment focused on the following questions:

- How does the initial and subsequent MPD response to DV calls address survivor safety, with particular attention to the experience of marginalized survivors?
- Does the current response increase survivors’ risk of further violence? If so, what could be improved to decrease that risk?

To learn about survivors’ experiences and institutional responses, Global Rights for Women (GRW) and the DV Workgroup conducted the following activities:

- Mapping of MPD’s response to DV cases to identify current case processing procedures.
- Interviews of practitioners involved in DV cases. GRW interviewed 32 practitioners – some two or three times - including responding officers, supervisors, and leaders within MPD; and members of agencies linked to MPD, such as 911, victim advocacy services, prosecution units, community corrections, and the courts.
- Observations of practitioners in their real-time-and-place work settings. Two GRW staff members participated in 15 hours of police ride-a-longs with the MPD during the summer of 2021 and observed officers in the field and while conducting administrative duties. GRW staff also toured the facilities of two community-based victim advocacy programs.
- Survivor interviews and focus group discussions. In total, 24 women who called police in 2018 – 2022 participated in 6 focus groups and 6 individual interviews. 23 of the 24 had called the police multiple times. 3 survivors participated in second in-depth interviews.

In 2017 and 2020, focus groups were held with community-based victim advocates from Cornerstone, Esperanza United, Phumulani, Sexual Violence Center, and Tubman. In 2021, a focus group was held with DASC advocates from Asian Women United, Division of Indian Work, Domestic Abuse Project, Esperanza United, and Sewa-Aifw.
- Text analysis to read and analyze forms, reports, case files, and other documents that organize case processing.
Four types of MPD texts were gathered for review of what shapes officer actions: 1) policies and protocols, 2) training materials, 3) CAD (Computer Aided Dispatch) records of 911 calls, and (4) police reports of DV calls. 100 police reports of DV calls and their accompanying CAD records from 10/15/2018 – 10/27/2020 were randomly selected and analyzed; 32 additional CAD records filed without a police report were also studied.

The resulting information revealed how problems or gaps in service are produced, which pointed to possible solutions and improvements in policy and practice.

Findings and Recommendations

The assessment identified the following gaps in service that increase survivors’ risk of further violence and describe how these gaps are produced.

Gap: When abusers fled the scene before police arrived, officers and follow-up investigators often didn’t attempt to locate them, leaving victims vulnerable to future violence.

What is our evidence?

- Generally, if the suspect was on scene when police arrived, he was arrested; if the suspect was gone on police arrival (GOA), he was not arrested.
- Lack of efforts to locate suspects were not tied to the seriousness of the incident.
- Follow-up investigations did not significantly improve efforts to locate the suspect.
- Most survivors related multiple experiences of officers not pursuing GOA abusers.
- Other system partners who bear some responsibility or oversight over the suspect also did not attempt to locate abusers.
- Advocates confirmed the high level of frustration with the handling of GOA cases.

How is this a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?

- Research shows that DV suspects in GOA cases pose a higher lethality risk to victims and have a higher risk of reoffending.
- The escalating danger posed by the GOA abuser and the continual systemic accountability issues are borne out by survivor experiences documented in this report.
- Victims feel they must defend themselves or their families, heightening lethality risk for themselves and their abusers.
- When GOA suspects remain at large, victims are fearful that calling police will only endanger them further; if suspects remain at large repeatedly, victims may give up entirely.

How is this gap produced? What contributes to it?

- Current unwritten policy or practices appear to discourage pursuit of GOA suspects.
• Current unwritten policy appears to discourage use of investigative resources in misdemeanor cases, which can involve serious assaults and repeat offenders.
• When GOA calls are dispatched as “Domestic Abuse Report Only,” further action on the case is less likely.
• Current policy does not explicitly direct officers’ actions in GOA cases.
• Only 3 suspects in the 55 GOA cases were convicted in both felony and misdemeanor DV cases.
• A suspect is more likely to be GOA if there is a delay in officers’ response to the scene and MPD objectives for ideal response times are not being met in many cases.
• Survivors and victim advocates with more recent experiences (2021 and 2022) described long waits for officers of 1 ½ to several hours.

Recommendations
• MPD should revise the existing DV policy to add more explicit language on responding to GOAs - such as the policies developed in the Blueprint for Safety implemented in St. Paul, MN.  
• Supervisory actions should be taken to ensure compliance with the new policy.
• Officers should then receive experiential training on the new GOA policy.
• More specialized DV investigator positions would improve prosecution of GOA cases.

Gap: If abusers who violated no-contact orders weren’t on-scene when victims made such complaints to police, there often was no follow-up action, emboldening abusers to continue violating orders.

In the police reports, as well as in the survivor stories, many abusers who violated no-contact conditions of court orders were also GOA after doing so. When suspects in court order violation cases weren’t pursued, there were often court order-related reasons given, and survivors had different comments about these situations.

What is our evidence?
• As in other GOA cases, if the suspect was on scene when police arrived, he was arrested; but not generally if he was GOA.
• Officers are sometimes unable to find the order in the online system.
• Officers appear to be screening cases based on the perception of likely prosecution rather than probable cause.

Advocates and officers also indicated discouragement with what they perceived as the lack of prosecution of OFP violation cases, even in cases where there is corroborating evidence such as video or social media.

**How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?**
- Abusers who violate protection orders repeatedly pose a higher risk to victims.
- Victims get mixed messages about OFPs, and abusers get the message that there will be no consequences for violations.

**How is this gap produced?**
- Lack of feedback on decisions not to prosecute discourages officers and advocates.
- The online OFP system is difficult for officers to use.
- Some officers are confused about the different types of orders which impedes online confirmation on the scene.

**Recommendations**
- MPD policy should include a specific statement regarding arrests for violations of an OFP – especially when a victim has reported multiple violations - in its domestic abuse policy. Multiple violations of an OFP can be felony-level crimes.
- Police, prosecutors, and advocates should agree on how OFP violation cases will be prioritized given limited resources.
- Supervisory actions should be taken to ensure compliance with new policy.
- Stalking charges should be considered to address repeated violations.
- A card with a chart on the different types of orders should be developed for officers to carry.
- More specialized DV investigator positions would improve prosecution of OFP violations.

**GAP: When responding officers communicate with victims or offenders in ways that exhibit explicit or implicit bias related to gender, class, race/ethnicity, disability, or sexual orientation, victims are discouraged from calling police in the future.**

This institutional assessment sought to understand where and how and for which victims an institutional practice is a problem. Facilitators and notetakers at focus groups and interviews were asked to stay alert to issues specific to victims of color and other marginalized groups. Survivors were asked follow-up questions related to police response and the impact of race, neighborhood, etc.

**What is our evidence?**
- Victims described various ways that they felt gender, race, and class negatively influenced the police response.
• Some officers lack understanding of cultural factors which negatively affect investigations.
• Lack of interpreter resources affects the police response when parties speak other languages than English.
• LGBTQ victims are reluctant to contact police due to past negative responses.
• Advocates identified stereotypes of victims or offenders with physical disabilities or mental health issues that negatively influenced police response.

How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?
• Research shows that the risk of intimate partner homicide is much higher for women of color.
• Longstanding stereotypes about women of color and women with mental health issues negatively affect the police response.
• Survivors do not feel supported by or trust officers who indicate they don’t want to handle DV cases or have an intrusive questioning style.
• LGBTQ victims feel that the violence was minimized.

How is this gap produced?
MPD’s supervisory policies and procedures do not adequately identify disrespectful or unacceptable behavior by officers, provide guidance and training on expected behavior, and apply fair disciplinary measures when necessary. There is general agreement in the community that this problem needs to be addressed. The consent decree between the Minnesota Department of Human Rights and the City of Minneapolis, and the consent decree pending from the Department of Justice will likely require related improvements, which will affect the handling of DV cases.

Recommendations
• Efforts to address explicit and implicit bias must be incorporated into the MPD’s rebuilding plans.
• New risk assessment tools for female same sex relationships and immigrant victims should be considered to improve current procedures.

Gap: Officers often did not interview witnesses to the abuser’s conduct, including children, or document their identity and contact information, lessening the opportunity for prosecution or probation actions that could enhance victim safety.

What is our evidence?
• In most cases where there were witnesses, police did not question witnesses and in many of the cases, documentation of the witnesses’ identities and contact information was missing.
• MPD policy doesn’t clearly direct officers’ actions related to child witnesses.
How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?
Best practice in law enforcement and prosecution of DV cases is to proceed in the least burdensome way for the victim, which includes documenting and utilizing as much other evidence as possible, such as witness observations, photos, video footage, medical records, etc. Not doing so places the burden of holding the offender accountable on the victim, which endangers her further.

How is this gap produced?
- Officers are confused about the expectations of responding officer vs. investigators regarding interactions with child witnesses.
- Some officers believe the use of body cameras requires less documentation and that others in the system are responsible for obtaining witness information given MPD’s staffing issues.

Recommendations
- MPD policy should be revised to direct officer actions regarding child witnesses.
- To improve witness documentation in reports, the regular trainings provided on this subject need to be followed up by supervisory actions that identify incomplete reports and convey expectations for improvements from the officers involved.

Gap: Property crimes accompanying domestic assaults or OFP violations often weren’t documented well or recommended for charging, impacting victims’ physical safety, economic security, and access to restitution.

What is our evidence?
- In DV cases involving theft or damage to the victim’s property, responding officers or investigators rarely documented replacement or repair estimates.
- In cases involving damage to property, responding officers or investigators photographed the damaged property 38% of the time.
- Police documented recommended charges related to the theft or property damage 20% of the time.
- Abusers who stole or damaged victims’ property were rarely prosecuted or convicted of property crimes.

How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?

Property damage and economic control by abusers erode the victim’s financial resources, lessening her ability to escape the violence.
How is this gap produced?
- MPD policy doesn’t provide clear guidance on how to address property damage related to DV calls.
- The MPD’s severe understaffing greatly reduces the department’s ability for responding officers to more fully document or recommend charges, or investigators to conduct follow-up, on domestic abusers’ theft or damage of their victims’ property.

Recommendations
- Law enforcement can help keep victims economically secure through their regular job duties.
- MPD’s domestic abuse policy should include the expectation that officers document not only crimes of assault, threats, stalking, and violations of orders; but also crimes with economic impact on victims (theft, property damage, etc.).
- Supervisory actions should be taken to ensure compliance with new policy.
- Officers should receive experiential training on the new policy.
- MPD should support partner efforts to develop additional resources for victims.

Gap: Emerging research on traumatic brain injury is being incorporated into the medical response to DV victims, and current DV protocols for patrol officers, investigators, prosecutors, and advocates should be revised to ensure a coordinated and effective response to victims with head trauma.

We include this gap to focus attention on this issue and ensure that subsequent efforts to improve practice incorporate steps to recognize the medical seriousness of head injuries and effectively respond to these victims. Over time, the frequency of concussions and brain injury in professional sports has been acknowledged and steps are being taken to protect players. In the medical field, this recognition has spread to the potential for brain injury in domestic assaults and the need for improved detection and treatment. The assessment did not expect to find specific police actions related to this issue because it is not yet addressed in current policies. However, we strongly urge MPD and all the governmental and social service agencies involved in DV cases to seize the opportunity to update and improve their responses to victims who have suffered head trauma.

What is our evidence?
- Officers regularly obtain medical attention for victims and document injuries in DV cases which allows for opportunity to focus on traumatic brain injury.
- A significant number of DV cases involved blows to the head or head injuries.

How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?
After conducting research in this area, the Center on Partner-Inflicted Brain Injury listed these lessons learned:
• Almost all DV survivors experience violence that could cause brain injuries and many struggle with mental health.
• While DV victims report extremely high levels of head trauma, brain injury is largely unidentified, rarely addressed, and not well understood by police, advocates, and other responders.
• Brain injury in the context of DV (termed partner inflicted brain injury) is markedly different from other commonly studied brain injuries, including brain injuries caused by accidents, sports, and combat.

Additionally, survivors reported longer-term impacts:
• One woman whose abuser broke her orbital bone lost a job because her eye was so swollen, she couldn’t see out of it for days. Subsequently, she experienced post-concussion symptoms (light and sound sensitivity) that made it difficult for her to work or go anywhere, as she had to be in a darkened room, had to turn off any TV-level noise, etc.
• A woman whose abuser caused a serious and permanent injury to her neck vertebrae said that the injury was so serious, she would face paralysis if she experienced another head or neck injury during an assault. She felt she had to constantly “assess every situation” and be ready to defend herself - even to the point of sleeping with a knife under her pillow – to ensure she would never be injured that seriously again.
• A woman whose abuser struck her in the face with a baseball bat, breaking her teeth, had just had a baby not long beforehand. This left her in the position of recovering from childbirth, managing numerous dental injuries, not being able to eat, caring for a baby, and not wanting to leave the baby alone with her partner.

Finally, none of the survivors who described the head injuries above felt their abusers were held accountable for this serious level of assault.

How is this gap produced? What contributes to it?
Brain injury is largely unidentified, rarely addressed, and not well understood by most of the governmental agencies and DV programs that respond to victims and offenders. Additionally, victims themselves may fail to identify brain injuries or address them, which heightens the need for intervention. One of the survivors above stated that when her nose was broken, she “couldn’t think – couldn’t think to call my family, or who could do that – couldn’t think of the number,” etc. She didn’t realize she may have had a concussion and was experiencing symptoms. Thus, this gap in victim safety is produced by lack of knowledge, policy/protocol guidance, and training among police and others who directly serve domestic violence victims, as well as victims themselves.

Recommendations
• MPD should partner with HART, local prosecutors, and victim advocates to update current MPD policy on:
  o The patrol response to DV calls when the victim may have a head injury.
- The investigator follow-up with victims who have been assaulted about the head.
- Community-based advocacy and victim support staff within police and prosecutor’ officers follow up with victims.

- Supervisory actions should be taken to ensure compliance with new policy.
- MPD should partner with HART to provide training to officers on any new policy or protocol on responding to DV calls involving an assault to the victim’s head.

**Gap: Current risk assessment practices do not utilize risk data to prioritize the deployment of criminal justice resources toward the most dangerous offenders.**

**What is our evidence?**

- Though patrol officers carried out risk information-related tasks required by policy most of the time, a high-risk designation does not heighten the collective response, such as prompting patrol to search for a GOA suspect, an investigator to try to contact the suspect, or a prosecution to ensue.
- Survivors are unclear about how the risk information is used and some are uncomfortable with filling out the form as police ask them to.

**How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?**

DV cases involving GOAs, repeat assaults, violations of OFPs, brain injury, and extensive property damage and thefts all represent possible high-risk situations, as documented in research studies.

**How is this gap produced?**

- There is no mechanism currently in place for a certain level of risk to override the impact of the unwritten policy or practices identified in this report.
- The current Domestic Violence Supplement to the police report does not incorporate attention to some of the safety and accountability issues identified in this report and provides limited space for victim’s responses.
- The current practice of having victims fill in the DV Supplement doesn’t elicit the most complete risk information.

**Recommendations**

- A coordinated, multi-disciplinary effort to update and improve risk assessment procedures and the response to high-risk DV cases across the system is needed to close the gaps identified in this report.
- Supervisory actions should be taken to ensure compliance with new policy.
Conclusion

There are gaps in the Minneapolis police response to domestic violence – gaps that impact victim safety. Victims are vulnerable to repeat violence or no-contact order violations by abusers who have learned if they leave the scene before police arrive, no consequences will result. Victims are discouraged from calling police after receiving responses indicative of impatience, bias, or adherence to negative stereotypes. Victims increasingly bear the burden of holding offenders accountable when witnesses aren’t documented, and property loss isn’t taken into account. Victims and responders are unaware of emerging information on the medical seriousness of assaults to the head, which are common in DV cases. System partners are not utilizing risk assessment’s potential to prioritize scarce resources to the most dangerous offenders.

The Domestic Violence Workgroup and Global Rights for Women (GRW) staff are well aware that the Minneapolis Police Department is currently experiencing a severe shortage of officers – as of the writing of this report, 510 sworn officers are currently on duty, as opposed to the authorized fully-staffed number of 888 officers.7 Everyone interviewed expressed concern about the shortage, and it was seen as the cause of many of the issues identified in this report. However, our findings also identified historical “We’ve always done it that way” or “We never do that” sorts of issues, lack of clear policy directive for patrol officers, and discouraging messages from other parts of the criminal justice system that de-prioritize domestic violence cases. This points to needed changes in written policies, supervisory practices, linkages among justice system actors, and many multi-disciplinary training needs that can be addressed while the MPD rebuilds. The findings also raise concerns that should be incorporated into restructuring plans.

We enthusiastically agree with the sentiments expressed on several occasions by Minneapolis Public Safety Commissioner, Cedric Alexander,8 “I know we don’t have enough people. That cannot be the beginning of the conversation.”

The Path to an Institutional Assessment of the Minneapolis Police Response to Domestic Violence

In 2017, a study by the Police Conduct Oversight Commission\(^9\) on the police response to domestic violence (DV)\(^{10}\) cases in Minneapolis documented that police officers wrote reports or made arrests in only 20% of DV calls from 2014-2016\(^{11}\). During that time, the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) received over 43,000 DV-related calls. This inadequate response occurred despite an existing DV protocol directing officers on how to respond, a DV training program, and sufficient resources to implement the protocol.\(^{12}\)

Concern about this finding led the Office of Police Conduct Review (OPCR)\(^{13}\) to ask that Global Rights for Women (GRW) conduct an assessment of MPD’s response to DV cases. GRW agreed to provide project leadership with the support of local DV advocacy and direct service agencies, and successfully secured a grant from the Minneapolis Foundation for this effort.

GRW proposed conducting an Institutional Assessment, a methodology developed by Praxis International,\(^{14}\) that is used by GRW staff and consultants in their efforts to address intimate partner violence around the world. This approach engages justice system practitioners, domestic violence advocacy providers, and the community members affected by the system’s response in the analysis. In fact, between 2000 and 2005, Minneapolis criminal justice agencies (police, the city attorney’s office, the DV court that existed at that time, and probation) agreed to partner with the Battered Women’s Justice Project (BWJP)\(^{15}\) to conduct institutional assessments of the...
law enforcement response, the misdemeanor prosecution response, the DV court response, and the probation response to DV cases.

GRW obtained agreements from relevant agencies involved in DV cases to appoint representatives to serve on a DV Workgroup, which provided a broad, multi-disciplinary view of the processing of these cases and assisted GRW in connecting with survivors for their input. GRW engaged with members of the MPD, the OPCR, and leadership of the MPD’s Violent Crimes Investigations Division in a collaborative effort to investigate the gaps between what victims experience and what the system provides, and effectively develop strategies to ensure those gaps are filled.
The Extent of DV in Minneapolis

To understand the scope of the problem of domestic violence in Minneapolis, the following statistics were gathered. According to the dashboard of Minneapolis police criminal offense incident reports, from January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2022, 32% of all aggravated assaults in Minneapolis were domestic aggravated assaults. The year-by-year bar graph indicates 968 domestic aggravated assaults in 2019, a small decrease in the years of the pandemic, and then an increase to 988 domestic aggravated assaults in 2022.
In the Hennepin County Attorney’s dashboard, felony domestic violence cases that are referred to them from MPD are second only to drug cases in the percentage of entire MPD caseload received by the County Attorney’s Office. While numbers of cases decreased somewhat during the pandemic, they were back on the rise in 2022.
In Hennepin County, domestic abuse-related cases filed in family court (such as divorce, child custody, child support) were the most frequent type of filing in all 9 types of family case filings in all 5 years from 2018 – 2022. At 27% of all family case filings in 2018, 27% in 2019, 31% in 2020, 29% in 2021, and 33% in 2022, domestic abuse-related family case filings steadily comprise 1/4 to 1/3 of the entirety of family case filings each year.

Finally, according to their most recent publications of annual statistics 2021, two of Minneapolis’s oldest community-based victim advocacy organizations - Cornerstone and Tubman – combined provided:

- Shelter to 717 adults and children endangered by domestic or sexual violence, and
- Victim advocacy, assistance in applying for OFPs, legal information or advice, legal representation in OFP and family law cases, and helpline support to 6,099 victims.
Methodology

An Institutional Assessment is a problem-solving tool for communities interested in more effective interventions in gender-based violence. It has been used throughout the United States to improve responses to DV and sexual assault cases by civil and criminal justice systems and responses to child abuse cases by child protection agencies.

An Institutional Assessment is different from other assessments of organizational functioning in that the key factor evaluated is the institution’s effectiveness in meeting the needs of the people it is intended to serve, not the quantity or efficiency of case processing. The Institutional Assessment examines how a problem that citizens are experiencing is generated by current institutional practices. Additionally, it seeks to discover if the problems are experienced across the board, or disproportionately impact specific members of the community.

Thus, an Institutional Assessment examines how complex institutions and systems operate. It discovers how workers are organized and coordinated, directly and indirectly, to approach and act on cases. Its premise is that workers are institutionally organized to do their jobs in particular ways through forms, policies, philosophy, training, and routine practices of the institution in which they work. When the institution routinely fails to address the needs of the people it serves, the problem is often a result of how work is organized or coordinated as well as structural issues in case processing and management. Systemic gaps are usually not attributable solely to individual performance failures or a lack of education and training.

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16 Gender-based violence affects persons of a particular gender disproportionately. DV affects women disproportionately. All Minneapolis DV victims participating in this assessment were women. In the 100 police reports reviewed, the identified victim was female 89% of the time. This report will often use female pronouns (she, her, hers) when describing survivors’ experiences, and male pronouns (he, him, his) when describing abusers’ actions.
The analysis pays attention to **8 primary methods** that institutions use in standardizing actions across disciplines, agencies, levels of government, and jobs:

An Assessment Team of practitioners and community members typically conducts the assessment. For the Institutional Assessment of the Minneapolis Police Department’s response to domestic violence, the Assessment Team was the DV Working Group. Information about citizens’ experiences and institutional functioning is gathered through:

- Mapping of case processing,
- Interviews of practitioners,
- Observation of practitioners in their real-time-and-place work settings,
- Text analysis of forms, reports, case files, and any other documents that organize case processing, and,
- Interviews and focus groups with citizens engaged in the institution.

The resulting information from this effort reveals how problems or gaps in service are produced, which points to possible solutions and improvements in policy and practice.
The Complexity of Risk and Safety\textsuperscript{17}

We often limit our notion of risk assessment to dangers that individual abusers pose to victims. We ask: what types of intimidation and violence will the abuser likely use, and how often? Who helps him maintain his system of abuse? What circumstances may lead him to escalate his violence? How severe is his future violence likely to be? In addition, we must be equally mindful of risks generated by a victim’s personal circumstances, by aspects of culture increasing her vulnerability, and by institutional responses. While one’s culture\textsuperscript{18} can be a source of strength, it can also be a tool of control for abusers.

People’s lives are complex. Factors reinforcing or diminishing safety and risk are also complex. There is no universal victim of domestic abuse and there is no universal abuser. There is no single formula for safety and accountability.

Interventions pose their own risks, and when dominant culture institutions impose a one-size-fits-all response, they may cut off avenues of safety and support. Different cultural groups may experience disparate reactions from social institutions. An institutional assessment aims to understand where and how and for which victims an institutional practice is a problem. How is work organized and coordinated at this point of intervention? What are implications for safety? Retaliation? Ongoing abuse and violence? Unintended consequences of intervention? The figure below illustrates this framework of risk and safety in the context of complex lives.

18 In this context, “culture” means the complex, symbolic frame of reference shared by a group of people. It takes in the totality of behavior patterns, art, beliefs, language, institutions, and other products of human work and thought.
The Institutional Assessment of the MPD Response to DV Calls

This Institutional Assessment of the MPD focuses on the following questions:

- How does the initial and subsequent MPD response to DV calls address survivor safety, with particular attention to the experience of marginalized survivors?
- Does the current response increase survivors’ risk of further violence? If so, what could be improved to decrease that risk?

The goal of the assessment was to understand survivors’ experience with the MPD, especially marginalized survivors; identify how officers are organized to address DV and any gaps between official policy and actual practice; and identify gaps in existing policy and practice that impact survivor safety and offender accountability. At the center of the interviews, observations, and case file analysis was the effort to view the gap from a survivor’s position. The constant focal point of analysis was the gap between what survivors’ experience and need and what the police response provides. Once this was understood, the DV Work Group members identified ways to solve it. Many survivors, at the end of their focus group or individual interview, also identified ways to address these gaps.

It should be noted that this assessment is not a review of the individual performance or effectiveness of any specific employee of the MPD. By asking how something comes about, rather than looking at individual performance, the Institutional Assessment process aims to discover systemic problems and recommendations for lasting change.
Data Collection

To learn about survivors’ experiences and institutional responses, Global Rights for Women (GRW) and the DV Workgroup conducted:

- mapping of MPD’s response to DV cases,
- interviews of practitioners involved in DV cases,
- observation of practitioners in their real-time-and-place work settings,
- survivor interviews and focus group discussions, and,
- text analysis to read and analyze forms, reports, case files, and other documents that organize case processing.

Mapping How the MPD Processes DV Cases

Following is a visual representation of the process by which a survivor’s report or call for assistance travels through the response system is instructive on many levels. Maps were completed with the DV Workgroup during meetings and interviews to understand what happens at each step of the process, and highlight linkages between agencies. We drew on the expertise of front-line workers, middle managers, and leaders to identify possible problems with current case processing and explore alternatives.

Examples of questions and focus for interviews about case processing included:
1. What is the front-line worker/middle manager’s role in case processing?
2. What do the patrol officer and investigator focus on when working on a case?
3. Who else would it be important to interview?
4. Who is the patrol officer and investigator linked to? Who receives the case file that the investigator creates?
5. Who monitors the work of patrol officers? Of supervisors?
6. What resources does the MPD have to process cases?
7. What forms and documents do MPD officers fill out while processing a case?
8. What laws, rules, regulations, and policies guide the work of the patrol officers and supervisors on domestic violence cases?

This information resulted in the following maps of existing MPD procedures.
Call is received

Determination of problem

**Problem: DOMESTIC**

- Family quarrels but not necessarily confined to blood or married relations.
- Report of any disturbance where parties are, or have been, in a marriage, domestic partnership, or other intimate relationship; or where parties share a close family relationship.
- This code is used to distinguish lower level domestic quarrels where physical violence HAS NOT OCCURRED and does not appear imminent. Most juvenile, custody, disturbance, and argument calls would receive this classification; along with obstruction calls (refusing to return car keys, let caller in house, etc.) and requests to remove unwanted parties where the relationship falls under state definition.
- Violations of harassment orders or visitation rights, where no immediate threat exists, may be referred to 311.

2 Officer Response, Priority 2

**Problem: DOMESTIC ABUSE**

- Any of the following events (in progress or just occurred) between persons who are participants in a sort of family, such as spouses, live-ins, former spouses, boy/girlfriends, parents/children, siblings and others:
  - Assaults or just attempted assaults.
  - Threats, both verbal and menacing.
  - Forceful intrusion onto premises by former spouses, live-ins, boy/girlfriends, roommates, etc.
  - Violations of orders for protection (which indicate a history of violence).
  - Damage to property (on the theory that it can escalate to violence against a person), especially “spouse going berserk” or “boy/girlfriend trashing the place” type of calls. These calls are most likely to come from a participant or direct observer who has knowledge of the situation to answer criteria questions.

2 Officer Response, Priority 1

**Problem: DOMESTIC ABUSE REPORT ONLY**

- Same events as under DOMESTIC ABUSE, except that caller is reporting them as having transpired in the past.

1 Officer Response, Priority 2

*Priority 2 may be upgraded to Priority 1 as calltakers or officers receive more information*
It is the policy of the Minneapolis Police Department to thoroughly investigate all allegations of domestic violence, make appropriate referrals, and take action according to the totality of the information known.

- Officers respond to location
  - Check welfare of those on scene
    - Request emergency medical services for anyone requesting medical attention
  - Gather information about incident, including any witnesses
    - Acquire contact information of witnesses
  - When both parties allege other used violence, determine primary aggressor
    - Determine if probable cause exists that crime was committed
      - If probable cause is determined, and suspect on scene, arrest suspect. If felony arrest, all felony arrests must be authorized at scene by supervisor.
  - Take photos and document evidence
  - Ask victim is suspect has access to guns
  - Ask victim to complete domestic violence supplement
  - If yes, property inventory
  - Ask victim to sign medical release
  - If misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor, check Probable Cause Enhanced Felony List
    - Check for existence of order for protection
  - If suspect not on scene:
    - MPD policy states:
      - It is the policy of the Minneapolis Police Department to aggressively utilize the arrest powers granted by the State Legislature
        - Arrest 'expected' if signs of injury or impairment; dangerous weapon involved; alleged assault (no signs of injury); victim alleges fear of immediate bodily harm; terrorist threats; criminal sexual conduct.
        - Officer may arrest W/O warrant if officer has PC to believe in preceding 72 hours domestic assault occurred.
        - Officer may make an arrest fo misdemeanor DV even if assault did not occur in their presence.
Key Informant Interviews with Practitioners

GRW interviewed 32 practitioners – some two or three times - including responding officers, supervisors, and leaders within MPD; and members of agencies linked to MPD, such as 911, victim advocacy services, prosecution units, community corrections, and the courts. The focus was on the 8 Methods that organize a worker’s work (see p. 25 above), such as questions about rules and regulations, administrative practices, and resources; details of the person’s job in observing, documenting, or responding to DV; how tools, equipment, processes, or policies involved in responding to DV actually function; and a specific case of DV and what happens at each step.

Observations of Workers in Action

Two GRW staff members participated in 15 hours of police ride-a-long with the MPD during the summer of 2021. Observing practitioners in their work environment provides first-hand understanding and perspective on pressures and opportunities they face when responding to DV cases. In addition, GRW staff observed officers in the field, at their offices, and while conducting administrative duties. Observations focused on how officers’ work was organized, not on individual performance. During ride-a-longs, GRW staff also interviewed officers about how their work is organized. Team members were unable to arrange more ride-a-longs due to COVID-related policy implemented by MPD. GRW staff also toured the facilities of two community-based victim advocacy programs.

Survivor Focus Groups and Individual Interviews, and Victim Advocate Focus Groups

Community-based victim advocacy organizations (Domestic Abuse Project, Tubman, and Cornerstone) as well as the Domestic Violence Community Navigator19 - all of whom work directly with survivors - played a vital role in recruiting survivors, and hosting and facilitating interviews and focus group discussions. Participants received a $50 stipend for their contribution to this assessment. In total, 24 women who called police in 2018 – 2022 participated in the 6 focus groups and 6 individual interviews. Twenty-three (23) of the 24 had called police multiple times. Three (3) survivors participated in second in-depth interviews.

Additionally, GRW and the Domestic Abuse Service Center (DASC)20 each facilitated focus groups of local victim advocates who work with victims from a variety of communities. Understanding survivors’

19 The Domestic Violence Community Navigator is an unsworn position offering DV victims a non-threatening interaction point with Minneapolis police. The Navigator assists victims/survivors through the law enforcement process; and informs the public about services provided, and community resources.

20 DV victims come daily to DASC (Domestic Abuse Service Center) in the Hennepin County Government Center for multiple services in a central location: advocacy, orders for protection (OFP), and legal consultation and representation from attorneys. Staff are ethnically and culturally diverse. Many are bi-lingual, speaking Spanish, Hmong, Somali, Hindi, Newari, Nepali, Telugu, Tamil, and Sanskrit.
actual, lived experience is critical to the analysis of existing policies or creation of new policies that aim to improve survivor safety and perpetrator accountability.

In 2017 and 2020, focus groups were held with community-based victim advocates from Cornerstone, Esperanza United, Phumulani, Sexual Violence Center, and Tubman. In 2021, a focus group was held with DASC advocates from Asian Women United, Division of Indian Work, Domestic Abuse Project, Esperanza United, and Sewa-Aifw.

Not all women experience violence in the same way, and many experience multiple forms of oppression due to race, class, ethnicity, migration status, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, and other aspects of their identities. The interviews and focus groups provided valuable insights into women’s lived experiences of violence, and specifically on their interactions with the MPD. Advocates, who often have long-term supportive relationships with survivors, were able to describe interventions more comprehensively over longer periods of time as well as identify response issues experienced by many victims. Personal identifying information of survivors or advocates has been omitted from all of comments included in this report.

Text Analysis

GRW conducted an analysis of texts used or produced by MPD in their responses to DV calls. Texts are the driving, coordinating engine of any large institution, including the MPD. To understand how an institutional response goes right or wrong in DV cases, we examine the texts used in case management processes.

Texts include words, images, and sounds, arranged in ways they can be read, seen, and heard. The screen on the police officer’s computer, the officer’s written report, and video or audio-recorded witness statements are just a few examples. We generally don’t think of these things of having an active quality. However, the data entry items on the screen, the format of the report, and the policy and protocol of taking statements – all direct officers to ask, inform, decide, screen, refer, add, eliminate, share, or deny. This is important to realize when one considers that a police report represents a DV victim’s experience. It is a paper stand-in for a real person – a “case” that then travels throughout the system, from person to person and agency to agency.

Text analysis is a close, careful reading of forms, reports, case files, policies, training curricula, matrices, and other printed, recorded, or visual materials to uncover a picture of how the institution has coordinated a worker to talk about and act on a case. Four types of MPD texts were gathered for review of what shapes officer actions: 1) policies and protocols, 2) training materials, 3) CAD (Computer Aided Dispatch) records of 911 calls, and (4) police reports of DV calls. Policies and protocols show what the MPD intends the practice to be. Training guides and materials show how the MPD interprets and communicates those practices to workers. Police reports indicate how a police officer and investigator at the MPD apply policy and training when they interact with survivors.
100 police reports of DV calls from 10/15/2018 – 10-27/2020 were randomly selected and analyzed. 93 of these reports also had accompanying CAD records.

| Years   | • 9 from 2018  
|         | • 49 from 2019 
|         | • 42 from 2020 
| Precincts - | • 11 from 1st Precinct  
|          | • 13 from 2nd Precinct  
|          | • 26 from 3rd Precinct  
|          | • 39 from 4th Precinct  
|          | • 11 from 5th Precinct  
| Shifts | • 31 from Daywatch  
|        | • 35 from Middlewatch  
|        | • 25 from Dogwatch  
|        | • 9 from Other21  
| Data collected | • Type of problem/response dispatched  
|                | • Response time  
|                | • Precinct, sector, and neighborhood  
|                | • Race/gender of victims and suspects  
|                | • Documentation of activities required or recommended policy22  
|                | • Recommended charges  
|                | • Investigation, if assigned  
|                | • Prosecutorial actions, if known  
|                | • Questions, comments, and suggestions by those reviewing the reports  

21 2 Power Shift, 1 Neighborhood Directed Patrol, 1 Evening Beat, 5 Not Documented. In the 5 reports where the shift wasn’t documented, times of the calls were listed: 1449 hours, 1320 hours, 1419 hours, 2209 hours, and 1405 hours.

32 additional CAD records of DV calls for which responding officers did not have to write a report\textsuperscript{23} were also analyzed:

| Year of call | • 9 from 2018  
|             | • 23 from 2019 |
| Precinct    | • 3 from the 1\textsuperscript{st} Precinct  
|             | • 3 from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Precinct  
|             | • 6 from the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Precinct  
|             | • 15 from the 4\textsuperscript{th} Precinct  
|             | • 2 from the 5\textsuperscript{th} Precinct  |
| Shift       | • 8 between 7 a.m. – 3 p.m.  
|             | • 17 between 3 p.m. – 11 p.m.  
|             | • 7 between 11 p.m. – 7 a.m.  |
| Data collected | • Type of problem/response dispatched  
|             | • Response time  
|             | • Precinct  
|             | • Race/gender of victims and suspects  
|             | • Documentation of activities required or recommended by policy  
|             | • Disposition  
|             | • Questions, comments, & suggestions by those reviewing the records |

\textit{Development of Findings and Recommendations}

While mapping, interviews, observations, and text analysis were being completed, the information was debriefed with the workgroup, keeping our assessment questions at the center of our discussions. We analyzed the interviews, observations, and text to identify systemic issues or problems that affect survivor safety and reviewed our evidence to see if we needed more information to avoid a focus on cases that are out of the ordinary.

Finally, possible solutions were generated from the ideas of our interview and focus group subjects, and the combined experience of our workgroup and GRW staff through discussions about how a particular gap in survivor safety could be closed through changes in policy, linkages, resources, etc. The following graphic depicts the assessment process used to produce this report.

\textsuperscript{23} In some instances, MPD policy does not require officers to write a report of their response. For example, one may see in these CAD-entry-only records that no one was present at the location of the call (No Service), a party was simply given a ride (Transport), etc. These are “call dispositions” – codes that police units use to clear a call. The last primary police unit to leave the scene enters the call disposition. For a full list of call dispositions that an officer can use to clear a call, see Appendices.
1. Our assessment

What gaps exist between survivor safety and the Minneapolis police response to domestic violence?

2. Describe what we heard, saw, & read.

4. Problem statements

5. How is what we’ve learned a problem?
A problem of safety & well-being?
A problem of accountability?


6. What is our evidence?
Do we need more information?

7. How is the problem produced?

Source/s of the problem
1. Rules & regulations
2. Administrative practices
3. Resources
4. Concepts & theories
5. Linkages
6. Mission, purpose, & function
7. Accountability
8. Education & training

8. How do we solve this problem?
What needs to be redesigned, and how?
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Gap: When abusers fled the scene before police arrived, officers and follow-up investigators often didn’t attempt to locate them, leaving victims vulnerable to future violence.

“In May [2022], he almost killed me. He put a gun to my head and dragged me with the car. He broke my nose. While running on the street, I called 911 . . . I was waiting at a gas station with people that saw what happened. I had to call back twice to see when police were coming . . . It took an hour and a half for police to come. Meanwhile, he’d taken my car, keys, and clothes . . . I was covered in blood but I think they didn’t think it was serious. He was driving around looking for me. He drove by while police were there, and I pointed him out, but they didn’t do anything.”

Survivor, focus group - 12/28/22

Relevant policy

While existing MPD policy does not explicitly articulate and direct officer actions in locating DV suspects who have fled the scene, arrests in DV cases are strongly encouraged. Officers are directed:

- To thoroughly investigate all allegations of DV, make appropriate referrals, and act according to the totality of the information known.
- To enforce criminal laws without regard to the relationship of the parties involved, and aggressively utilize the arrest powers granted by the State Legislature.
- That arrests for domestic abuse, based on probable cause, are expected if any of the following circumstances exist:
  - Signs of injury or impairment
  - Dangerous weapon involved
  - Alleged assault – no signs of injury
  - Victim alleges to be in fear of immediate bodily harm
  - Terroristic threats
  - Criminal sexual conduct

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• That an officer may make an arrest for a misdemeanor domestic assault even if the assault did not occur in their presence.
• That a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant, even in the person’s own residence, if the officer has probable cause to believe that in the preceding 72 hours a domestic assault occurred.

Additionally, as part of MPD’s Domestic Abuse Incident Response Protocol, patrol officers shall, if the suspect is gone on arrival, remind the victim to call police if suspect returns within 72 hours of the incident. In all cases of domestic violence or alleged acts of domestic abuse, a police report and supplement shall be completed immediately. If no arrest is made, the supplement shall clearly show sufficient reasons for not making the arrest.

In general, supervisors have the authority to exercise control over subordinates to accomplish department directives. Supervisors are responsible for the behavior and actions of subordinates within their immediate control. They are also responsible for:

• Inspection, evaluation, and discipline of all assigned subordinates.
• Setting an example for subordinates in the areas of appearance, work habits, skill, and attitude.
• Work assignments and objectives.
• Insuring MPD rules, regulations, and orders are followed and are not ridiculed by any MPD employee.

In addition, supervisors have the following specific duties:

• Investigation of citizen or department complaints alleging misconduct, incompetence, neglect of duty, or any other department rule violation.
• Appraisal and analysis of work accomplishments for subordinates.
• Review and approval of report’s completeness and accuracy.

What is our evidence? What did we hear, see, or read?

Generally, if the suspect was on scene when police arrived, he was arrested; if the suspect was gone on police arrival (GOA), he was not arrested.

Of the 100 DV police reports reviewed during this assessment:

- In 55% of the cases, suspects were GOA.
- In 25% of the cases, officers documented efforts to locate the suspect (14 cases of 55). In these 14 cases, officers located and contacted 3 suspects, and arrested 2.
- In the 41 remaining cases, the report did not document any effort to locate or contact the suspect. However, in 7 cases, there appeared to be an explanation for not doing so. 29
- This leaves 34 GOA cases (1/3 of the cases reviewed) that did not document any effort to locate or contact the suspect; nor any explanation for not doing so. This was true even though most times some identifying information (name, age, and physical, clothing, and vehicle description) and/or suspect contact information (phone number, address, workplace, family address) was given to police.

Lack of efforts to locate suspects were not tied to seriousness of the incident.

There is a range of conduct – misdemeanor to felony – evident in these 34 GOA reports.

- **Example of misdemeanor**: Victim and suspect dating for 2 years. They do not live together and do not have children together. Today suspect was playing video games at victim’s residence. She asked him to stop. He refused; victim unplugged the game player. He grabbed her, started shaking her, and repeatedly called her a bitch. Suspect took victim’s house key, wouldn’t give it back, and left the scene. 30
- **Example of felony**: Suspect picked victim up from work in her car and was upset someone called him a snitch earlier in the day. When victim said she just wanted to go home, suspect got angry and said she didn’t care about him or love him. He punched her more than 10 times in the face. He stopped the car and got out. Victim also got out of the car, then suspect got back in and told her to get in. She refused and he drove off; then came back and again told her to get in. She again refused. He ripped off the rear-view mirror, threw it at her, and then ran her car into a tree. She approached on foot and asked why. He hit her in the face and started hitting her with the car door. A man came out of a nearby residence and asked if they were ok. Suspect told the man to mind his own business and punched victim in the face. The man said he’d call police. Suspect ran to him and punched him in the face twice, knocking the man to the ground. 31

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29 3 cases appeared not to have probable cause, in 2 cases the complainants did not want a report made, in 1 case the suspect was homeless/had no known address, and in 1 case only 1 officer was able to respond to talk to the victim.
30 Case 2019 – 3.
31 Case 2020 – 1.
Follow-up investigations did not significantly improve efforts to locate the suspect.

In the 34 GOA cases with no attempt to locate the suspect, plus the 14 GOA cases where police did attempt to locate the suspect (48 total):

- An investigator was assigned 35% of the time (17 cases out of the 48), leaving 65% of the cases (31 cases) with no follow-up investigation.
- In these 17 cases, the investigator attempted or did locate the suspect only 23% of the time (4 cases out of the 17), leaving 13 with no attempt by the investigator to locate or contact the suspect.

Most survivors related multiple experiences of officers not pursuing GOA abusers.

Repeated OFP violations, property damage and an assault. “There was an OFP he kept violating. He slashed my tires. He threatened me. He kept violating but police wouldn’t do anything. When he realized he was getting away with it, he started in on my mother. He broke her windows. Police still wouldn’t do anything. They said, ‘How can you tell it was him?’ even though he was caught on camera. Then in 2019 he knocked her into a car, knocking her unconscious. She had a concussion and experienced post-concussive symptoms for a year afterward. He got away with it because he told police she pointed her finger at him in a threatening manner. I feel I’ve called hundreds of times. He’d run and come back. I feel police didn’t care because he was my husband.”

Repeated OFP violations, home break-ins, theft, property damage, and drive-by shootings. “This began in 2016. I put an OFP on him. A bad fight resulted that put me in the hospital. He broke in and locked me out of my own house. Another time, he broke in and stole $3,000 from me. Another time, he broke out the door frame to unlock the chain. Another time, he broke in and pulled a gun on the kids in a bedroom. Police did nothing. I called his probation officer and the probation officer said, ‘Yes, I am aware, but the prosecutor has decided not to charge.’ Fast forward to 2020. He is abusing alcohol, and disrespectful and physical. I called police but he left. I then went to the precinct. There’s been so many times he’s broken in. He’s popped tires on 4 different vehicles. Every time, I’ve told officers ‘He’s at [redacted] Bar every night.’ But there’s been no follow-up – no investigation.”

[This same survivor then described another domestic violence incident the week before Thanksgiving in 2021.] “A bullet came through my window. [Later that week] he was driving around me and tried to hit me. The next day I picked up a meal for Thanksgiving. At home there was a jackhammer noise – gunshots. I told the kids to get down. It shattered my daughter’s window and went through walls. Later I found bullets in my bedroom window and the living room window. The 3rd time was November 30th. A big shot, like a shotgun, just as my son came in. There was glass in his hair. [Later in the conversation, this survivor added that her son turned and looked and saw the suspect]. I was on the phone with someone who said, ‘This is 2nd degree assault.’ The on-scene officer agreed but said ballistics wouldn’t come. He said an
investigator would be assigned. I got a letter, dated December 16, saying an investigator still hadn’t been assigned because they were short-staffed and would be ‘information only’ for now if there was no contact with the suspect. The letter also said, ‘If you are still interested in pursuing this matter, please contact us in 10 days or the case will be closed.’

Other system partners who bear some responsibility or oversight over the suspect also did not attempt to locate.

Several survivors also gave examples of other system partners who had some responsibility or oversight over the suspect but also did not attempt to locate or contact the GOA abuser:

- Cooperating with patrol officers and investigators but then being told the case wasn’t going to be charged by a prosecutor.
- Not being able to get different precincts or jurisdictions to communicate with one another when crimes happened in different places, or the GOA perpetrator is roaming around.
- Calling the suspect’s probation officer only to be told nothing could be done:
  - “I even got a copy of the officer’s dash cam and showed it to the probation officer – and still nothing.”
  - “I had to call police again after he trespassed, and they wouldn’t do anything. I called their sergeant and was told to get a protection order. But if they aren’t going to enforce that, that just makes it worse. The officers even acknowledged my frustration but still didn’t do anything. I even called his probation officer – the probation officer wouldn’t do anything.”
  - “When I came out to see who it was, he put me in a headlock and stole my phone. I called his probation officer, who said ‘I’ve got 5 reports already.’ The city attorney won’t do anything. I’ve called the prosecutor a number of times. I’ve called his probation officer. Meanwhile, I am now in my 8th hotel.”
  - “He broke in and pulled a gun on the kids in a bedroom. Police did nothing. I called his probation officer who said, ‘Yes, I am aware, but the city attorney has decided not to charge.’”
  - “He has 3 warrants against him. One for OFP violation, one for narcotics and violation of probation, and one for running from police. I called his new probation officer who said, “Call police. Make another police report.” I called the probation officer again when he was out front in my yard and the PO said, “That’s not what I do.”

There is a probation officer stationed at the Domestic Abuse Service Center who reviews the following cases to see if any of the suspects are on probation:

- Domestic violence where the suspect was gone upon police arrival (GOA)
- Felony domestic violence where the suspect is in custody
- Orders for protection
It is then up to the suspect’s supervising probation officer whether any probation action will be taken against the suspect. One of the probation officers interviewed during this assessment, aware that GRW had conducted focus groups with survivors, noted that some survivors were describing offenses that took place between 2018 and 2020; this probation officer thought that patrol and investigator follow-up on felony GOAs had improved since then but acknowledged that misdemeanor GOAs were still an issue.

Advocates and criminal justice partners confirmed the high level of frustration with the handling of GOA cases.

A local victim advocate said that advocates have access to all DV cases “but focus on GOAs because the volume is so high.” The advocate went on to say victims mention GOAs “all the time” as well as things officers have said to victims in GOA cases, such as “This is not our priority,” or “You need to move” – instead of attempting to hold the abuser accountable.

Another advocate observed that, “There are a lot of GOA cases, and then nothing happens with them.” This was the case in almost all police reports of GOA suspects reviewed during this assessment (both felonies and misdemeanors October 2018 – October 2020). Only 3 were convicted of a crime from the GOA incident. See the GOA chart in the appendices.

A third advocate explained that when suspects are in custody, those cases receive the resources. This was confirmed by several interviewees who are prosecutorial staff or in positions of law enforcement supervision or leadership: “Regarding resources . . . in GOA cases, where the defendant is not in custody, the priority is down.”

An MPD member acknowledged everyone’s frustration with GOAs in DV cases, especially because unlike crimes committed by strangers, “We know who the suspect is.”

**How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?**

Research shows that DV suspects in GOA cases pose a higher lethality risk to victims.

A DV suspect who is GOA is one of the 20 indicators of dangerousness on the oldest, periodically updated, and widely used instrument to help DV survivors assess their risk of homicide.  

32 “Has he avoided being arrested for domestic violence?” is Question 7 on the Danger Assessment developed by Jacquelyn C. Campbell, PhD, RN, FAAN, in 1986 with consultation and content validity support from battered women, shelter workers, law enforcement officials, and other clinical experts on battering. Most recently updated in 2019, it is a clinical and research instrument designed to help battered women assess their danger of homicide. For more information, see the Danger Assessment website maintained by Johns Hopkins School of Nursing at http://www.dangerassessment.org/
one of the risk factors identified in Hennepin County DV homicide cases reviewed by the Minnesota Fourth Judicial District Domestic Fatality Review Team, of which MPD is a partner. In the 4 most recent team reports from the Fatality Review team, they reviewed a total of 14 domestic homicides. In 9 of these cases, the “perpetrator had previously avoided arrest for domestic violence.”

Concern about GOA DV suspects as a safety issue in Minneapolis was expressed 20 years ago in the earlier institutional assessments. Battered Women’s Justice Project (BWJP) reviewed 79 randomly selected MPD reports from patrol officers responding to DV calls in the summer of 1998. 48 were GOAs, and in only 4 instances did officers document attempting to locate the suspect. In that report, the authors observed that “GOAs constitute a large percentage of the domestic violence-related calls, and as a matter of process, receive inconsistent follow-up;” and that MPD “should institute a stronger response to misdemeanor domestic assault GOAs. The current practice of not regularly pursuing GOAs may result in further endangering victims.”

Tragically, this risk factor was present in a recent case. In July 2022, a man appeared in front of his ex-girlfriend while she was walking her dog in south Minneapolis. He told her he was going to take the only thing that loved her away from her, and then shot and killed her dog. He fled the scene before police arrived and remained at large until 4 days later when he shot his current girlfriend to death in Brooklyn Center.

Research shows DV suspects in GOA cases have a higher risk of reoffending.

Additionally, previous research has shown that offenders who leave the scene are more likely to have lengthy criminal histories, have active restraining orders, and by examination of subsequent criminal activity pose a far greater long-term threat to victims. An offender who leaves the scene should be viewed as a strong indicator of future violence and thus the need for arrest. Further, one study reported that, on average, their victims were far more fearful than those whose offenders remained. In another study, a 1-year follow-up of offenders found that those who left the scene had twice the number of past criminal charges and twice the recidivism rate as those present when police arrived. They also were far less likely to be first-time offenders or have a limited criminal history. This was the case in many of the GOA reports in this assessment. In 43% of them, the suspect had 3 or more criminal convictions prior to the GOA incident. See the GOA chart in the appendices.

Therefore, a practice to primarily arrest those who stay versus those who flee often perversely benefits more dangerous offenders.\textsuperscript{36} Global Rights for Women (GRW) staff reviewing police reports were struck by seeing, for instance, misdemeanor level DVs where a suspect stayed on-scene, was arrested, and was convicted; and seeing felony level DVs where a suspect was GOA and never held accountable. For example:

- Victim and suspect are married and live together. Suspect got mad at victim because he believed she was cheating on him. He hit her in the face and pushed her. Victim was scared of her husband and pressed the alarm on their home security system. Police arrived in 12 minutes. Suspect still on scene and was arrested for domestic assault. No investigation or interview of suspect documented. No risk information - victim refused to fill out a DV supplement. Suspect had no prior record. He was convicted of disorderly conduct 4 weeks later.\textsuperscript{37}

VERSUS

- Victim and suspect dating and do not live together. Victim arrived late at suspect’s residence. Irate about her being late, he met her outside and got in her car. He broke the wiper control off the steering column and began punching her head. He made her go inside, then beat her several more times through the night, saying “You might not live.” He used his fists and kicked her. At one point, he pushed her against a wall and choked her until she “lost air” and felt pressure in her head. Suspect’s adult son was in the residence in another room. Suspect went to work at 6 a.m., saying if she left, he’d beat and kill her. He took her car keys. Victim began vomiting after he left. She had spare keys, left suspect’s apartment at 7 a.m., and called police from a neighbor’s.

Police arrived in 12 minutes. She told them she called 911 the previous night, while suspect was with her in her car, but suspect grabbed her phone and said “Bitch, you called 911” and started slapping her. Officers found the 911 call and could hear suspect cursing and victim crying. Officers went to his apartment and found his vehicle, but no one would let them through the security door. Victim filled out DV supplement - was afraid suspect would seriously hurt or kill her. Patrol officer’s report indicates Domestic Assault-Strangulation as recommended charge. Suspect had 6 criminal convictions before this incident, with a drug case pending during this incident. Investigator followed up with victim 2 weeks after incident and found she’d sought medical attention and had a broken nose and a concussion. Investigator obtained records and photos taken by medical provider. Seven (7) weeks after incident, investigator made first attempt to call suspect and left message on his voice mail. The next day, victim called investigator and said she


\textsuperscript{37} Case 2019 - 26
was moving out of state and did not want to say where. County attorney then declined case. No documentation whether investigator asked victim if she’d been threatened or intimidated, or if contacted an advocate.38

The escalating danger posed by the GOA abuser and the continual systemic accountability issues articulated above are borne out by survivor experiences.

• “He came back.” In 5 of the police reports39 when the suspect was GOA, the suspect returned to the scene after police left. In 2 of these 5 cases, the suspect committed additional crimes, in one instance vandalizing the victim’s car and in another setting a fire in the victim’s bedroom.

• “He followed me.” A survivor described the second time police were called on her abuser, “He hid in my room. When I got home, I found it trashed. He stole my phone. Someone else called police. He strangled me and I got away . . . I called my mom, who came over and called police. Police took a while to get here – they heard he wasn’t there. It took 40 minutes for them to get there. They took a report and gave me a blue card. They took it seriously; I think because they could see marks. They recommended an OFP, which I did get. I wish they would have taken me to the hospital – it would’ve helped to have documentation. My mom drove me back to her house. My abuser followed us for 45 minutes. We pulled into another police station. All he had to do was wait it out because police can’t stay.”

• “He got worse.” In 2 of the survivor stories set forth earlier which described multiple experiences with the abuser being GOA, one can see the abuser’s conduct escalating in danger to the victim. In the first instance the suspect’s actions went from violating the no contact condition of an OFP, to slashing the victim’s tires, to threatening the victim, to breaking the victim’s mother’s windows, and finally to assaulting the victim’s mother. In the second instance, the victim applied for an OFP against her abuser after he assaulted her. Over a period of 5 years, he broke into her residence repeatedly, on one occasion stealing money, and on another occasion pointing a gun at her children. He slashed the victim’s tires 4 times. Most recently, she believes him responsible for 3 drive-by shootings that took place over 2 weeks, the last one witnessed by her son and nearly striking him in the head.

• “He tries to force me to have sex.” A survivor whose abuser followed her to Minneapolis from another state, and who subsequently called MPD multiple times, said her abuser has become familiar with her neighborhood. “He has nothing going for himself but feels entitled to use me . . . cusses at me . . . tries to force me to

38 Case 2019 – 25
have sex. . . He hangs around downtown getting high. He drinks and smokes crack. He begs for money and prostitutes himself. [She started to cry.] I’ve been infected by him. I’m HIV positive. It’s a full-time job doing all this stuff, so I don’t like to be made to feel I’ve done something wrong. I should have the right to call police.”

Victims feel they must defend themselves or their families, heightening lethality risk for themselves and their abusers.

• One survivor recalled how she’d been abused since her first relationship at 14, and now by her children’s father. She left him in 2018, but he wouldn’t leave her alone, so she started calling police in 2019. She said police were helpful but could never catch him, so: “I started fighting back. When I met him, I was a drug dealer. So was he. I got pregnant and wanted to leave all that. He punched me. I felt super-human. I felt he was going to do something worse if I didn’t. I turned around and beat the shit out of him. . . He didn’t hit me for a long time after that. 6 or 7 months later, he started belittling me. I wanted him to leave. He went outside . . . I was going to lock the door. He kicked it in and grabbed a baseball bat and smacked me in the teeth and broke them. Then he tried to take the baby. I convinced him to set her down. I got behind him and choked him out. That was the last time he ever looked sideways at me. But then he was shitty to my family – terrorizing them. It got to the point I sent my kids upstairs and got my baseball bat and said, ‘Let’s get it on.’”

• In discussing the extent to which victims must figure things out for themselves, one survivor said “Like life and death – it ain’t going to be me. You end up getting worse than your abuser in some ways because you’re always on defense, always fighting him, always sleeping with a knife under the pillow. He strangled me once so that I have a cervical spine injury. So, I have to think about defending myself all the time.”

• The survivor who moved to Minneapolis to get away from her abuser, only to have him follow her, has called MPD multiple times and said “I am no longer afraid of him. I’m afraid of what I’ll do to him. I’m so tired of being harassed. My door is off its hinges, holes are punched in the walls, and my ceiling fan is broken. One time he pushed in a window, cutting himself, and there was blood all over my house – the police didn’t get him that time, either. The time I videoed him is the only time the officer understood. He was fighting with officers. They arrested him and took him to jail but he got out right away. I got a letter in December 2021 that he pled guilty a month before. No one told me. I wanted to make sure he would be on meds and go to rehab.”

When GOA suspects remain at large, victims are fearful that calling police will only endanger them further; if suspects remain at large repeatedly, victims may give up entirely.
• A survivor recalled the horrific death of her neighbor and its impact on her own feelings about calling police: “My first experience with Minneapolis police was when my neighbor was killed in an arson after police didn’t do anything when he threatened her. He came back and burned this woman in her bed. After that, I was too scared to call police on my husband. He was physically abusive to the kids, and sexually abusive to me. My youngest daughter is a child of rape.”

• The survivor whose abuser’s conduct escalated after multiple GOAs to the point he assaulted her mother (described earlier) said “I gave up. I stopped calling police. I gave in and tried doing what he wanted. His behavior only stopped because he was killed in 2020 by a guy at the motorcycle club. Before then he even vandalized my son’s grave – a 6-year-old. He drilled his face out. I called his probation officer . . . We got divorced and he was still bothering me. He drilled my son’s gravestone just to haunt me. He drilled out his eyes, ears, and chest.”

Almost everyone interviewed mentioned GOAs as a longstanding, frustrating issue. Like the survivors, many observed that “The word is out that nothing will happen if you’re gone before police get there.” This, too, was something that the BWJP report authors warned of over 20 years ago: “Repeat offenders may have learned to avoid criminal accountability by fleeing the scene.”

How is this gap produced? What contributes to it?

Current unwritten policy or practices appear to discourage pursuit of GOA suspects.

Our interviews uncovered indications of an unwritten policy that officers are no longer to search for or attempt to arrest GOA suspects, which seems to have evolved since the murder of George Floyd in 2020. Several survivors reported being told by officers responding to their 911 calls that: “Officers can’t go get him,” “We can’t do that anymore,” and “We have to stay hands off.”

Similar comments were captured in a video posted online by a resident of a Minneapolis neighborhood in 2021. A police officer explains to a citizen why officers cannot approach someone sitting in a car in the neighborhood, who had been called into 911 as selling drugs.


The officer states, “Our hands are tied by the city council,” and “We’re hands off.” He goes on to say officers are not doing their jobs fully. The caller asks the officer who is going to take care of it, and can citizens take care of it. The officer responds, “No, you can’t – they just get away with it.” And “The criminals have way more freedoms now.” The video ends with the officer saying in situations like this, there is nothing he can do – his hands are tied. An important note here is not just what the officer says, but also how he says it. He is not angry or brusque, but earnest and apologetic. The video is 3 to 4 minutes; the person who apparently called 911 mentions having dealt “with this for an hour and a half.”

Current unwritten policy appears to discourage use of investigative resources in misdemeanor cases, which can involve serious assaults and repeat offenders.

Additionally, there appears to be an unwritten policy or practice not to utilize investigative resources in misdemeanor cases. Individuals who work in the criminal justice system commented on this during their interviews: “Minneapolis police have a history of not investigating misdemeanor cases. It’s always been that way ever since I can remember.” Cases where the DV suspect is GOA will often fall in that category. Interviewing a suspect who was GOA during the patrol response would presumably be one of the tasks of a follow-up investigator – if an investigator is assigned. Therefore, in GOA misdemeanor cases, there is a Catch 22: more investigation is needed before an arrest or prosecution can result, but investigative resources aren’t assigned in misdemeanor cases.

The second of BWJP’s institutional assessments conducted in 2001 describes a related unwritten policy or practice of patrol officers not interviewing suspects when responding to DV calls: “Interviews with patrol officers and investigators revealed divergent opinions about this practice. Patrol officers stated that interviewing the suspect was the job of the investigator, and that they didn’t get paid enough to be investigators. Investigators stated that standard practices for first responders included documenting questions asked of the suspect. Street officers do interview suspects when making arrests for other misdemeanor crimes.”

When GOA calls are dispatched as “Domestic Abuse Report Only,” further action on the case is less likely.

This is a typical designation for a 911 call about something that has occurred in the past, and the caller is not reporting ongoing or very recent physical violence, etc. A supervisor pointed out that how an officer responds is influenced by the dispatch designation. When calls are dispatched to officers as “Domestic Abuse Report Only – 1 Officer Response,” the only action the officer anticipates is simply to make a report, although the officer can upgrade the call to a higher priority if appropriate upon arrival on-scene.

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In the 100 police reports reviewed, 15 of the 21 cases dispatched as “Domestic Abuse Report Only – 1 Officer Response” were GOA cases. Though police write a report, these cases are less likely to result in further investigation or prosecution because the incident is not further investigated and thus not linked to the pattern of repeat violence by most GOA abusers.

Current policy does not explicitly direct officers’ actions in GOA cases.

Finally, the current MPD policy is not explicit about attempting to locate GOA suspects. As this assessment and previous reports demonstrate, GOAs are a longstanding issue.

Only 3 suspects in the 55 GOA cases were convicted in both felony and misdemeanor DV cases.

In police reports of GOA suspects reviewed during this assessment (both felonies and misdemeanors, October 2018 – October 2020), only 3 were convicted of a crime from the GOA incident. See the GOA chart in the appendices.

The Police Conduct Oversight Commission report indicated that in 2006, an MPD investigator was dedicated to GOAs. This investigator was placed at DASC to investigate felony level cases to be submitted to the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office. In 2014, a GOA Response Team was created to improve the response of the Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office and MPD to DV cases where the suspect has fled prior to being arrested. The team consisted of a specially assigned police investigator to focus only on misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor GOA cases, advocates to provide increased support for victims, and a centralized prosecutor to review and charge all of these cases. Following the creation of the team, the City Attorney’s Office was able to increase the charging rate for GOA cases by 400% while simultaneously decreasing the time from case review to resolution by over 36%.

This process is still in place, so if lack of investigative and prosecutorial resources is the problem, it will be important to include these resources as MPD rebuilds and adds staff.

A suspect is more likely to be GOA if there is a delay in officers’ response to the scene and MPD objectives for ideal response times are not being met in many cases.

Current MPD response times in DV calls are impacted by the priority classification of the call when assigned to a responding officer, and the availability of responding personnel resources or lack thereof. Additionally, not all officers are assigned 911 calls. According to a DV

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Workgroup member, as of 2022, roughly a third of patrol – approximately 200 officers – take 911 calls, and each of the 5 precincts can have as many as 200 calls a day.\textsuperscript{44}

MPD policy\textsuperscript{45} states:

- Calls classified as Priority 0 include those situations where a known crisis exists that threatens the life of an individual. This is the highest possible priority, and the fastest possible response is desired. The objective is to have squads enroute to the call within 30 seconds of receipt by the dispatcher.
- Calls classified as Priority 1 include situations where an imminent threat to personal safety, or the loss or damage to property exists. Conditions at the scene of the call are unstable. The objective is to have a squad enroute to a priority 1 event within 70 seconds of receipt by the dispatcher.
- Calls classified as Priority 2 include situations where no immediate threat of harm exists at the scene of the call. A timely police response is still desirable. The objective is to have priority 2 calls assigned at the earliest opportunity or within 45 minutes of receipt by the dispatcher. Pending priority 2 calls are assigned out of sector to an available precinct squad after 10 minutes or if known that sector squads will be unavailable indefinitely. Priority 2 calls are assigned up to the last 15 minutes of shift. If after 30 minutes the call remains in MECC\textsuperscript{46} due to a lack of recommended unit availability, the dispatcher may notify the affected precinct shift supervisor to review the pending priority 2 calls and recommend a course of action.
- Calls classified Priority 3 include situations where conditions are stable at the scene of the call. MECC may hold priority 3 calls for the squad in whose district the call is occurring for up to an hour. After an hour the situation should be reassessed by MECC and the precinct field supervisor, if necessary, to determine if the call should be reassigned to a squad outside the district. Priority 3 calls may be assigned up to the last 15 minutes of shift.
- Calls classified Priority 9 include administrative or service assignments. Squads on service assignment may be reassigned to higher priority event.

\textit{Assigned priority of DV calls.} During our analysis of the 100 police reports and the 32 randomly selected CAD-entry only records, we documented call priority classification and response times (time from call pick-up to officer arrival at the scene and time from call assignment to officer arrival).

\textsuperscript{44} “There were 220 calls for service logged by dispatch in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Precinct yesterday,” Minneapolis Police Facebook page, March 30, 2023.
\textsuperscript{46} Minneapolis Emergency Communications Center (911)
Calls per year by priority:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Priority 1 calls</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority 2 calls</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Priority Calls (3, 4, 9, not documented)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Response time – Priority 1 Calls:_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Call pick-up to officer arrival</th>
<th>Call assignment to officer arrival</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 2 min.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – 10 min.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – 30 min.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 – 45 min.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 – 60 min.</td>
<td>4 (75 – 97 minutes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 60 min.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Calls</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
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</table>

10% of the 70 Priority 1 DV calls took longer than 30 minutes from call pick-up to officer arrival. On the other hand, once those same calls were assigned to an officer, in no instance was the response more than 30 minutes. However, the times are far from the policy’s ideal of 70 seconds.

For any Priority 1 response to take longer than 60 minutes is dangerous for victims. In the 4 responses over-60 minutes, 2 appeared to involve changes in the initial circumstances of the call, which changed the priority classification. In the other 2 calls, callers were upset at the delay. One called back 6 times while his ex-partner was breaking his windows, asking when the officer would arrive. The second call involved multiple callers making multiple calls about a woman dragged downstairs and locked outside on a January night.
Response Time – Priority 2 calls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Call pick-up to officer arrival</th>
<th>Call assignment to officer arrival</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 2 min.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – 10 min.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – 30 min.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 – 45 min.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 – 60 min.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 60 min.</td>
<td>11 (62 – 134 minutes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Calls</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36% of the Priority 2 DV calls took longer than 30 minutes from call pick-up to officer arrival. Once assigned to an officer, in only 1 instance was the response more than 30 minutes. However, these responses don’t meet MPD’s goal to assign Priority 2 calls within 45 minutes of receipt by the dispatcher.

Response Time – Lower priority calls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Call pick-up to officer arrival</th>
<th>Call assignment to officer arrival</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 – 10 min.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – 30 min.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 – 45 min.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 – 60 min.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 60 min.</td>
<td>3 (72 min. – 4 hrs. 28 min.)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26% of calls given a lower priority classification (situations where conditions are stable, administrative in nature, or service calls) took longer than 30 minutes from call pick up to officer arrival. Once assigned to an officer, in no instance was the response more than 30 minutes, which is well within MPD’s policy allowing the dispatcher to hold these lower priority calls for up to an hour if needed to wait for an available officer. One of the responses over-60 minutes took 4 hours and 28 minutes, which is troubling even if a lower priority call. Additionally, the call description indicates that the priority may have been misclassified lower than it should have been. An elderly woman called for her elderly neighbor who said her
husband was abusing her and trying to set her hair on fire with a cigarette lighter. The caller was scared and waiting for police in the apartment building hallway. Another call also seemed misclassified – a woman who called 911 back twice during a 104-minute wait for an estimate of the officer’s arrival, as she wanted someone removed from her residence against whom there was a DANCO.

Survivors and victim advocates with more recent experiences (2021 and 2022) described long waits for officers of 1 ½ to several hours.

Before the murder of George Floyd, MPD was significantly understaffed. Afterward, many police officers left or retired, and the understaffing is now severe – the department is short 378 officers at the writing of this report. This impacts whether there are enough officers available to respond to calls, or whether available officers have enough time to search for GOA suspects. For example, two survivors who participated in listening sessions or interviews were told by responding officers “We don’t have enough staff” to look for a GOA suspect.

A member of the police department noted the department is short-staffed not only in patrol but also in investigations, and GOAs “sit and wait.” Command staff could pull an investigator from another unit, but then the other unit would be short. Gun violence (shootings, person with a gun calls, armed carjackings, gunshot victims) has increased exponentially and investigators previously assigned to domestic violence had to be pulled away: “Best investigative practice in homicide cases is four to six homicide cases per two-person team. At the end of 2021 at MPD, there were 20 homicide cases per two-person team. Officers and other staff are stressed, to the point some have gone to supervisors in tears. And you can’t hand this to someone else. The suburbs are in the same boat. The feds can help somewhat but aren’t going to take domestic violence cases.” This police department member wished police could investigate every DV case; but doesn’t know that investigating every case could happen, as it will take several years for MPD to get back to sufficient staffing levels.

“Whose job is it to catch the bad guys?” If the suspect is gone when police arrive, is it anyone’s job to look for him? If not, whose job is it to investigate the case so that a prosecutor can hold the offender accountable? If a case is assigned to investigation, is it anyone’s job to try to locate or contact the GOA suspect? What if he’s on probation? If there aren’t enough resources to look for the suspect in all cases, what about suspects who commit a crime of domestic abuse against a victim and then flee before police arrive – over and over and over again?

GRW staff, while reviewing police reports
Current Good Practices We Support and Encourage

Before addressing improvements, we want to acknowledge good practices of officers that support victim safety and offender accountability:

Callbacks
MPD’s Domestic Abuse Incident Response Protocol directs officers to tell victims to call back if the GOA suspect returns within the next 72 hours. There were several cases where victims followed that instruction when the suspect returned, and the suspect was then arrested.

Back-up from non-assigned officers
In one of the police reports, officers who were not the responding officers to a DV call, overheard the call, the description of the GOA suspect, and direction of travel; and took the initiative: "We found out from another squad this was likely going to be a domestic abuse, so we began looking for the suspect." They quickly found him and arrested him.47

Phone geo-location services
In several cases, the responding officer requested a “ping” of the GOA suspect’s phone, which revealed the suspect’s direction of travel and eventual location.

KOPS alert
In one case48 the officer requested a KOPS alert49 on a man and his vehicle after he assaulted his girlfriend and her 5-year-old daughter one day, then returned the next day and kicked their door in. The alert, combined with location data on the man’s phone, enabled a neighboring jurisdiction to quickly find and arrest him.

Documenting the dispatch in the report
In many cases, officers documented details of the 911 dispatch at the beginning of their reports of GOA cases: “Victim was beat up,” “He has been physical in the past,” “Caller’s boyfriend punched her and threatened to kill her,” “Caller heard a gun being cocked and is afraid he’ll shoot up the house,” “911 overhead the male threatening to hit the female,” and “The male has a brick and hit her in the face with it.” Including 911’s description of the

47 Case 2020-15
48 Case 2018-6
49 Minnesota Department of Public Safety's "alert file" called KOPS (Keeping Our Police Safe) enhances officer safety by alerting officers of unsafe situations when encountering a vehicle or person involved in a recent incident by disseminating safety information statewide. There are 3 KOPS alert options: (1) Officer Safety, (2) Safety to Individual (other than officer), i.e., suicidal person, and (3) Informational. Alerts may be flagged to indicate when weapons may be involved. All KOPS file information is automatically purged from the system after 72 hours except in 12-hour domestic abuse pick up and hold cases. The Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual, "KOPS (Keeping Our Police Safe)," Volume 7, Field Operations. https://www.minneapolismn.gov/media-www-content-assets/documents/MPD-Policy-and-Procedure-Manual.pdf
violence and who perpetrated it helps support probable cause to arrest the suspect if other officers should encounter the GOA suspect within the next 72 hours.

**DV specialized or trained investigators**

The value of investigative specialization or DV training is demonstrated by the quality of investigators’ follow up with GOA suspects. In the police reports reviewed, those assigned to follow-up investigation contained the investigator’s notes, some of which indicated no attempt to locate or contact the suspect - even though most times location and phone information was documented - and instead concentrated on contacting the victim again and expressing impatience if she didn’t call back right away. Other investigators, clearly trained and experienced in investigating DV cases:

- Attempted to locate and contact the suspect - for example, by contacting his probation officer or finding out where he works.
- If able to contact the suspect, evinced skill at getting the suspect to talk to them, nailing down his version of events, as well as inquiring if he had any injuries, etc.
- When contacting the victim, inquired about safety and any fears she had, follow-up injury or medical information, and anything additional about the incident that may not have been reflected in the initial police report.
- Made attempts to collect corroborating information, such as security video near where the violence took place.

Additionally, advocates mentioned several times that the relationships forged with specialized DV investigators were extremely helpful in quickly addressing issues in particular cases. These investigators were also quite willing to seek the expertise of advocates about working with survivors.
**Recommendations: How do we close the gap? What will help address it?**

MPD should revise existing DV policy to add more explicit language on responding to GOAs - such as the following policies developed in the *Blueprint for Safety* implemented in St. Paul, MN.  

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**Model Policy for Patrol Officers on Gone on Arrival Cases**

Domestic violence incidents where the suspect leaves the scene before police arrive often involve dangerous suspects hoping to evade consequences for their actions.

- When an officer makes a determination that probable cause exists for an arrest, but the suspect is not present, the officer should search for the suspect. Officers should obtain the following information:
  - Suspect’s name, date of birth, and physical description, including clothing
  - Suspect’s means and direction of travel
  - Description of the suspect’s vehicle if applicable
  - Where the suspect might have gone
  - Where the suspect stays when not with the victim
  - Whether the suspect has ever interfered with the victim’s attempts to seek help

- Officers shall take the following action:
  - Search for the suspect on the premises.
  - Search for the suspect in the immediate area and where suspect might have fled.
  - Issue a pick-up and hold.
  - Encourage the victim to call 911 if suspect returns.
  - As with all other domestic abuse calls, provide information to the victim about restraining orders, advocacy services, and arrange for transport to a shelter or medical facility if needed.

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Model Policy for Investigators on Gone on Arrival Cases

In those cases in which the suspect was not arrested on scene, prosecutors find it helpful to refer the case to the investigator to attempt to interview the suspect in order to commit the suspect to a story or a defense.

Victim safety must be taken into account prior to doing so. Potential danger factors to consider include: (1) a suspect unaware that police were called, (2) a suspect who is gang-affiliated, (3) a victim unaware of the possibility the suspect could be interviewed days or weeks after the crime, and (4) a suspect who has made prior threats or acts of suicide, homicide or taking the children.

When a decision is made to interview a suspect, inform the victim that the suspect may be interviewed within the next two weeks or so. If the suspect has a violent history, conduct the interview as soon as possible. Conduct the interview in person, for victim safety as well as to assess the suspect’s reactions and truthfulness.

Regardless of whether the offender in or out of custody (GOA), cases with one or more of the following factors will receive the highest priority in case assignment:

- An imminent time deadline before which the suspect must be charged or released
- Significant injury or impairment
- Strangulation or stalking behavior has been alleged
- A victim’s responses to risk questions, including whether the suspect has avoided arrest in the past, indicates significant risk of harm
- A victim expresses fear of imminent bodily harm

Cases with one or more of the following factors will receive secondary priority in case assignment:

- Minor injury or injury, except where the prosecutor requested investigation
- No indication of ongoing abuse or victim intimidation by the suspect

No follow-up investigation will be assigned on cases involving:

- Misdemeanors where the initial investigation is complete
- Cases without probable cause
The new GOA policy should include supervision strategies that ensure compliance.

The success of a coordinated DV response hinges largely on what happens in the first hour of each case. The patrol officer’s role in laying a foundation for all subsequent interventions cannot be over-emphasized. Patrol supervisors, in turn, relay the department’s priorities and expectations, thereby reinforcing the interagency response and the patrol officer’s key role. This is accomplished by supervisors periodically attending DV calls at the scene and reviewing reports daily to maintain the department’s standards and reinforce public safety and offender and systemic accountability goals.51

Additionally, we recommend supervisors provide an opportunity for officers to give feedback on new policy after its implementation. Patrol officers are frequently asked to implement new policy updates without much explanation and without additional time or staff being allowed. This kind of “just do it” dynamic often dooms new policy to a failed implementation. Once officers have some time to apply the new policy, they should be asked for their feedback on what’s working and what isn’t.

**Recommended Policy Elements to Include in the Supervision of Patrol**

Once the policy on the patrol response to GOAs is adopted, we recommend supervisors:

- Ensure that patrol officers receive and are introduced to the policy.
- Monitor responding officers on-scene activities and compliance with policy by periodically appearing on the scene of calls where the suspect is GOA and assessing the patrol response.
- Respond to officer questions about actions and decisions in GOA cases.
- Respond to victim or victim advocate questions about actions and decisions in GOA cases.
- Conduct daily and ongoing reviews of patrol officer reports in which the suspect was GOA.
- Periodically review a sample of reports submitted by officers in cases where the suspect was GOA to review compliance with policy and protocol.

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Officers should receive experiential training on the new GOA policy.

Once supervision of new policy and protocol is in place, MPD should introduce it to patrol officers through experiential training, using actual 911 calls and dispatches, as well as victim statements, so that officers can apply the new policy with real fact situations. We also suggest sharing information from this report on why GOAs are a safety problem.

Survivors participating in listening sessions or individual interviews suggested including victim experience as much as possible in training. All hoped that stories they shared could be used to educate or train officers. Several were willing to participate in training efforts. Directors and supervisors at several community-based advocacy programs are interested in brainstorming these sorts of activities with law enforcement leaders and trainers.

Additionally, trainers could incorporate excerpts from MPD police reports of good responses to DV calls where the suspect is GOA. GRW staff identified some of these in the reports reviewed that they could provide. This is another way for officers to see good application of policy to real fact situations and receive positive feedback on their work. Several officers surveyed about their DV in-service52 stated they wished for more feedback on whether they were doing a good job in DV cases.

More specialized DV investigator positions would improve prosecution of GOA cases.

More investigator positions in which the individuals are specialized and trained in DV would provide role clarity to practitioners, support the work of patrol officers, and investigate cases more quickly with the result of prioritizing DV cases for victims.

MPD could use this report to support requests to city government for more officers, and to support grant applications that would help fund additional staff and training. The DV Workgroup is willing to help or support in whatever way they can.

52 According to a person involved in this training who was interviewed for this project, the last time this DV in-service was provided was 2018. 73 officers responded to the survey.
Gap: If abusers who violated no-contact orders weren’t on-scene when victims made such complaints to police, there often was no follow-up action, emboldening abusers to continue violating orders.

Survivors who participated in one particular focus group emphatically asked facilitators to tell police and prosecutors, “If you’re not going to do anything, stop telling us to get an OFP!”

In the police reports, as well as in the survivor stories relayed during focus groups and interviews, many abusers who violated no-contact conditions of court orders were then also GOA after doing so. In fact, there were several survivor stories in the previous section on GOAs that described that very experience. There was some consideration while writing this report of combining these two sections. However, when suspects in court order violation cases weren’t pursued, there were often court order-related reasons given; and survivors often had different comments about these cases when participating in focus groups or interviews. Therefore, this section remains separate, but it will be important for readers to read this section with the previous section on GOAs in mind.

Relevant Policy

The MPD has adopted the following protocol\textsuperscript{53} for patrol officers responding to adult arrest and suspect cases for the following offenses:

- Felony 1st, 2\textsuperscript{nd}, and 3\textsuperscript{rd} degree assaults if the parties are family or household members.
- Felony domestic assault by strangulation.
- Felony terroristic threats if the parties are family or household members.
- Misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony domestic assault.
- Misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony violations of an Order for Protection (OFP) or a Domestic Abuse No Contact Order (DANCO).
- Misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony violation of a harassment or restraining order, if parties listed are family or household members.
- Gross misdemeanor or felony stalking if the parties are family or household members.

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As part of this protocol, patrol officers shall complete the following preliminary investigative tasks when responding to any calls described above:

- Check for existence of an OFP, harassment/restraining order, or DANCO on every domestic-related 911 call.
- Ask victim to complete domestic violence victim’s supplement.\(^{54}\)
- Take photographs. Examples of things to photograph include but are not limited to: the arrestee; victim; injuries; scene, including any damaged property; and the arrestee in an OFP or DANCO case at a prohibited address.
- Collect any physical evidence and property inventory it.
- Obtain contact information from witnesses to the incident including name, address, and phone number. Question witnesses regarding the incident.
- If suspect is gone on arrival, remind victim to call police if suspect returns within 72 hours of the incident.
- If the case is misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor level, check the Probable Cause Enhanced Felony list.\(^{55}\) Follow the instructions pertaining to the arrested party or suspect if they are on the list and add the additional charge listed.

An OFP that has not been served cannot be enforced. Minnesota Statute section 518B.01 Subd. 8a allows an officer to effect instant service of the order upon the respondent through the Order for Protection Short Form Notification.\(^{56}\)

Regarding DANCO’s, if an officer determines an individual is in violation of a DANCO, an arrest shall be made.\(^{57}\) While MPD policy doesn’t make a similar specific statement regarding violation of an OFP, in all cases of domestic violence or alleged acts of domestic abuse, a police report and supplement shall be completed immediately. If no arrest is made, the supplement shall clearly show sufficient reasons for not making the arrest.\(^{58}\)

\(^{54}\) In addition to the protocol’s requirement of officers to check for the existence of an OFP or DANCO, the domestic violence supplement that is given to victims to fill out also asks this question “Do you have an Order for Protection or a Domestic Abuse No Contact Order with or against this person?”

\(^{55}\) The Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office maintains a list of all defendants known to be chargeable with a felony assault, domestic assault, or violations of an OFP, harassment/restraining order, or DANCO.

\(^{56}\) The Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual, “Order for Protection Short Form Notification,” Volume 7 (Field Operations)/Section 300 (Call Procedures).


\(^{57}\) The Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual, “Arrests for Violation of Domestic Abuse No Contact Order,” Volume 7 (Field Operations)/Section 300 (Call Procedures).


\(^{58}\) The Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual, “Arrests for Violations of Domestic Abuse No Contact Order,” Volume 7 (Field Operations)/Section 300 (Call Procedures).

Regarding visitation violations Minnesota Statute section 609.26 states that a person is in violation of visitation rights of a parent when that person “takes, obtains, retains, or fails to return a minor child from or to the parent in violation of a court order, where the action manifests an intent substantially to deprive that parent of rights to parenting time or custody.” The officer on-scene response:

- Verify the status of a child visitation order by checking records. Officers shall also check for DANCOs and OFPs.
- If officers have reason to believe the child may be transported out of state by the non-custodial parent, immediate enforcement actions will be initiated.
- If any transfer of custody is going to happen as a result of the visitation violation situation, the officer shall notify a supervisor to respond to the scene and approve the transfer. If transfer of custody is not authorized at the scene, the officer may still refer the victim to the Crimes Against Children unit.
- Supervisors who are notified of an incident involving visitation violations shall respond to the scene, and review and approve the transfer of custody or determine that custody should not be transferred.

Hennepin County has indicated they will review referrals for criminal charging in these situations on a case-by-case basis. Factors they consider include, but are not limited to, substantial effort made to hide child, removal from the state to deprive of custody, or the child was in custody of the county.\(^5^9\)

**What is our evidence? What did we hear, see, or read?**

As in other GOA cases, if the suspect was on scene when police arrived for a report of a no-contact order violation, he was arrested; but not generally if he was GOA.

In the 100 police reports reviewed:

- Violation of a court order’s no-contact condition was the subject of 21% of these reports.
- Of these 21 cases, 9 involved OFPs and 6 involved DANCO violations.
- One case involved a child visitation order.

• One case involved violation of a trespass notice from a landlord.
• 4 cases involved violation of multiple orders (2 where there was both an OFP and a DANCO, 1 with multiple OFPs, and 1 where there was both a DANCO and a trespass notice).

In the police reports, several victims expressed frustration with repeat violations.

• “Victim told officers she has called police numerous times, and the suspect always gets ‘let off’ and this is a way for the suspect to taunt her, and she knows that he will return when officers leave because he has done this many times in the past.”
• “Yesterday suspect contacted victim via Messenger, asking to follow her. She believes this is because she is helping his ex-wife deny him custody of their children. Victim said suspect has violated the order in the past, has been abusive to other women and their children, and has multiple OFPs against him. Victim said he has never been charged and is getting away with his behavior because of the lack of coordination from other jurisdictions. Victim says that he was ordered not to have firearms but has obtained one.”

Survivors who participated in focus groups and interviews also reported making many calls to report repeated OFP violations – two survivors reported making a least 100 calls over several years. The circumstances of non-arrest and the reasons given to victims by officers are similar to those articulated in the previous section about GOAs (“We can’t go get him,” etc.). Survivors also reported the following issues specific to no contact conditions of court orders.

**Officers are sometimes unable to find the order in the online system.**

Several survivors said officers trying to confirm the court order in the online system said they couldn’t see it or find it.

• “He was sleeping in front of my place for 3 hours. It took 2 or 3 hours for police to get there. He had warrants, a no contact order, and a harassment order. But police wouldn’t do anything. I called back to 911 and asked for a supervisor and she said to them, ‘It’s right there.’ So, they took him to a hospital.”
• “I have made calls throughout the years regarding . . . the OFP. Police would say they couldn’t ‘see’ the OFP. No report, no response, no report. It would have been nice to know these were being investigated or probation being notified.”

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60 Although a trespass notice is not a court order, it is an attempt by victims to prevent contact with abusers; and so it is appropriate to note them in this report. In the typical situation, a landlord sees a person on the property who does not belong there and gives him/her a trespass notice. The notice states the person is not to return to the property. If the person returns, the landlord may call the police, although police may not be able to arrest in all situations. Mary Geimer & Paul Birnberg, “Trespass by Tenant’s Guest,” *Minnesota Landlord/Tenant Law: Training Manual for Police*, HOME Line, Bloomington, MN, June 2016.
61 Case 2019 – 1
62 Case 2019 - 39
• “For years, police kept saying, ‘Get an OFP.’ After filing, he assaulted me and my son. When I called in February, they said the order was not on file. But it was. Afterward, he called 1,000 times between 8 and 2 a.m.’

Officers appear to be screening cases based on the perception of likely prosecution rather than probable cause.

Victims were told “If you didn’t see him, we can’t go after him,” “How can you tell it was him?” and “Just because it’s on Facebook doesn’t mean we can prove it,” even though many victims had surveillance video, saved text or social media messages, and call logs.

• “I went and got an OFP. I didn’t see him again in person, but he started contacting me with fake numbers and fake social media accounts. I would block them and then a new one would pop up. I didn’t report these right away because I figured I could ignore it . . . I had a new phone with a new number. I don’t know how he got it, which scared me, so I made a new report. I sent police screen shots. Nothing happened for months. There has to be some way of figuring out where this stuff is coming from instead of just hitting a wall.”
• “The investigator seemed like he didn’t want me to or didn’t think I should testify, so I didn’t.”
• “There was a warrant out for him for violating the OFP. I kept telling police he’s at [redacted] Bar every night, but they never check.”

After listening to others in her focus group, one survivor who had experienced repeat violations remarked that she realized that if the abuser wasn’t on-scene when police arrived, police may not be able to look for or arrest him immediately, but she didn’t understand why repeat violations didn’t generate prioritization, an investigation — something.

One survivor sums it up: “I filed for an OFP in September 2021. Police never did anything, but they never did anything because he was always gone. I’ve called myself, I’ve used the neighbor’s phone, etc. He’s only been arrested twice. . . . He lives in a different precinct. There’s even a warrant out for him now and they won’t go get him. My attorney advised me to call every time he calls, but now they don’t take me seriously. Because police won’t do anything, I feel I have to take his calls sometimes to see where he is. A cop . . . came and said, ‘You called him. I’m not doing a report.’ Then he sent me a picture with a gun. This cop again said, ‘Nope, not doing it.’ I said, ‘What if he burns the house down?’ This cop said, ‘There’s a big difference between calls and a burning house.’ Now, this cop just calls and doesn’t even come to my house. My ex has violated hundreds of times, and nothing happens.”
Advocates and officers also indicated discouragement with what they perceived as the lack of prosecution of OFP violation cases, even in cases where there is corroborating evidence such as video or social media.

Advocates reported that the lack of enforcement of OFP violations has been a frustration for victims for many years. This appears to have also been case as long ago as 20 years ago, as observed in the second of the assessment reports by BWJP: “If the violator was on-scene when police arrived, police made an arrest. While prosecutors do proceed on those charges, it appears that OFP violators are not held accountable for repeat violations or when they are GOA.”

One of the advocates interviewed during this assessment commented at length about officer discouragement with the lack of prosecution of OFP violations: “From my own experience and dealing with officers daily, I know many of them are frustrated due to the lack of prosecution that happens with OFP violations. The lack of prosecution results in officers becoming cynical about the whole process of responding to protection order violations. They then unfortunately relay their frustration to victims in the form of a poor response. I believe there needs to be better communication between street officers and prosecutors on what exactly prosecutors are looking for in protection order violation reports to help get these cases actually charged. I think this helps advocates as well because we as advocates are often told that law enforcement is not doing anything; in all reality they are writing the reports, but the cases are not being charged after being received by prosecutors. MPD needs to have more open communication with prosecutors about expectations and needs.”

How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims?
A problem of offender and systemic accountability?

Abusers who violate protection orders repeatedly pose a higher risk to victims.

Violation of protection orders is a risk factor on every DV risk, danger, and lethality assessment instrument, including the one used by Minneapolis police on the Domestic Violence Incident Victim’s Supplement. Unless protective orders are enforced, they can prove harmful to victims by creating a false sense of security. Three survivors said the failure to arrest the repeat OFP violator correlated directly to his conduct escalating – whether more frequent, more assaultive, or growing to encompass the victim’s family. See also the previous gap section on GOAs.

Victims get mixed messages about OFPs, and abusers get the message that nothing will happen to them.

Survivors are told to get OFPs and then told nothing can be done about violations. Several said they had lost confidence in the system. Two of the police reports contain statements of frustration from victims that “He gets away with this all the time.”

Several survivors recounted quotes from their abusers, such as “I told you nothing would happen.” Others said their abusers implied that their success in avoiding arrest was the result of some sort of “in” they had with police, with remarks like “I own the police.”

**How is this gap produced? What contributes to it?**

The online OFP system is difficult for officers to use.

The authors of this report reviewed the many screens that officers must look through to check the validity of OFPs. Multiple hearings with multiple changes of conditions result in files which are indeed confusing and impede access to relevant data in a timely manner.

Some officers are confused about the different types of orders which impedes online confirmation on the scene.

Officers as well as survivors often confuse OFPs and DANCOs or used the terms interchangeably. This makes the act of confirming the order online time-consuming. 10% of officers surveyed at their last DV-related in-service training volunteered that they were confused about the different kinds of orders.

Lack of feedback on decisions not to prosecute discourages officers and advocates.

Some advocates and officers are discouraged at what appears to them a lack of prosecution of many of these cases, even when they have corroborating evidence such as video or social media. Some patrol officers participating in a survey after training said they did not get feedback about why cases they thought were adequately documented were not prosecuted.

Influences from other parts of the system negatively affect officers’ understanding of the importance of enforcing no contact orders.

As seen in the previous gap section on GOAs, there are issues of non-response from other parts of the system that potentially influence the response of police to violations of court orders. See the survivor’s list on the next page.
A Survivor’s List of OFP Failures

I had the experience of my OFP taking forever to get served. Then he showed up at court and they said they couldn’t serve him.

I did call police after the OFP was instituted when he tried to get in my back door. Police took 45-60 minutes to get there, and then he was gone. Another time, he came over. I called, but again he was long gone by the time they got there.

They did ask me if I was afraid, he would hurt or kill me or my children. I said no. I would have described past abuse, including sexual abuse, if I had been asked. But everything was in the OFP. . . . I thought they could see it.

If he’s gone on arrival, the message is that the OFP doesn’t mean anything. My ex then acted entitled – showing up at my door, etc.

He tried to volunteer at my kids’ school. I asked the school if they could do anything to stop the volunteering. They said no. I had the no-contact order and showed them. They still said they couldn’t do anything. They referred me to the police officer for the school, who was present during this conversation.

In court, the court put me in a room with my husband and his lawyer.

I had pages of emails from him. No one looked at them except the custody evaluator, who recommended he not have custody as a result. The court overrode the custody evaluator and gave him visitation if he would go to parenting class, which he did.

I was bribed by my husband’s attorney: “If you drop the OFP, we will give you money and custody of the kids.” But then he still got visitation.

Police need understanding of emotional manipulation. My ex uses the children . . . . for example, sends me flowers through the children and says “Mom makes me sad.” He also sent a Mother’s Day card to his ex-girlfriend signed as coming from my kids.

His ex-girlfriend – he sexually assaulted her . . . . He was arrested for 1st degree criminal sexual assault . . . . in March 2022. He bonded out after 2 days. There has been pretrial after pretrial but no trial yet. His ex-girlfriend got an OFP and he has violated it twice.

Police need better understanding of trauma. Sometimes the reaction to trauma is just to give in. Then police get mad and think you’re defending the abuser.
Current Good Practices We Support and Encourage

Efforts to make the online verification system easier to read
The MPD DV Navigator is participating in a workgroup to make changes in the online OFP verification system. For example, instead of having a system in which data fields are entered, which require the officer to scroll through multiple screens, the Navigator is suggesting also uploading the document itself. For most people, it is more natural and is faster to skim read and flip through pages than it is to hunt through data fields.

Asking the victim for a copy when necessary
In the police reports, there were several instances where, when the officer couldn’t verify the order in the online system, the officer asked the victim if she had a copy of the order.

Creation of a chart explaining the different court orders
A City Attorney’s Office staff member who participates in officer training provided an “order chart” at the last DV-related in-service for officers. It explained the various orders, for who and in what situations they’re imposed, and differences between them. 10% of officers at the in-service commented on their evaluations that they wanted this chart and found it helpful.

Clear policy on child custody disputes
In one of the police reports, the complainant called police because her ex-partner was violating a child visitation order. In many places around the country, this would have received an officer response along the lines of “That’s civil – you’ll have to go back to court.” Fortunately, MPD has a very clear policy – for both patrol officers and supervisors – on what to do when presented with a child custody dispute. And in this particular case, the officer also recognized that this was a very specifically written court order that the ex-partner was clearly violating. The officer called his sergeant, who agreed, and carefully effected an arrest as well as retrieved the child.

Recommendations: How do we close the gap? What will help address it?

The MPD should include a specific statement regarding arrests for violations of an OFP – especially when a victim has reported multiple violations - in its domestic abuse policy.

Regarding DANCO’s, if an officer determines an individual is in violation of a DANCO, MPD policy states an arrest shall be made. MPD policy should make a similar specific statement regarding arrests upon violations of an OFP. This would be a consistent fit with current policy, which states that in all cases of domestic violence or alleged acts of domestic abuse, a police report and supplement shall be completed immediately. If no arrest is made, the supplement shall clearly show sufficient reasons for not making the arrest.
Police, prosecutors, and advocates should agree on how OFP violation cases will be prioritized.

Repeat offenders, exemplified many times by survivors’ stories in this report, should certainly be prioritized. Once that agreement has been made, it should be articulated within MPD’s domestic abuse policy.

Supervisory actions should be taken to ensure compliance with new policy.

Once policy on the patrol response to OFP violations is adopted, we recommend supervisors:

- Ensure that patrol officers receive and are introduced to the policy.
- Monitor responding officers on-scene activities and compliance with policy by periodically appearing on the scene of calls where the suspect has violated an OFP or other court order and assessing the patrol response.
- Respond to officer questions about actions and decisions in order violation cases.
- Respond to victim or victim advocate questions about actions and decisions in order violation cases.
- Conduct daily and ongoing reviews of patrol officer reports of court order violations.
- Periodically review a sample of reports submitted by officers in cases where the suspect violated a court order, to review compliance with policy and protocol.

Additionally, advocates and officers recommended regular meetings between police supervisors and prosecutors to discuss OFP violation cases that are uncharged, declined, or dismissed. The Blueprint for Safety has some brief policy language on this topic that could be used as a model:

- The appropriate attorney(s) of the prosecuting jurisdiction should meet quarterly with law enforcement, the supervisor of the victim/witness program, and community-based advocates to discuss uncharged cases and the thoroughness of investigations.
- The appropriate attorney(s) of the prosecuting jurisdiction is available to meet with law enforcement as requested to review individual cases that have been uncharged, declined, or dismissed.

Stalking charges should be considered to address repeated violations.

In survivor descriptions of multiple OFP violations, the abusers’ conduct often fits the definition of stalking, which is one of the risk factors identified in Hennepin County DV homicide cases reviewed by the Minnesota Fourth Judicial District Domestic Fatality Review Team, of which MPD

is a partner. In the 4 most recent team reports, the team reviewed a total of 14 domestic homicides. In 7 of these cases, “perpetrator stalking behavior” was listed as present in the case.66

Stalking is defined in Minnesota67 as harassing another person by engaging in conduct causing the victim to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated, regardless of the relationship between the harasser and victim. It is a gross misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in jail to harass another by committing any of the following acts:

- Directly or indirectly intending to injure the person, property, or rights of another.
- Following, monitoring, or pursuing another through any available technological or other means.
- Returning to the property of another without authority.
- Making repeated telephone calls or sending repeated text messages to the victim.
- Sending letters, messages, telegrams, packages, or other objects, including electronically, to the victim’s home or work.

If the perpetrator possesses a dangerous weapon at the time of the offense, it is a felony punishable by up to five years in prison.

Officers should be trained to recognize and include stalking offenses when recommending charges; prosecutors should also identify possible stalking charges when reviewing cases and developing charges.

A card with a chart on the different types of orders should be developed for officers to carry.

Officers recommended, and so do we, that the chart shown at the last DV-related in-service that explained the different types of orders be reproduced as a handout for officers. Better yet, some officers recommended reducing it to a smaller laminated card for officers, as well as uploading it to PIMS,68 MDTs69, etc.

A specialized DV investigator position would improve prosecution of OFP violations.

Many violations of orders are repeat offenders engaging in stalking behavior. We recommend considering specializing one of the DV investigators in order violation and stalking cases. This would more quickly attend to those offenders who are engaging in a high level of activity that is time-consuming for regular patrol officers and investigators with other caseloads, as well as the heavier evidence trail (hundreds of social media messages, phone call logs, etc.).

66 See Minnesota Fourth Judicial District Domestic Fatality Review Team reports from 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 on the “Annual Reports” page of the team’s website A Matter of Life and Death.
http://www.amatteroflifeanddeath.org/results
67 Minnesota Statute section 609.749.
68 Police Information Management System
69 Mobile Data Terminals
GAP: When responding officers communicate with victims or offenders in ways that exhibit explicit or implicit bias related to gender, class, race/ethnicity, disability, or sexual orientation, victims are discouraged from calling police in the future.

This institutional assessment sought to understand where, how, and for which victims an institutional practice is a problem. Facilitators and notetakers at focus groups and interviews were asked to stay alert to issues specific to victims of color and other marginalized groups. Survivors were asked follow-up questions related to police response and the impact of race, class, and gender.

*Relevant policy*

The MPD Policy and Procedure Manual includes a mission statement,\(^7^0\) that outlines its goals related to procedural justice and how all citizens should be treated.

**Mission.** What we do is consistently provide the full range of professional police services from the heroic to the prosaic: protecting the vulnerable from danger, arresting offenders who have harmed others, comforting the bereaved, rendering first aid, writing reports, collecting evidence, investigating cases, giving referrals to other government services, answering questions, offering directions, attending community meetings, and so much more. Public safety is not just the absence of crime, it is the presence of justice. How we do our work is as important as what we do; we treat others with dignity, giving them voice and respect, being neutral in our decision-making and working to build trust. Every aspect of our professional service must demonstrate our commitment to procedural justice. We will act by giving others voice and respect, being neutral and building trust in our interactions:

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<tr>
<th>Values</th>
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<th>Trust, Accountability, Professional Service</th>
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<td>Commitments</td>
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<td>Care, Connection, Communication, Courage, Character</td>
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</tbody>
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**What is our evidence? What did we hear, see, or read?**

Demographics of the 100 police reports:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender of victim</td>
<td>• 89% female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 11% male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender of suspect</td>
<td>• 89% male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 11% female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the relationship</td>
<td>• 96% opposite sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 4% same sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/ethnicity of victim</td>
<td>• 2% Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 52% Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 22% Caucasian/White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1% Hawaiian/Pacific Islander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 4% Hispanic/Latino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 11% Native American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 8% Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/ethnicity of suspect</td>
<td>• 3% Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 69% Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 12% Caucasian/White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1% Hawaiian/Pacific Islander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 5% Hispanic/Latino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 7% Native American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 3% Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instances when parties only spoke a language</td>
<td>• 5% (Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other than English -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age/disability of the parties</td>
<td>• 1% juveniles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2% 50-60 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 3% 60-70 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1% physical disability (used wheelchair)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Several self-identified developmental or mental health diagnoses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Demographics of the 32 CAD-only records:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim gender</td>
<td>69% female, 25% male, 6% unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect gender</td>
<td>69% male, 25% female, 6% unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of relationship</td>
<td>94% opposite sex, 6% same sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/ethnicity of victim</td>
<td>Unknown in all but 4 instances. Typically, the person calling 911 is the victim and is not asked to describe themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/ethnicity of suspect</td>
<td>44% Black, 9% Caucasian/White, 3% Hispanic/Latino, 6% Native American, 38% Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age/disability of the parties</td>
<td>In one case, victim reported cognitive or mental disability; in another case, suspect had physical and cognitive issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographics of survivor focus groups and interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survivor race/ethnicity</td>
<td>8 Black women, 3 Latino/Hispanic(^{71}) women, 1 multi-racial woman, 4 Native women, 8 white women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages</td>
<td>23 – 75 years old (22 women were 23 – 49 years old, 1 was 51, 1 was 75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivor relationships</td>
<td>22 women in opposite sex relationships, 2 in same sex relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivors with children</td>
<td>17 with children, 7 with no children or didn’t wish to say</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>2 women reported joint/mobility issues, 2 reported mental health diagnoses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{71}\) The Minneapolis Police report form follows federal policy in defining “Hispanic” not as a race but as an ethnicity; and in addition to a “Race” data field the form also provides an Ethnicity data field to indicate whether a party identifies as Latino or Hispanic.
Victims described various ways that they felt gender, race, and class negatively influenced the police response.

Many victims felt that being female affected the response, and if they lived in a poor or “bad” neighborhood with primarily residents of color. Some survivors thought that race was particularly a factor with men of color suspects being treated differently than white male suspects.

- A survivor of color said, “Most people who came to my aid – if they were men it felt like a gender thing – like they didn’t take it seriously because I was a woman. I didn’t feel like race was a factor . . . . I had Black cops and Asian cops, and all acted the same.”

- “On one hand, I feel the arrest response could have been because my partner was a person of color. On the other hand, I don’t think my being a person of color mattered in how I was treated.”

- “I think more should be done for [abusive men of color] instead of sending them to prison. I think they do more to a black man and less to a white man. That’s a money issue.”

- “When I would go to the precinct instead of calling, I got the flat, bored voice: ‘Put down your information – name, etc.’ The only time I was treated nice at the precinct was when a woman talked to me. She could see in my eyes that I was drained.”

- While describing a victim advocate communicating with police and prosecutors about her case, a survivor said, “I felt because the advocate was white, it gave more credibility to my story.”

- “There is an assumption that all of us are repeat callers – ‘I’ll bet you let him in’ and ‘This is not the first time.’ . . . One time when police came to my house, I felt kind of faint and kind of swayed toward a female officer. She jerked away and said, ‘Eww, don’t touch me.’ I told her to leave. She said something about needing to get home safe to her kids.’ . . . I don’t distrust just because an officer is white. I’m giving everyone a chance. But this does make you think, ‘Here we go again – they can’t relate.’ And they don’t care – like they’re looking at a stereotype. They look around like ‘Glad I’m not living here.’ They treat you poorly for living in a poor neighborhood.”

- “When they respond to low-income housing, you don’t have the same expectation as you see on TV shows. . . . I’ve got 2 or 3 bolt locks on my door. I’ve got locks on my windows, but the glass isn’t bullet proof. [One of the co-authors of this report walked by this area and did see windows of upper-level apartments damaged by what appeared to be bullet holes.] There is retaliation between drug dealers. I’m looking to fix my car so I can leave.”
Response to abuse by a same sex partner. One survivor said that police told her “‘Looks like you could have took her, or picked something up to defend yourself. You look strong.’ This was when my left eye was swollen. They were thinking ‘cat fight.’”

Survivors who described themselves as having mental health issues.

- “I have gotten mixed signals and have had mixed experiences. They say I’m too excited to be believed. They told him I was lucky I was too hyped up and hysterical to be believed. They told me to stop talking. They just wanted to get out of there.”

- A survivor who listened to another survivor say the abuse had gotten so bad that she considered suicide responded, “I’ve been there. I’m going through therapy and taking meds. And yet one time the police told me to ‘Shut the F up.’ And I was anxious and tearful. . . . [Another] time I was drinking, and he told police I hadn’t taken my meds. Police right away had me taken to a hospital because I was drinking and [he said] I wasn’t taking meds. But the hospital released me, saying ‘Why are you here?’”

Survivors living in Little Earth. During a listening session with survivors who live in Little Earth, the participants and facilitator engaged in the following conversation:

- “My daughter intervened once. He broke her wrist. I called 911. Police never came. My daughter had to go in person to the precinct.”
- “I had that happen last week. I made a . . . call on a juvenile. Police didn’t want to come. They said, “Let us know when he comes back.””
- “That happens a lot here.”
- “This area has a bad reputation.”
- [Facilitator] “Why do you think that is?”
- “It’s always going to be that way.”
- [Facilitator] “Have you ever received follow-up from an investigator after your domestic violence call?”
- [All participants laughed.].
- [Facilitator] “This project is not only looking at the police response to domestic violence but also how that works or doesn’t work for communities of color or other underserved communities. Do you have any experiences or thoughts on that?”
- [All participants gave examples of police comments in their presence that either perpetuated negative stereotypes, such as “Drinking again;” or that were unnecessarily rough comments or actions such as “I love being a cop” after handcuffing a woman, and grabbing teenagers and saying things like “He smells like weed,” or “You need to watch how you talk to me.”]

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72 Little Earth is 9.4 acre, 212-unit Housing and Urban Development (HUD) subsidized housing complex located in the urban industrial core of Minneapolis, Minnesota. Little Earth was founded in 1973 and remains the only indigenous preference project-based Section 8 rental assistance community in the United States. For more information, see https://www.littleearth.org/.
• [Facilitator] “It sounds like some of the examples of police responses you’ve given are about police assuming or saying they’ve been disrespected.”
• “Yes, especially if drugs or alcohol have been involved. I got arrested once for sticking up for a friend. The judge dismissed it.”
• “It helps to have white friends.”
• “There are no Native police anymore.”
• “I wish there was Native police here. Then there wouldn’t be racism.”
• [Facilitator] “It sounds as though you’ve acted as your own police officer.”
• [All participants said yes.]
• [Facilitator] “When I listen to you all and think of the police reports I reviewed that came from Little Earth, I am hearing and seeing a very high level of violence. Am I right about that?”
• “That is the experience I have had.”

Advocates hear from victims in marginalized communities that they are reluctant or afraid to call police due to these negative responses.

Advocates working with survivors of a variety of racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds echoed many of the themes and comments by survivors set forth above. As with any large police department, some officers do not want to handle DV calls, resulting in their lack of sensitivity to victims, a lack of urgency in responding to these calls, or a victim-blaming attitude. One person interviewed gave the example of recently working with a victim who stated that the officer made a comment along the lines of “Let’s get this over with” and did not get out of his car to take the report. This resulted in the survivor feeling she shouldn’t call police. Another gave the example of the officer’s body language - standing with arms crossed - showing impatience.

While the MPD has made an effort to hire more officers of color, most responding officers are still white males. Several of the survivors interviewed said some victims of color are hesitant to call police because of the negative effect they fear it will have on their families and communities; and some victims of color have reported a delayed police response: “They would wait until 4 or 5 squad cars come park in front . . . before they even approach . . . .”

Some officers lack understanding of cultural factors affecting investigations.

Some officers lack understanding of cultural factors affecting investigations of DV in communities of color – what questions to ask, what to document, etc. For example:
• Common tactics of abuse in immigrant communities include threats of deportation, withholding the victim’s immigration documents, and economic abuse, but officers rarely ask about these things.
• One advocate said many of the Latina victims she works with are not married to their partner but culturally, view him as their husband. If asked about rape, these women wouldn’t report it because they don’t think it’s a crime: “He’s my partner;” or “I need to be nice to him;” or “My mother said I have to do this.” Many of the women this
advocate works with come from small villages. All of this results in a fear of reporting. Many of these women are undocumented, and if they call police, the first thing police ask is for identification. Victims then don’t want to submit to further questions.

- Negative stereotypes can influence how the officer sees the level of violence or the impact on the victim. Several people interviewed gave examples of the negative stereotypes of victims with criminal records or victims who are Black being accustomed to more violence in their lives or being more violent themselves, and how this can influence officers who hold those stereotypes to minimize the violence when documenting it in their reports or seeing victims of color as perpetrators. One of those interviewed observed, “Black women’s pain is diminished.” A Black advocate said, “We use our hands, we are loud, etc. When police interact with a woman communicating that way, they say, ‘Well, maybe she did something, too.’ Their interpretation is that the perfect victim doesn’t look like that.”

As a result, one advocate said she has observed that women of color are not calling police as much, and more of them are carrying weapons, feeling they have to defend themselves.

Lack of interpreter resources affects the police response when parties speak other languages than English.

Some of those interviewed pointed out there have been problems with officers sometimes using children or family members or even suspects as interpreters when speaking with victims with limited English proficiency (LEP). These interviewees thought officers should be using Language Line. They were unaware that MPD policy states that while the City of Minneapolis Language Line provides interpretation services to residents with questions about city services and functions, it should not be used for phone interpretation between police and LEP individuals. Rather, personnel in the field are to identify the LEP individual’s primary language by asking what language they speak or using a language identification card. Once the language has been identified, police are to contact a city vendor. One person interviewed said there is a lack of these interpretation resources. Another person said that an LEP victim told her that even when there was an interpreter, she felt rushed – as though the officer was checking off boxes and leaving, which felt like she was a bother to police.

The LEP policy recognizes that exigent circumstances may require deviation from the procedure. In such situations, MPD personnel are to use the most reliable, temporary interpreter available, such as a bilingual MPD employee, a family member, friend, or bystander.

73 Language Line interpreters listen to limited English speaking persons, analyze their message, and accurately convey its original meaning to the dispatcher or law enforcement officer. For more information, see https://www.languageline.com/
Examples include: the need to obtain descriptive information on a fleeing suspect or to identify an injured person. In other than exigent circumstances, MPD personnel should only use family, friends, or bystanders for interpreting in informal, non-confrontational contexts, and only to obtain basic information at the request of the LEP person; because: (a) using family, friends or bystanders to interpret could result in a breach of confidentiality, a conflict of interest, or an inadequate interpretation. In addition, barring exigent circumstances, police personnel should not use minor children to provide interpreter services. Advocates noted victims are less likely to provide details about the abuse when their children are used as interpreters. Lastly, sometimes reports have not been made when the victim doesn’t speak English.

**LGBTQ victims are reluctant to contact police due to past negative responses.**

While none of the 100 police reports - which included 4 reports involving same sex couples - resulted in an arrest of both parties, one person interviewed said that has happened in some same sex cases. This person thought police viewed the abuse as mutual combat, or same gender or same size equaled a mutual fight – resulting in a victim not being taken seriously. Two people interviewed said most LGBTQ victims don’t want to reach out to police. They commented on other response issues, such as failure to document degrading names or slurs specific to the LGBTQ community, not documenting or photographing injuries, or not giving out victim resource information.

One victim of color felt that “the intersection of being queer, of color, and with a white partner” resulted in the white person having more credibility with officers. Another issue is that the partner perceived as more feminine is often going to be perceived as the victim. When asked if these examples were actions of screening victims out versus screening victims in, one person said, “It feels like the officer is trying to do the job of the investigator, or the investigator is trying to do the job of the prosecutor. But if someone called me a fag, it’s not their job to say it won’t be prosecuted. I’m not asking them to understand; I’m just asking them to write my experience.”

**Advocates identified stereotypes of victims or offenders with physical disabilities or mental health issues that influenced police response.**

One person who has worked with victims with physical disabilities or mental health issues observed that stereotypes exist here, too, that can impact an officer’s response – for example, minimizing someone’s conduct based on a perception of a mental health issue, or blaming the violence on a disability, or seeing a person as less credible because of a disability.

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How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims?
A problem of offender and systemic accountability?

Research shows that the risk of intimate partner homicide is much higher for women of color.

*When Men Murder Women*, an annual report prepared by the Violence Policy Center, details the reality of homicides committed by males against females in single victim/single offender incidents. The study analyzes the most recent homicide data submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The most recent data available, for the year 2020, indicates Black women were murdered by men at a rate (2.96 per 100,000) nearly three times as high as white women (1.07 per 100,000). American Indian and Alaskan Native women (1.86 per 100,000) were also murdered by men at a higher rate than white women.\(^\text{76}\)

Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) analyzed intimate partner homicide data from the National Violent Death Reporting System among 10,018 women over 18 years old in 18 states over a span of 10 years (2003–2014). Again, Black and American Indian/Alaska Native women experienced the highest rates of homicide. The CDC concluded that targeted IPV prevention programs for populations at disproportionate risk - and enhanced access to intervention services for persons experiencing IPV - are needed to reduce homicides among these women.\(^\text{77}\)

There is heightened danger for women of color, who may not feel they can call for help.

Longstanding stereotypes about women of color and women with mental health issues negatively affect the police response.

During this assessment, we learned that negative stereotypes about Black women being more violent can lead to the assumption that she is the aggressor. One survivor said this is what happened to her, describing an incident where she was grabbed out of the shower and threatened with a knife and in defending herself, injured the perpetrator. She was arrested, even though at 100 pounds, she was significantly smaller than her 6-foot partner. She was not permitted to go back to her own house, even though she was the lease holder. She ended up having to move, where the abuser eventually followed and accosted her again.

Native American survivors of domestic violence who lived in the Little Earth subsidized housing complex added, “We are survivors. In Little Earth, we’ve been pushed down and beat up since we were born. We’re trying to survive. That’s why we take drugs – to survive. If I have a beer or a joint, ____________________________

\(^{\text{76}}\) The last 22 years of these annual reports are archived in the Publications section of the Violence Policy Center’s website. [https://vpc.org/publications/](https://vpc.org/publications/)

\(^{\text{77}}\) See Racial and Ethnic Differences in Homicides of Adult Women and the Role of Intimate Partner Violence — United States, 2003–2014, which is the July 21, 2017 issue of the CDC’s weekly morbidity and mortality report. See [https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/pdfs/mm6628a1.pdf](https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/pdfs/mm6628a1.pdf)
I don’t have to think. Our men were warriors. That was taken away. That hurts. We have huge hearts.”

Negative stereotypes about victims with mental health issues can result in victims being perceived as “crazy,” not credible, etc. A survivor who described herself as having mental health issues said, “Police create a domino effect. They continue to take the self-respect your abuser has taken. I’m 51. I don’t want to spend the rest of my life getting myself together.” She said she would not call police again.

Survivors react negatively to officers who indicate they don’t want to handle DV cases or have an intrusive questioning style.

Advocates and local criminal justice practitioners observed that victims can tell when officers don’t want to deal with domestic violence cases; that really affects the impact of officers’ response on victims. Victims feel like they were wrong to call police and are less likely to call again or if they do, may find the burden of holding the offender accountable falls to them. They may also feel intimidated by police demeanor. Questions delivered with “Why” or “How come” without explanation feel intrusive or accusatory. These dynamics can be exacerbated for victims of color.

Undocumented victims pressed for hard copy confirmation of their identity may not want to submit to questions from police about the domestic violence. Victims who moved here from other countries with different law enforcement and criminal justice systems are confused by police responses such as not needing to do a written report, and don’t want to call for help or use the system again. All these things result in women of color not calling police and feeling they have to prepare to defend themselves, even to the point of carrying weapons.

LGBTQ victims feel that the violence was minimized.

LGBTQ victims who received a response that appeared to minimize the violence (aspects of the violence not documented, no pictures taken, no victim resource information given) feel they are left with nothing and may not want to interact with police again.

How is this gap produced? What contributes to it?

MPD’s supervisory policies and procedures do not adequately identify disrespectful or unacceptable behavior by officers, provide guidance and training on expected behavior, or apply fair disciplinary measures when necessary. There is general agreement in the community that this problem needs to be addressed. The consent decree from the Minnesota Department
of Human Rights requires related improvements, and the consent decree pending from the Department of Justice will likely include these as well. Both will affect the handling of DV cases.

Current Good Practices We Support and Encourage

Building Relationships
Several advocates who work with women of color, Latina victims, or immigrant women said they had been able to forge relationships with individual investigators or supervisors when issues arose in cases with victims from these communities. Several positive examples were given of specific success stories because a connection existed to someone who would address problems quickly.

Some officers and supervisors visit various community groups that serve communities of color, and varied ethnicities and cultures – to speak about police matters or to engage in fellowship with community members. The co-authors of this report viewed social media posts of these events and saw many individuals responding to these posts about the positive nature of interacting with police in this way.

Breaking the language barrier
In several of the police reports, officers documented that one of the parties couldn’t speak English well. Officers had advocacy information and DV supplement forms in different languages to give victims. An officer who was bilingual read the forms aloud to the victim to make sure she understood and wrote down her answers. One person interviewed said they had seen officers use their own phones to translate words or phrases.

Creating a positive impact on children
A survivor of color whose now ex-partner assaulted her in front of her children, and police came and arrested him, said police treated both her and her partner very respectfully. They handled the arrest sensitively in front of the children: “I was happy about that. My kids learned respect.”

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See the Consent Decree webpage on the Minnesota Department of Human Rights’ website, which contains a report on the investigation preceding the consent decree, a copy of the decree, and a fact sheet with major highlights.

Recommendations: How do we close the gap? What will help address it?

Efforts to address explicit and implicit bias must be incorporated in the MPD’s rebuilding plans.

This assessment only studied DV cases, but it’s reasonable to assume that efforts in other cities to address discriminatory policing and police brutality would improve their response to DV cases. These efforts typically include:

- Data collection that allows analysis of cases by race, class, gender, etc.
- Effective anti-bias training
- Diversification of the workforce
- Supervisory procedures that uncover unacceptable behavior and provide a fair and reasonable process for the removal of problem officers
- Timely investigation of citizen complaints against officers and accountability measures that are transparent and meaningful
- Expanded programs to improve community relations
- Partnerships with community organizations to better address social problems like homelessness and mental illness that the criminal justice system is not equipped to solve.

MPD has finalized a consent decree with the State of Minnesota; and there is then pending the consent decree from the Department of Justice. We would expect that similar recommendations will be forthcoming.

Local advocates and survivors shared ideas on what would be important to include in trainings.

- Build into existing DV training the justice system experience of DV victims and offenders from other countries, to help criminal justice practitioners understand immigrants’ discouragement, mistrust, etc. of the bail system.
- Whatever training is planned, use people’s stories, real case examples, etc. – participants can relate, can empathize, etc. and are better able to ask the “what if” questions that will help them apply what they’ve learned to their daily work.
- Provide cultural sensitivity training, knowledge, and education about the impact of poverty, education about negative racial stereotypes and how implicit bias affects behavior, and training about additional investigative skills, tips, and strategies when responding to DV in communities of color. Include a multi-disciplinary audience (local system partners and service providers) in addition to police officers. Officers and other system partners could learn much from each other, as well as network in important ways that could better serve a diverse community.
New risk assessment tools for female same sex relationships and immigrant victims should be considered to improve current procedures.

The DV Workgroup discussed the updating of the current risk assessment questions used by MPD. The Danger Assessment authors have recently created two new adaptations – a Danger Assessment for use in abusive female same sex relationships and a Danger Assessment for immigrant victims. We recommend that the DV Workgroup explore the use of these new instruments in Minneapolis.

“It’s hard to heal. There are things we have to do to heal. When police don’t do anything, we’re forced to deal with these things instead of the work we need to do . . . . Police could help us navigate differently. They could be confidence builders.”

Survivor, focus group - 12/27/21

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79 See discussion of Danger Assessment on page 42.
Gap: Officers often did not interview witnesses to the abuser’s conduct, including children, or document their identity/contact information, lessening the opportunity for prosecution or probation actions that could enhance victim safety.

Relevant policy

The MPD DV Incident Response Protocol requires officers to get contact information from witnesses, including name, address, and phone number; and question witnesses.⁸²

What is our evidence? What did we hear, see, or read?

In the majority of cases, witnesses were not questioned and in many of these, documentation of the witnesses’ identities and contact information was missing.

Of the 100 police reports reviewed during this assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There were witnesses, including children of the parties involved, in</th>
<th>66% of the cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The kinds of witnesses available in these cases were - | - Older children  
- Parents or siblings of the parties involved  
- Neighbors  
- Staff or employees in the building or establishment where incident occurred  
- Passersby  
- The new partner of one of the parties |
| In the 66 cases where there were witnesses, officers documented witness identities, contact information, and what they saw in | 45% of the cases (i.e., in 30 of the 66 cases) |
| - In the remaining 36 cases, it was clear witnesses were present but they weren’t questioned.  
- In these 36 cases, there was mixture of documentation efforts as to the witnesses’ identity and contact information - | - Identified vaguely (“a neighbor,” “victim’s mother,” etc.) with no further information.  
- Identified by name with no contact information.  
- When there were several witnesses, sometimes only one or two witness names/contact info were obtained. |

In 4 reports, officers documented an explanation for not obtaining witness identities or contact information, such as a chaotic scene with intoxicated or agitated persons,⁸³ the victim refusing to give the identity of or not knowing the name of a witness,⁸⁴ and a witness who is quarantining indoors with a contagious illness (COVID).⁸⁵

Several of the advocates and officers interviewed acknowledged that patrol documentation of witness identity, contact information, and what the witness saw has been an ongoing issue that is always addressed in training.

**MPD policy doesn’t clearly direct officers’ actions related to child witnesses.**

This was another issue identified in Battered Women’s Justice Project’s (BWJP) second assessment report 20 years ago: “There is no MPD policy regarding the role of the officer’s interaction with children who witness domestic assault. The MPD should develop and implement a departmental policy regarding the officer response to child witnesses of domestic violence.”

During this assessment, several people interviewed said that officers don’t understand the difference between an on-scene assessment and a more formal investigative or forensic interview, having been told that “talking to kids is an investigator’s job.” An advocate said officers had told her that MPD has a policy that says patrol officers must not interview children and all interviews must be done at Cornerhouse.⁸⁶ However, a search of MPD’s policy manual does not indicate any such policy. An individual working in the local criminal justice system said they understood that if patrol officers interview a child, then CornerHouse won’t do a follow-up forensic interview out of concern for a child being interviewed too many times. However, this also appears to be a misunderstanding, as CornerHouse’s protocol states only that “CornerHouse does not support a practice of repeated, duplicative forensic interviews.”⁸⁷

While MPD policy doesn’t clearly direct officers about child witnesses, the DV supplement does ask victims this question about danger concerns for their children: “Do you think he will injure or kill you or your children?” When they review police reports each day, advocates and victim

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⁸³ Case 2019 – 2
⁸⁴ Cases 2019 – 31 and 2019 – 34
⁸⁵ Case 2020 - 31
⁸⁶ CornerHouse is a Children’s Advocacy Center located in Minneapolis. CornerHouse works to address the traumatic effects of child abuse - supporting children and families throughout the disclosure, investigation, and legal processes, which includes forensic interviews of children. CornerHouse also provides therapeutic healing through mental health and advocacy services, which helps children and families heal from their experience of abuse. For more information, see [https://www.cornerhousemn.org/](https://www.cornerhousemn.org/).
⁸⁷ Julie Stauffer, MSW, LICSW; “A Look Inside the CornerHouse Forensic Interview Protocol;” APSAC ADVISOR; Vol. 32, No. 2; p. 9. [https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5da61df2de233e586746cdfe/t/604a6a065b4ec75baf659eb9/1615489542642/Stauffer+%282020%29+A+Look+Inside+CornerHouse+Forensic+Interview+Protocol.pdf](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5da61df2de233e586746cdfe/t/604a6a065b4ec75baf659eb9/1615489542642/Stauffer+%282020%29+A+Look+Inside+CornerHouse+Forensic+Interview+Protocol.pdf)
witness staff do follow up with victims about any children mentioned—about any safety planning needs, any information that wasn’t shared with responding officers, etc. The supplement also asks victims if there were any witnesses to the assault.

**How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?**

Best practice in law enforcement and prosecution of DV cases is to proceed in the least burdensome way for the victim, which includes documenting and utilizing as much other evidence as possible, such as witness observations, photos, video footage, medical records, etc.

*Not doing so places the burden of holding the offender accountable on the victim, which endangers her further.* Several survivors said they would be afraid to testify against their abusers, and one described specifically how her abuser retaliated against her for accessing the justice system. After she filed for an OFP, her abuser assaulted her. She put a security system in place in her home, after which he told her, “Do you think a door will stop me from killing you?” She then went on to say during her interview: “For me to be the main testifier—I don’t want that. He will hold it against me. . .”

This survivor has good reason to feel the way she does. Witness intimidation is most associated with organized crime and domestic violence.88 Domestic violence victims are at elevated risk for retaliation, especially when living with or economically dependent on the offender; or in contact with the offender because of shared parenting.89 Most explicit acts of intimidation take place where police exert little control: at the witness’s home, school or work;90 or while the witness is running errands or socializing.91 But witnesses also report being intimidated at the crime scene, while at the police station making a statement and while in the courthouse waiting to testify. Some report being intimidated while on the witness stand.92

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89 Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996
91 Fyfe & McKay, 2000
**How is this gap produced? What contributes to it?**

With regard to child witnesses, officers are confused about the expectations of responding officer vs. investigators regarding interactions with child witnesses.

Several advocates and individuals who work in the criminal justice system said some officers are confusing a brief on-scene assessment or inquiry of a child with “an interview,” which is perceived by patrol officers as a formal, lengthier endeavor done after the incident by an investigator or forensic interviewer. Officers with this perception then don’t communicate with child witnesses.

Some officers believe the use of body cameras requires less documentation and that others in the system are responsible for obtaining witness information given MPD’s staffing issues.

Additionally, comments from officers to those who were interviewed for this project as well as in surveys officers completed after training indicates some officers thought that since officers have started using body cameras, it isn’t necessary to “write all that down.” Other officers thought that investigators or prosecutors would or should get this information themselves from 911 records. Here are some additional comments from officers responding to the survey, in which one can see their frustration with lack of time and staffing:

- “I’ve thought all along that the current procedure is too time-consuming and places too much responsibility on already overworked patrol officers. Furthermore, it adds complexity to a profession that is already very complex and fuels an ever-growing policy manual. How can we be expected to go out on the street, a very dynamic environment, and follow 1500 pages of policies?”
- “I just wish we had all the time in the world for these calls but the reality is we don’t. I would suggest making the policy more simple. This policy needs to be condensed.”
- “The main thing that hinders Minneapolis police officers is time and call load. We can’t spend 3 hours on a domestic. A busy shift has almost no time to spend on these calls.”
- “We just don’t have time to do everything.”
- “Way too much to have to remember for one type of call. Way too easy to forget things and more complex than it needs to be. Everyone is complaining about domestics now: how long they will take and how short we are on the street.”
- “We have very large call volumes. We can’t take 6 hours on a domestic. Take that into consideration before telling us about all this extra stuff you want documented.”
- “More details require more time which requires staffing!!!!!!!!”

Influences from other parts of the system negatively affect officers’ understanding of the importance of documentation.

As seen in the previous gap sections on GOAs and OFPs, there are issues of non-response from other parts of the system that influence the response of police. Many of the officers surveyed
thought they had done a thorough job of documentation, only to find later that a case was dismissed without explanation. For example:

- “It does feel like we do a lot of work on these cases, though; and are told is it because victims aren’t cooperative, and you need all this documentation. Then the case is ultimately dismissed anyway. It is very frustrating.”
- “We won’t get better at these unless you tell us what we are doing wrong, or what we are doing right. Extremely frustrated to be subpoenaed and then released with either no explanation or just that the case was dismissed or pled to disorderly. Why? Was it something I could have done better?”
- “It is disheartening when we just get an email saying ‘released from subpoena’ because case was dismissed with no further info as to why.”

See also the GOA chart in the appendices, which indicates only 3 cases in which the offender was charged and convicted.

**Current Good Practices We Support and Encourage**

**Witness safety**
In one police report, the victim said she didn’t think a witness - a neighbor - would want to be identified during the police response but might be willing to talk to someone the next day; and the officer made a note of this and did not go to the neighbor’s apartment.

**Documenting behavior or demeanor in non-verbal children**
In two police reports where a very young (3 to 4 years old) child had witnessed the abuse, even though the child didn’t verbalize anything, officers observed and documented that the child appeared scared and had wet or defecated their pants. In another police report, again where a very young child had witnessed the incident, the officer documented the look on her face and that she was trembling.

**Modeling respectful treatment of victims and offenders in front of child witnesses**
Two survivors appreciated police interaction with their children. One said, “My kids love the police! They love the stickers. Things like that make the situation a bit lighter.” The other, whose abuser was arrested in front of the children, said “I was happy with the police. My kids got the message about being treated with respect.”

**Going the extra mile to track down witnesses**
In one instance, an investigator assigned to a shots-fired DV case drove to the scene to see if he could see where the bullet went and approached a man on his roof who seemed to be looking at damage from a bullet.

**Safe Spaces program**
Although the Safe Spaces program was not initiated or carried out by MPD, its local law enforcement attention to victim intimidation in the courthouse presents an important
partnership for MPD to be aware of as well as an example of how an observation by one officer can translate into a successfully implemented victim safety measure. The Safe Spaces program is information and telephones placed in courthouse restrooms for victims of human trafficking and other forms of abuse. Simply picking up the phone generates an immediate connection to the Security Operations Center. In its first 4 months, Safe Spaces received an average of one call per week. The idea for the program came from the manager of Uniformed Operations in the courthouse after she observed a woman in obvious distress whose hand was being gripped tightly by a man alongside her. The manager later said, “‘Often, the bathroom is the only safe space the victim has where they can get a breather or a couple minutes to themselves.’”

Recommendations: How do we close the gap? What will help address it?

MPD policy should include a specific statement regarding a patrol officer’s investigative role.

A supervisor interviewed during this assessment said officers should understand that in misdemeanor DV, they are the investigator. We recommend a statement to this effect be included at the beginning of MPD’s Domestic Abuse Policy.

MPD policy should be revised to direct officer actions regarding child witnesses.

Further, MPD’s Domestic Abuse Incident Response Protocol already requires officers to obtain contact information from witnesses to the incident including name, address, and phone number, and to question witnesses regarding the incident. We recommend including child witnesses in that mandate and clarifying the expectation of an on-scene assessment/inquiry versus a formal interview. For example: “A responding officer is generally in the best position to do an on-scene assessment: injuries, child demeanor and safety concerns, and anything the child has to say about what happened or what precipitated it.”

Officers should consider the following in determining whether to talk to a child:

- The weight of the child’s interview in establishing probable cause
- The likelihood the child will suffer adverse consequences or retaliation by the suspect
- The child’s physical, emotional, or psychological ability to give a statement

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• The child’s age and ability to understand questions and formulate responses
• An officer should not talk to a child if the officer feels it is not safe for the child or others.\textsuperscript{95}

New policy should include supervision strategies that ensure compliance.

We also recommend that the MPD create guidance for proactive supervision of reports that could include using a checklist (which includes attention to child witnesses) to review daily reports submitted by patrol officers.\textsuperscript{96} If preferred, this guidance could also include a very brief checklist of just those elements related to child witnesses only, such as:

A Checklist of Important Information for Officers to Document Regarding Children at the Scenes of Domestic Abuse Calls:
• Identifying information about the child. For example, full name and birthdate of the child, and parties’ relationship to the child.
• The environment the child is in.
• The physical/emotional/mental state of the child.
• Anything the child has to say about what happened or what precipitated it.\textsuperscript{97}

Additionally, we recommend supervisors provide an opportunity for officers to give feedback on new policy after its implementation.

Officers should receive experiential training on any new policy regarding child witnesses.

In addition, once supervision on witness documentation is implemented, we recommend training for officers and investigators on the new policy on child witnesses. Training should include the difference between an on-scene assessment and an interview, when each should be done, who should do them, and tips for doing them well. A responding officer is generally in the best position to do an on-scene assessment (injuries, child demeanor and safety concerns, and anything the child has to say about what happened or what precipitated it). A supporting officer who can focus on the children, an investigator, or a forensic interviewer can often be in a better position to do follow-up interviews for children unavailable or too upset at


the time of the incident, as well as intensive, more formal interviews that might be needed for complex cases. Training should include good examples from police reports, and modeling some interactions with children (role plays, good quality videos, etc.).

**Officers should continue to receive reminder or refresher training on existing policy related to witnesses.**

Training on the part of MPD’s Domestic Abuse Incident Response Protocol that requires officers to obtain contact information from witnesses to the incident including name, address, and phone number; and question witnesses regarding the incident is already included at every academy and in-service session. We recommend that training practice continue.
Gap: Property crimes accompanying domestic assaults or OFP violations often weren’t documented well or recommended for charging, impacting victims’ physical safety, economic security, and access to restitution.

Relevant policy

While MPD policy does not specifically direct officers to take reports on theft or property damage that accompanies domestic abuse, the policy – as well as Minneapolis Emergency Communication Center (MECC) policy - does anticipate that these circumstances will occur.

MECC Domestic Abuse policy\textsuperscript{98} states:
If any of the following events have transpired between persons who are participants in a sort of "family," such as spouses, live-ins, former spouses, boy/girlfriends, parents/children, siblings and others, they may well be considered domestic abuse calls:

- Report of assault or attempted assaults.
- Report of threats, both verbal and menacing.
- Forcible intrusion onto premises by former spouses, live ins, boy/girlfriends, roommates, etc.
- Report of violations of orders for protection (which indicate a history of violence).
- Report of damage to property (on the theory that it can escalate into violence against a person), especially the "spouse going berserk" or "boy/girlfriend trashing the place" type of calls.

Step 2 of the MPD Domestic Abuse Incident Response Protocol\textsuperscript{99} states one of the investigative tasks patrol officers shall complete when responding to a domestic abuse call is: “Take photographs. Examples of things to include but are not limited to: the arrestee; victim; injuries; scene, including any damaged property.”

What is our evidence? What did we hear, see, or read?

Of the 32 records of DV calls to 911 for which there was a CAD entry only, there were 2 involving theft of or damage to victim’s property: stealing money from a disabled victim’s SSI\textsuperscript{100} funds and damaging a victim’s phone.

\textsuperscript{98} Domestic Abuse in Progress policy, Minneapolis Emergency Communication Center, last updated April 23, 2020.
\textsuperscript{100} SSI - Supplemental Security Income – are monthly benefits to people with limited income and resources who are disabled, blind, or age 65 or older. See https://www.ssa.gov/SSI/text-over-ussi.htm
Of the 100 DV reports, 21 involved the abuser’s theft of or damage to the victim’s property. None of these were cases where the property could arguably be the abuser’s property. The kind of theft or damage to the victim’s property included:

- 1 arson to a residence
- Broken basement windows
- 2 instances of destroying newly purchased large screen TVs
- 1 instance of pouring bleach on victim’s clothing
- 1 stolen purse, containing cash and IDs belonging to victim and her children
- 4 instances of stealing the victim’s house keys
- 5 instances of stealing or destroying the victim’s phone
- 3 stolen vehicles (2 cars and 1 scooter)
- 2 instances of suspect deliberately crashing or crashing into victim’s car
- 1 instance of pouring a substance into victim’s gas tank
- Damage to car body
- 3 instances of damaged car equipment/accessories (broken windshield wiper control on steering column, broken side mirror, broken headlight)
- 4 instances of breaking windows on the victim’s car

In these 21 reports, 4 complainants did not wish an arrest or prosecution to be pursued. In the remaining 17 reports:

- Responding officers or investigators documented replacement or repair estimates in 2 reports.
- Stolen property was the subject of 4 reports, and damaged property was the subject of 13 reports, in which responding officers or investigators photographed the damaged property in 8 cases and did not document whether they photographed the damaged property in the other 5 cases.
- Police recommended charges related to the theft or property damage in 3 reports; charges related only to accompanying assaultive conduct in 3 reports; and did not document a recommendation for any charges in 11 reports.
- Prosecutors obtained a conviction related to theft or property damage in 1 case; and convictions related only to accompanying assaultive conduct in 3 cases. It is not known whether restitution for the theft or damage to victim’s property in these 4 cases was ordered. This leaves 13 cases where the abuser doesn’t appear to have been held

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accountable\textsuperscript{106} for stealing or damaging the victim’ property; and in instances where an assault accompanied the theft or property damage, was not held accountable for the assault, either.

Range of conduct. There is a range of conduct – misdemeanor to felony - evident in these 13 cases:

- \textit{Grabbing, shaking, name-calling, theft of house key}. Victim and suspect dating for 2 years. They do not live together or have children together. While suspect was at victim’s residence, victim asked suspect to stop playing video games and take down a Christmas tree. Suspect refused; victim unplugged video game player. Suspect grabbed victim, started shaking her, and calling her “Bitch” repeatedly. Suspect took victim’s house key and wouldn’t give it back. Suspect left scene before officers arrived.

- \textit{Arson, animal cruelty}. Victim and suspect in a relationship for 2 years. Suspect moved into victim’s residence, and they lived together until an argument on over her not wanting to be in the relationship anymore and him wanting another chance. Suspect took victim’s phone, car keys and vehicle, and left. A few minutes later, police stopped him for speeding and found his driver’s license revoked and wanted victim to come get her car that he was driving. Suspect’s friend picked up victim and drove to victim’s car. Suspect wouldn’t give victim the keys, so victim drove the friend’s car back to victim’s residence, while the friend convinced suspect to give up the keys. The friend then drove victim’s car to victim’s residence with suspect. Victim called police because she thought suspect went in her residence, but he left when police arrived. After police left, suspect called victim, saying he’d get his things. Victim went to the store because she didn’t want to be there when suspect came over. Suspect’s friend then called victim to say suspect got his things and was leaving. Victim returned 5 minutes later, opened her door, and was met with heavy smoke and fire.

An arson investigation later revealed that when suspect came to victim’s residence, he picked up one of victim’s cats that was outside, put it in the house, made several piles of victim’s clothing, set them each on fire, and left. The fire caused $70,000 structural damage, and $30,000 damage or loss of contents. One of victim’s cats was found dead under a couch and another was so ill from smoke inhalation that victim surrendered it to a shelter because she couldn’t afford treatment. There isn’t documentation of an investigator attempting to locate or interview suspect, although there was a mug shot taken of him 3 ½ weeks after the fire. A warrant for suspect was issued 1 ½ years after the fire. As of March 2023, he hasn’t been convicted of any charges arising from this incident.

\textsuperscript{106} It is possible that prosecutors may have issued warrants for the offenders who were not arrested or permitted the offender to enter into a diversion agreement or continuance without plea. GRW staff had available only disposition status comments in the reports; and Minnesota Public Criminal History, which shows only convictions and not arrests, warrants, continuances, or diversion agreements.
10 of the 24 survivors who participated in listening sessions or individual interviews described experiences of their abusers stealing or damaging their property. None of these were instances where the property could arguably be the abuser’s property.

Several described a one-time experience – the abuser vandalized or stole the victim’s car, kicked in a door at a residence, or broke many personal items belonging to the victim. Others had these kinds of experiences multiple times. One survivor described incidents of her abuser slashing her tires, breaking her mother’s windows, and even vandalizing her son’s grave by drilling out the image of her son that was on the gravestone. Another survivor described several incidents of her abuser breaking into her residence to steal or disable things not in a dramatically destructive way, but rather to make life more difficult or frustrating for her. For example, on one occasion he disabled the internet service and on another the cable service. On other occasions, he stole all the remotes for all the electronics in the house and stole all her right shoes – leaving only the left ones. None of the survivors indicated that these abusers were held accountable for any of the property theft or damage.

How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?

Property damage and economic control by abusers erode the victim’s financial resources, lessening her ability to escape the violence.

The most well-established and commonly accepted descriptions of the experience of intimate partner violence, the concepts of Power and Control\textsuperscript{107} and Coercive Control,\textsuperscript{108} identify theft or damage of the victim’s property as a common tactic of domestic abusers. Power and Control identifies intimidation and economic abuse as tactics of an abuser and gives examples of these that include destroying the victim’s property and taking the victim’s money. Coercive Control identifies abuser behaviors intended to dominate their partner or limit their freedom, including financial abuse and damaging the victim’s property.

In researching why abusive men kill or attempt to kill their partners, David Adams, a longtime co-director of an abuser education program, interviewed 31 men in prison who had killed their intimate partners. For seven of these men, Adams coined the term “materially motivated” – meaning their primary interests in relationships with women were related to money and other


material assets, and not only their possessions, such as a house and a car, but also the benefits that such possessions confer.

In the case of a house, for example, the material benefits include not just having equity in a home as well as status in the community, but also having a place to call home with all the attendant privileges. What stood out in the materially motivated men that Adams interviewed was their expectation of such benefits without assuming any reciprocal responsibilities. They also seemed to expect such benefits while having no emotional attachment or loyalty to their partners. These men appeared to have murdered their partners primarily motivated by grievances concerning money, possessions, and other material benefits. They murdered not for profit, but to avoid material loss.109

Local survivor experiences of theft of or damage to their property.
Adams’ observations encapsulate what some local survivors said about abusers’ theft or damage of their property.

Abuser feels entitled to victim’s property. In one police report110 when the abuser stole the victim’s car, the victim told police she’d been trying to break up with him for months. He moved into her residence 6 months prior, and had become abusive and entitled to her possessions soon after moving in. He stole her car and after she convinced him to return it, she took it to her grandparents’ home while he was sleeping. When he woke up and saw the car was gone, he started screaming “Where’s the car?” He was so angry she had hidden her car from him that he punched her multiple times in the face and head, then shot her with a BB gun approximately 50 times.

In another example, a local survivor who also said that her abuser had forced her to have sex, prefaced that revelation by also describing his entitlement to her home and resources. She moved to Minneapolis to get away from her abuser, but he followed her. “He stays a couple months and goes back. . . . He preys on me. . . . He manipulates me. He won’t clean up after himself but will massage my legs, and then use that against me. ‘Look what I did for you,’ etc. He has nothing going for himself but feels entitled to use me.”

Impact on victim’s safety and security. The theft and damage of victims’ property can be an indicator of heightened physical danger from some abusers. In addition, local survivors described the impact on their personal safety and security: stolen or destroyed phones meant survivors had to run to a neighbor or flag down a passerby to call for help; vandalized cars left survivors with no way to leave the scene of the abuse; and, stolen keys and kicked in doors prevent survivors from keeping abusers out of their homes, often for some time. A locksmith or handyman are typically

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not immediately available, especially at night, and it may take days until an appointment can be made. Then there is the burdensome cost of these repairs or replacements.

These kinds of losses can then generate even more costs for cash-strapped victims. One survivor reported that her abuser had vandalized her car, which was parked on the street, to the point it was inoperable during a snow emergency. Her car was ticketed and towed by the city. When she tried to explain to someone at the impound lot that she was the victim of a crime – hoping to get all or some of the fees waived - she was told there were no exceptions. While she tried to scrape together the money to pay for the ticket and the tow, the impound lot also charged daily storage fees which eventually amounted to $600. She again tried to explain what had happened, hoping to get all or some of these fees waived; but again, was unsuccessful.

Another survivor who’d been living with his abuser but had to move out when the relationship ended, had no place to go and was living his car. His ex-partner found him and broke the windows in the car and poured a substance in the gas tank. This survivor then had no secure place to sleep or store his belongings, and no way of moving the car without risking damage to the engine.

**How is this gap produced? What contributes to it?**

MPD policy doesn’t provide clear guidance on how to address property damage related to DV calls.

While MPD policy appears to anticipate that theft or property damage may occur as part of domestic abuse, the policy does not specifically direct officers to take reports on theft or property damage that accompanies domestic abuse. Additionally, most of the theft or property damage described above are misdemeanors, and as discussed previously, there appears to be an unwritten policy or practice to not utilize investigative resources in misdemeanor cases.

Some officers appeared to have the impression that the existence of a relationship means the victim’s property is community property (jointly owned with the abuser) and the abuser has a right to destroy it, as related in the survivor stories at the beginning of this section. Two survivors were told by responding officers that officers would not take reports of stolen or damaged property because “you were in a domestic relationship with him” or “he lives here.”

The survivor who reported break-ins and thefts of petty things like shoes, remotes, etc. stated during her interview that she and her ex-partner were never married and he hadn’t lived with her for years.

The survivor who reported that her ex-partner had broken all of her breakable possessions while she was away stated that she and her ex-partner were never married and had been out of the relationship for some time when she allowed him to stay briefly at her apartment after his release from mental health treatment until he could find his own place. He had not previously
lived with her at that apartment and none of his possessions were there. Several local advocates and individuals working in the local criminal justice system who were interviewed said they had heard similar comments from officers.

The MPD’s severe understaffing greatly reduces the department’s ability for responding officers to more fully document or recommend charges, or investigators to conduct follow-up, on domestic abusers’ theft or damage of their victims’ property.

A member of the police department interviewed for this project noted that it isn’t just property crime within DV calls for which there is a shortage of responding officer and investigator time; the same is true for other property crimes, as well. For example, citizens are frustrated that police currently often don’t have resources to investigate car thefts, catalytic converter thefts, garage burglaries, etc. The incidence of carjackings in Minneapolis has increased dramatically – 57% from 2020 to 2021, and 23% from 2021 to 2022. Police have to prioritize initial response and investigative time for cases where the public is in danger.

Consequently, police may feel that in this era of scarce police resources, victims of theft and property damage can use other resources such as car insurance, renter’s insurance, or homeowner’s insurance for replacements or repairs of stolen or damaged property. But many DV victims don’t have and can’t afford monthly premiums for various types of insurance. Even if they did, it is not realistic to expect insurance to cover the multiple experiences that many victims have: an abuser not once but twice stealing or smashing a phone, slashing tires on four different cars, or breaking into a residence multiple times. Also, Minnesota’s crime victim compensation fund accepts such applications only from victims of violent crime. Property crimes are not covered.

Finally, the theft and damage to victims’ property described in this section would often fall in the misdemeanor category of crime. As stated in several parts of this report, there appears to be a longtime unwritten MPD policy that investigative resources aren’t invested in misdemeanor crimes.


\[112\] For more information, see the webpage for the Minnesota Crime Victim Reparations Board at https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ojp/help-for-crime-victims/Pages/crime-victims-reparations.aspx.
Good Practices We Support and Encourage

Standbys
Some police reports documented officers standing by while the victim prepared to leave her residence for the night. In two reports where the abuser assaulted the victim and then stole or destroyed her phone, officers took pictures of the scene and the damage, made sure the victim had a safe place to go for the night, stood by while she gathered some personal items, and offered to escort her to her vehicle.

Alerting victim to additional resources
In the arson and animal cruelty at a victim’s residence described earlier, the investigator talked to the victim about resources that may be available from the Red Cross and from her insurance company. Also, either the responding officer or investigator made the victim aware of the Domestic Violence Intervention Initiative—a partnership between the MPD and Minneapolis Animal Care and Control—which provides free pet kenneling to individuals reluctant to leave a domestic relationship due to concern for their pet’s safety. One of the victim’s cats was ill from smoke inhalation, and she surrendered it because she no longer had the means to care for it.

Criminal justice partners following up with victims about property damage
Each day a victim witness specialist at the Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office contacts victims in cases where the perpetrator was arrested. The specialist uses a Victim Input form to guide their conversation. Although primarily to get the victim’s input on the eventual disposition of the case, the form does suggest that the victim be asked if any of her property was damaged and if any restitution would be requested.

Phones and cameras for victims
In some instances, especially where a victim’s phone has been stolen or destroyed, or where a victim is repeatedly being accosted at her residence, community-based victim advocacy programs can provide phones or cameras to victims.

Moving assistance for victims
A survivor who participated in a listening session reported that after realizing she needed to move out of her residence so that the abuser would no longer know where she lived, she contacted Mother’s Love and received help moving out and then into a new place.

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115 See Appendices.
116 Mother’s Love Initiative is a grassroots organization made up of African American mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters. The initiative is focused around violence and domestic violence, understanding that they are often intertwined. For more information, see https://www.amothersloveinitiative.org./
Recommendations: How do we close the gap? What will help address it?

Law enforcement can help keep victims economically secure through their regular job duties. As the gatekeeper to the criminal justice system, it is critical that law enforcement respond to protect the economic security of victims, whether through collecting evidence or enforcing court orders. These actions are not only necessary for the victim’s safety but can make the intervention of each officer more effective, improve the success of the criminal justice system, and enhance community safety. The following are just a few of the positive outcomes that may result from law enforcement support of economic security:

- Protecting victims’ economic security can make them better able – and more likely – to cooperate and testify in court.
- Economic evidence and arrests for economic crimes can improve an officer’s ability to hold offenders accountable by increasing the likelihood of successful criminal and civil court actions.
- Showing economic impacts and gathering evidence of economic crimes during the investigation allows prosecutors and judges to see the full context of the crime and pursue the proper recourse. For example, victims may receive needed restitution or economic relief for documented damages.
- Victims will be less vulnerable to homelessness or unemployment, which are serious risk factors for further victimization.
- Victims are more likely to report additional or future crimes if their trust in the justice system is improved by law enforcement recognizing and supporting their economic security.\footnote{MPD’s domestic abuse policy should include the expectation that officers document not only crimes of assault, threats, stalking, and violations of orders; but also crimes with economic impact on victims (theft, property damage, etc.).}

An advocate reported that there is a laminated card that lists the currently MPD policy along with property-related questions for officers to ask, but it needs to be updated. To assist in this process, protocol elements could be drawn from the Law Enforcement Guide to Safety and Economic Security for Victims of Violence Against Women, available online from the Institute for Women’s Policy Research.\footnote{An advocate reported that there is a laminated card that lists the currently MPD policy along with property-related questions for officers to ask, but it needs to be updated. To assist in this process, protocol elements could be drawn from the Law Enforcement Guide to Safety and Economic Security for Victims of Violence Against Women, available online from the Institute for Women’s Policy Research.}


Advocates also recommended that the policy clarify how property theft and damage is a criminal matter and not a civil matter. For example, property owned by a victim who is not married to the suspect is not marital property that the suspect has a right to take or destroy.

**Supervisory actions should be taken to insure compliance with new policy.**

Considering the benefits to victims, law enforcement officers and the criminal justice system as a whole, a police department’s successful incorporation of policies and protocols that promote economic security should be accompanied by an investment in guidance for department supervisors. We recommend MPD create guidance for department supervisors, which could be drawn from recommendations for supervisors in the *Law Enforcement Guide to Safety and Economic Security for Victims of Violence Against Women*.\(^\text{119}\)

Additionally, we recommend supervisors provide an opportunity for officers to give feedback on new policy after its implementation.

**Officers should receive experiential training on the new policy.**

Once supervision of new policy and protocol is in place, we recommend that the Minneapolis Police Department introduce it to patrol officers through training. We recommend using a domestic abuse police report with elements of economic crime against the victim to engage the audience and give them an opportunity to apply the new policy and protocol. *The Law Enforcement Guide to Economic Safety and Security for Victims*\(^\text{120}\) has a sample police report that could be used during training if a department doesn’t wish to use its own; suggested discussion questions; and suggestions for other content, training format and timing, and who to include in the audience.

**MPD should support partner efforts to develop additional resources for victims.**

We also urge MPD, in partnership with prosecutors, advocates, and community-based programs, to support efforts to develop additional resources for DV victims whose abusers have stolen or damaged their property or burdened victims with other security-related costs. For example:

\[\text{\footnotesize References}\]


• A resource that would fund lock changes for domestic violence victims would provide a measure of personal security for victims. For example, the Project Safe program\textsuperscript{121} can send a professional locksmith to change a victim’s lock or cylinder for free. An advocate is available to discuss safety concerns, safety plan, and determine if the survivor qualifies for a free lock change. If so, the advocate will set up an appointment with a professional locksmith.

• A resource to assist victims whose abusers vandalized their cars would help victims maintain their independence and their employment. For example, the Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office has a modest amount of discretionary funds for witness security, safety, or safety planning expenses. A former staff member of that officer recalled that a victim whose abuser was being prosecuted had lost several jobs because the abuser put sugar or other substances into her gas tank, leaving her no way to get to work and subsequently, she lost jobs. Witness security staff suggested a high-quality locking gas cap (cost $75-175) and paid for it with this discretionary funding, after which there were no more instances of vehicle-tampering.

• A resource to assist victims in moving to a new residence would facilitate their escaping violence. At a training, one officer asked, “Is there any access to moving trucks/moving helpers for victims? Seems like that is an obstacle, them not wanting to leave behind their property, which I can understand.”

• Advocacy on behalf of victims with Minnesota’s crime victim compensation fund may help support victims’ request for restitution. For example, could a case be made for victims whose property was stolen or damaged during an assault that this is part of a crime of violence for which restitution can legitimately be requested?

If any of these resources could be established, MPD’s Domestic Violence Navigator suggested that the navigator position could serve as manager or distributor of these resources – e.g., distribute a cell phone, etc. It would be important to inform patrol officers of any new resources established, as documentation of property theft or damage would likely be the criteria upon which the provision of these resources would be based.

\textsuperscript{121} Project Safe is a project of Safe Horizon, a leading victim assistance organization, operating a network of programs across New York City communities and systems. For more information, see https://www.safehorizon.org/project-safe-lock-replacement/.
Gap: Emerging research on traumatic brain injury is being incorporated into the medical response to DV victims, and current DV protocols for patrol officers, investigators, prosecutors, and advocates should be revised to ensure a coordinated and effective response to victims with head trauma.

Over time, the frequency of concussions and brain injury in professional sports has been acknowledged and steps are being taken to protect players. In the medical field, this recognition has spread to the potential for brain injury in domestic assaults and the need for improved detection and treatment.

The identification of this gap is included to focus attention on this issue and ensure that subsequent efforts to improve practice incorporate steps to recognize the medical seriousness of head injuries and effectively respond to these victims. The assessment did not expect to find specific police actions related to this issue since it’s not addressed yet in current policies. However, we strongly urge MPD and all the governmental and social service agencies involved in DV cases to seize the opportunity to update and improve their responses to victims who have suffered head trauma.

Relevant policy

MPD’s policy on preliminary investigation of domestic abuse\(^{122}\) states:

- Officers are to thoroughly investigate all allegations of domestic violence, make appropriate referrals, and take action according to the totality of the information known.
- Officers are to enforce criminal laws without regard to the relationship of the parties involved, and aggressively utilize the arrest powers granted by the State Legislature.
- Arrests for DV, based on probable cause, are expected if:
  - Signs of injury or impairment,
  - Dangerous weapon involved,
  - Alleged assault - no signs of injury,
  - Victim alleges to be in fear of immediate bodily harm,
  - Terroristic threats, or
  - Criminal sexual conduct.

The relevant portion of MPD’s DV Incident Response Protocol\(^{123}\) states officers should:


- Obtain a signed medical release with shaded areas completed from victim if victim is seeking medical treatment.
- Ask the victim to complete a domestic violence victim’s supplement.
- Document in report the victim’s answers to risk assessment questions\(^{124}\) listed on domestic violence victim’s supplement and ask any follow-up questions.
- Take photographs. Examples of things to photograph include, but are not limited to, the arrestee; victim; and injuries . . .

**What is our evidence? What did we hear, see, or read?**

Officers regularly obtain medical attention for victims and document injuries in DV cases.

MPD policy directs officers to offer medical attention in applicable cases\(^{125}\) and to photograph injuries. In the 100 police reports reviewed, officers documented the location on the body, any symptoms (pain, dizziness, etc.), and how it was caused in 100% of the 61 cases when victims reported in injury. In the 54 cases where there were visible injuries, officers documented photographing the injuries in 83% of the cases. Increasing attention to the signs of head injuries will further enhance the current response.

A significant number of MPD cases involved blows to the head or head injuries.

Of the 100 DV police reports reviewed for this project, 35 involved blows to the head.\(^{126}\)
- In 20 cases, the victim was punched multiple times in the head.
- In 8 cases, the victim was punched once in the face.
- In 2 cases, the victim was punched once in the head so hard that she fell to the ground.
- In 1 case, the abuser shoved the victim so hard she fell backward and struck her head on a clothes washer. He then threw her to the floor so hard that her head struck the floor.
- In 1 case, the abuser struck victim’s head with a frying pan
- In 1 case, the abuser repeatedly banged the victim’s head against a wall
- In 1 case, the victim was punched on the side of her neck so hard that a large dark bruise had formed by the time officers arrived

\(^{124}\) These questions include a diagram for the victim to indicate where she was injured, and questions relevant to the potential for brain injury, such as: How were you assaulted? Did you fear for your safety while being assaulted? Describe the assault.

\(^{125}\) When the victim requests it, when a party has an injury, when there has been physical contact between the parties, etc.

\(^{126}\) For the purposes of this review, blows to the head is defined as striking a person in the face, head, or neck with a closed fist or hard object; or taking hold of someone’s head and forcefully making contact with a hard surface such as a floor, wall, etc.
• In 1 case, the abuser headbutted victim in the forehead so hard she fell to her knees, then headbutted her again at the back of the head and she lost consciousness.

One-third of the survivors who participated in focus groups or interviews reported being struck in the head.

Of the 24 survivors in focus groups or individual interviews, most had been assaulted multiple times. 8 specifically mentioned instances of being struck in the face or head:
  • 2 survivors were struck several times and hospitalized with a concussion. One of these survivors reported having post-concussion symptoms (light and sound sensitivity) for a year.
  • 1 survivor reported that her abuser knocked her mother’s head into a car so hard that she lost consciousness and had a concussion, as well as had post-concussion symptoms for the next year.
  • 2 survivors reported having their noses broken. One of these survivors also received a broken orbital bone.
  • 1 survivor was struck across the face with a baseball bat and her teeth were broken.
  • 1 survivor said her abuser smashed her head against something while dragging her, which caused a serious, permanent injury to one of the vertebrae in her neck.
  • 1 survivor was kicked in the face.

In 2022, local forensic nurses saw 120 patients who were victims of domestic violence. The Hennepin Assault Response Team (HART) is a team of nurses available to conduct an evidence collection exam. They are specially trained to provide trauma-informed medical care and support for individuals who have experienced domestic or sexual assault, human trafficking or sexual exploitation, and child sexual abuse. The supervisor of HART said the team saw approximately 900 patients in 2022; 120 were victims of DV.

How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims? A problem of offender and systemic accountability?

After conducting research in this area, the Center on Partner-Inflicted Brain Injury listed these lessons learned:
  • Almost all DV survivors experience violence that could cause brain injuries and many struggle with mental health.
  • DV causes and exacerbates brain injury and mental health struggles and is connected to suicidality and substance use.

127 Currently located at Hennepin County Medical Center in Minneapolis, HART is adding availability at 12 additional area hospitals in 2023. For more information, see https://www.hennepinhealthcare.org/support-services/violence-assault-and-abuse-resources/hart-resources/.
• Those providing direct services to domestic violence victims know that DV impacts mental health, but programs struggle with effectively providing services and meeting the needs of survivors with mental illness, especially with the lack of available and accessible of trauma-informed mental health services.

• Service providers and first responders don’t know that DV victims might have brain injuries. While DV victims report incredibly high levels of head trauma, brain injury is largely unidentified, rarely addressed, and not well understood by DV programs.

• Brain injury in the context of DV (termed partner inflicted brain injury) is markedly different from other commonly studied brain injuries, including brain injuries caused by accidents, sports, and combat.

The Center’s findings suggest the vast majority of survivors who access advocacy services have had experiences that clearly impact the brain and cause the following symptoms:

• Physical (headaches, sleeping problems, sensitivity to light or noise, dizziness, balance problems, fatigue, seizures)

• Emotional (worries and fears, panic attacks, flashbacks, sadness, depression, hopelessness, anger or rage)

• Thinking (remembering things, understanding things, paying attention, or focusing, following directions, getting things started, figuring out what to do next, organizing things, controlling your emotions or reactions)

The importance of paying attention to partner inflicted brain injuries is heightened by the experiences reported by survivors here in Minneapolis. The dangerousness is obvious from the examples listed above. Additionally, these survivors reported longer-term impacts:

• The woman whose orbital bone was broken lost a job because her eye was so swollen, she couldn’t see out of it for days. Subsequently, she experienced post-concussion symptoms (light and sound sensitivity) that made it difficult for her to work or go anywhere, as she had to be in a darkened room, had to turn off any TV-level noise, etc.

• The woman who had a serious and permanent injury to her neck vertebrae said that the injury was so serious, she would face paralysis if she experienced another head or neck injury during an assault. She felt she had to constantly “assess every situation” and be ready to defend herself - even to the point of sleeping with a knife under her pillow – to ensure she would never be injured that seriously again.

• The woman who was struck in the face with a baseball bat, breaking her teeth, had just had a baby not long beforehand. This left her in the position of recovering from childbirth, managing numerous dental injuries, not being able to eat, caring for a baby, and not wanting to leave the baby alone with her partner.

Finally, none of the survivors who described the head injuries above felt their abusers were held accountable for this level of assault. The woman who said her abuser knocked her mother unconscious said he “got away with it” by claiming her mother pointed her finger at him in a threatening manner.

**How is this gap produced? What contributes to it?**

Brain injury is largely unidentified, rarely addressed, and not well understood by most of the DV programs and government agencies that respond to victims and offenders, including police. Additionally, victims themselves may fail to identify brain injuries or address them, which heightens the need for intervention.

One of the survivors stated that when her nose was broken, she “couldn’t think – couldn’t think to call my family, or who could do that – couldn’t think of the number,” etc. She didn’t realize she may have had a concussion and was experiencing symptoms. Thus, this gap in victim safety is produced by lack of knowledge, policy/protocol guidance, and training among those who directly serve domestic violence victims, as well as victims themselves.

**Recommendations: How do we close the gap? What will help address it?**

Minneapolis is fortunate to have the resource of the Hennepin Assault Response Team (HART), which has a great deal of experience with DV victims as well as the potential for brain injury. HART has recently created a signs and symptoms card for victims who should be alerted to the potential for a brain injury:

**SIDE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have you . . .</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Been hit in the face, neck, or head?</td>
<td>Been pushed or fallen, and hit your head?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Been choked, strangled, or suffocated?</td>
<td>Been shaken severely?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You may have a brain injury, even if you don’t have any marks on your skin. Symptoms could include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thinking/remembering issues</th>
<th>Change in emotional health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical ailments</td>
<td>Sleep disorders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SIDE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call 911 if you experience:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Severe headache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vomiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleepiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of consciousness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HART is currently housed at Hennepin County Medical Center but is rolling out a presence at 12 additional area hospitals in 2023. HART is also hosting a large multi-disciplinary training on strangulation in Minneapolis in June 2023. We recommend that MPD take advantage of this excellent resource in the following ways.

MPD should partner with HART, local prosecutors, and victim advocates to update current MPD policy on:

- The patrol response to DV calls when the victim may have a head injury.
  - Are there any questions patrol officers should ask in cases when the victim has been struck in the head to alert prosecutors and advocates of the potential seriousness of the assault?
  - Is there anything it would be helpful to document?
  - Should police have access to and give out the above signs and symptoms card to victims?
  - As HART rolls out a presence at 12 additional area hospitals in 2023, should police give victims information about the availability of being seen by a forensic nurse?
- The investigator follow-up with victims who have been assaulted about the head.
  - Should questions be developed to inquire into whether victims are experiencing post-concussion symptoms?
  - If victims answer affirmatively, should the investigator be prepared to offer resources, suggest medical attention, etc.? It would be important to work with prosecutors on these sorts of questions, with an eye to better support prosecutors holding perpetrators of these kinds of assaults more highly accountable.
- Community-based advocacy and victim support staff within police and prosecutor’ officers follow up with victims.
  - These practitioners are updating risk assessment information with victims – should inquiry be made of victims with head injuries about any signs or symptoms of brain injury?
  - If victims answer affirmatively, should these advocates and staff members be prepared to offer resources, suggest medical attention, etc.? It would be important to work with prosecutors on this sort of information, in the event it should be shared.

Supervisory actions should be taken to ensure compliance with new policy.

Any training on a new policy in this area should be given to supervisors first, to insure buy-in, good messaging, and that supervisors are equipped to supervise on this new issue.

MPD should partner with HART, local prosecutors, and victim advocates to update current MPD policy on:

- The patrol response to DV calls when the victim may have a head injury.
Once any policy change is made, HART is well-equipped to partner with MPD in a multi-disciplinary training (police, prosecutors, victim advocates, medical responders) on recognizing and documenting possible brain injury.

Education for victims and the community should also be planned.

- Could advocates and police partner in such an effort once any new police policy takes effect?
- Could HART’s brochure be utilized as education for victims?
- Could support groups or other activities be a place where survivors are alerted to the potential for brain injury?
- Are there outlets in the community that are appropriate for community outreach talks on this subject?
Gap: Current risk assessment practices do not utilize risk data to prioritize the deployment of criminal justice resources toward the most dangerous offenders.

“MPD acts like domestic violence is important with all the stuff we are required to do on these cases. In reality, we focus more on robbers, drug dealers, and gangsters, when in fact, . . . these are the same people committing domestic violence. Maybe our focus should be on abusers, and it would have a trickle-down effect to other violent crimes.”

*MPD officer, in response to a survey question asking for officer suggestions to improve the response to domestic violence.*

**Relevant policy**

Indicators of who is causing fear and who is presenting danger are included in MPD’s guidance for officers determining the primary aggressor\(^{129}\) at the scene of domestic abuse calls:

- Whether one person in the dispute was acting in self-defense;
- Whether a violation of an OFP or DANCO has occurred;
- Extent of injuries, if any, to any person involved;
- Who initiated the first act of physical violence;
- Existence of a fear of physical injury, because threats were made;
- History of physical violence perpetuated by one party against the other; and
- The physical stature or physical ability of the persons involved.\(^{130}\)

The MPD’s domestic abuse policy\(^{131}\) also requires responding officers to complete these activities when responding to these calls:

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\(^{129}\) When both parties allege the other used violence and a self-defense analysis is not applicable or possible, the terms: primary aggressor, predominant aggressor, or dominant aggressor, are used in DV arrest laws or policies in to identify the individual who poses the most serious, ongoing threat, which may not necessarily be the initial aggressor in a specific incident.


• Ask if suspect has access to guns or ammunition or if there are any in the home. If yes, ask if victim has safety concerns. Document responses in report. Officers may property inventory guns and ammunition for safe keeping.
• Check Probable Cause Felony Enhanced List on all DV calls, including when suspect is GOA. This list is maintained by the Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office of all defendants known to be chargeable – due to particular types of past criminal convictions - with a felony for assault; domestic assault; or violation of an OFP, harassment/restraining order, or DANCO.
• Ask the victim to complete the Domestic Violence Victim’s Supplement.

The policy defines risk assessment as questions officers ask a victim that pertain to DV history and the potential threat of future violence. Risk assessment questions appear in MPD’s DV Victim Supplement, available in English, Spanish, Hmong, and Somali.

The MPD’s Domestic Abuse Incident Response Protocol also requires responding officers to provide victim advocacy information to victims:
• Inform victims of domestic violence resources on the Victim Assistance Card (Blue Card).
• Offer advocacy services of designated community-based program to victims.
• Inform victims that they will likely be contacted by victim witness staff the following week during business hours, to discuss the case and provide resource referrals.
• If a victim indicates they would like to speak with an advocate right away, officers shall call the designated community-based program.132

What is our evidence? What did we hear, see, or read?

When responding to DV calls, patrol officers generally carried out risk information-related tasks required by policy most of the time.

In the 100 police reports reviewed during this assessment, officers documented that the:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task described</th>
<th>Percentage of the cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim was asked if suspect has access to guns or ammunition or if there are any in the home. If yes, victim was asked if any safety concerns in</td>
<td>79% of the cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable Cause Felony Enhanced List was checked for suspect’s name in</td>
<td>67% of the cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim was asked to complete DV supplement in</td>
<td>76% of the cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seven (7) of these were also complaints of an OFP or DANCO being violated.

In the 24 cases when police did not document asking the victim to complete the DV supplement, police noted a reason for not doing so in 3 cases, leaving 21 cases without documentation of completing the supplement. It should be noted that in three of these 21 cases, officers documented verbally asking the victim some of the risk assessment questions from the DV supplement.

In the 100 police reports, officers documented:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Giving the victim the Victim Assistance Card (Blue Card) in</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calling the designated community-based advocacy program in</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the cases where there was no blue card or phone call documented, officers documented an explanation for not doing so in 6 cases.

Advocates and individuals working in the local justice system reported that the risk assessment information on DV supplements is used by:

- Law enforcement supervisors and prosecutors to prioritize cases for scarce investigation resources.
- Prosecutors to inform recommendations for bail and conditions, and sometimes to include in criminal complaints or for use at trial (e.g., a victim comment on the supplement such as “If he gets out, he will kill me.”)
- Victim advocates to follow up with victims on safety planning.
- Probation officers to see if the supplement indicates a suspect already on probation has guns, which can be used as a basis for the probation officer to search the person’s residence or other premises. Probation will also follow up with victims on other questions/answers on the supplement.

In addition to the DV supplement, other forms used by criminal justice practitioners reference risk assessment or ask some risk-related questions. For example, each day a victim witness specialist at the Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office contacts victims in cases where the perpetrator was arrested. The specialist uses a Victim Input form\textsuperscript{133} to guide their conversation. Although primarily to get the victim’s input on the eventual disposition of the case, the form does ask risk assessment questions: about any OFPs, defendant contacts from jail, injuries, history of violence, fears of testifying in court, and the defendant’s access to guns.

For another example, the Minnesota Pretrial Release Evaluation form\textsuperscript{134} (for pretrial release generally – not DV specific) asks about prior criminal record, whether a lethality assessment has been conducted, and any victim comments.

\textsuperscript{133} See Appendices.
\textsuperscript{134} See Appendices.
Finally, there are everyday informal ways that practitioners collect or share risk assessment information. The director of DASC described the helpfulness of the daily information exchange and two-way learning process that occurs with the presence of an embedded investigator, who is in daily communication with on-site and off-site victim advocates about DV cases, and about the circumstances of particular victims or offenders. Advocates described relationships they had forged with individual law enforcement supervisors and prosecutors who they could call and press a particular case where risk assessment information didn’t appear to be recognized or where new risk information had been obtained. And in the police reports reviewed during this assessment where follow-up investigators were assigned, some investigators – not all, but some - asked victims follow-up risk assessment questions.

However, when risk information is collected, a high-risk designation doesn’t appear to heighten the collective response, such as prompting patrol to search for a GOA suspect, an investigator to try to contact the suspect, a prosecution to ensue, or probation action to be taken.

In 23 of the 48 GOAs, the victim filled out the DV supplement, but the case wasn’t assigned to investigation and didn’t get prosecuted. For example:

Victim and suspect are in a relationship and live together. Victim has children. Today suspect wanted to have sex and when victim did not want to, suspect punched her in the face. He then picked up a 10 lb. kettlebell and swung it at her, hitting the side of her hip and torso. She ran from the residence. She came back later to get diapers for her children and got involved in another argument with suspect that turned physical. Suspect told victim she could not leave and grabbed a screwdriver and tried to stab her with it. He took her phone and keys. Victim was able to get away from him and leave the residence to call police. Police arrived in 8 minutes, but suspect was GOA.

Victim filled out the DV supplement, saying she was afraid for her safety during this incident because she had no way to call for help. She thinks suspect will seriously injure or kill her because he doesn't want her to leave him. He intimidates or threatens to assault her every couple months. Suspect has 12 prior criminal convictions between 2004-2019. The police report recommends a charge of 2nd Degree Assault. The case was not assigned to investigation or prosecuted. He was on 3 years’ probation at the time of this incident – until April 2022 – but there is no record of any probation action taken.

*Case 2020-16*
There were 15 additional reports where the victim filled out the DV supplement and the case was assigned to investigation, but still wasn’t prosecuted. For example:

Victim and suspect were in a relationship for 1 year. They do not live together. They have a baby together. Today suspect came to victim's apartment and started kicking the door, telling the victim to let him in or he’d kick the door in. Victim opened the door, and suspect punched her 5 or 6 times in the face. He then broke victim's 50" TV and left. Police arrived 2 hours and 14 minutes later.

On the DV Supplement, victim answered the question "How often does this person intimidate or threaten to assault you?" with "Not often - barely see him." She did not think suspect would seriously injure or kill her or her child. Victim said suspect had assaulted her in the past and she filed prior reports. Victim is listed as a previous victim on suspect’s enhancement sheet. Suspect has 6 prior criminal convictions between 2011-2012. Officers did not document any attempt to locate or contact the suspect. Report recommends charge of 5th Degree Domestic Assault-Enhanced.

Investigator assigned 1 day later and reviewed body camera footage, did not try to locate or contact suspect, and tried to call victim and noted the number is not hers (the 911 record states she told 911 that she’d be staying with a friend). Investigator noted that if victim is not going to make herself available, he can’t conduct an investigation; and sent the case to the County Attorney’s Office without doing further investigation. The County Attorney’s Office declined to charge the case 2 days later.

Case 2020 - 10

There are differences among investigators in follow-up on risk assessment. The difference in approach among investigators reflected at various points in this report may indicate a difference in philosophy about DV or their training/experience in DV cases or an interest/lack of interest in DV cases. This was confirmed by several of those interviewed, who were also asked about patrol officers asking follow-up questions to victims’ answers to risk assessment questions on the DV supplement. One person said that a patrol officer told them, “That’s an investigator’s job”; and another person said that officers and supervisors have told them, “That’s a resource issue.”

Victims feel rushed.
Additionally, some who were interviewed said the practice of giving the DV supplement to the victim to fill out - instead of the officer asking the victim questions – creates a situation where the officer is waiting for the victim. This gives victims the sense that they have to hurry. Sometimes there is more than one squad that responds to a call, and then there are multiple officers present. The formatting of the form doesn’t give victims much room to write more than
a few words in answer to each question, and finally, victims might be full of adrenaline, shaking, writing on the hood of a car, and can’t remember everything. There is no opportunity to add to the answers the next day.

Survivors are unclear about how the risk information is used and some are uncomfortable with filling out the form.

The current protocol is to have DV victims fill out the Domestic Violence Victim Supplement themselves in their own handwriting. There were mixed feelings from survivors when asked about this practice. Some did not remember filling out the form or being asked these questions. Some did remember and either didn’t have an opinion one way or the other, or thought these questions were too intrusive. One survivor felt that the questions themselves weren’t intrusive, but rather the environment and the way in which the questions were asked. Some who’d made multiple calls said they’d been given the form or asked these questions during some but not all incidents.

None of the survivors knew what the information was used for, how it could be helpful, etc. Some specifics from the survivors along these lines are enlightening, and may point to the disconnect that can happen when questions are simply listed on paper instead of being part of the regular human interchange of conversation:

- One survivor said she would have told the officer about past sexual abuse if she had been asked, as opposed to writing it down on a form.
- One talked about risk-informative behavior that doesn’t seem to get taken up or recognized in the system, such as her abuser’s angry behavior in public (yelling and swearing in court, etc.).
- Another thought that all the information she put in her OFP application – which was full of information about the conduct her abuser had engaged in – was visible to police and so she wasn’t very comprehensive in her answers to risk questions on the DV supplement. She thought this misunderstanding could have been addressed if the form or the police asked open-ended questions instead of yes or no questions.
- One survivor said even though she had provided the risk information, she was surprised that it didn’t seem to be shared with the courts: when she went to court, she was placed in a waiting room with her abuser and his lawyer.
- Finally, a survivor who had called police many times for OFP violations for which the abuser wasn’t held accountable had become discouraged about the value of being a “good victim” who fills out all the forms and answers all the questions: “I don’t even want to talk to advocates anymore because I’m put in a ‘box’ of safety. I’m not getting
child support. I’m on a domestic violence waiver now so I don’t have to get a job but I have to safety plan, which is generic. I have to go through this so many times, and it is not authentic anymore. To victim advocates, prosecution, and police – I’m just a number.”

**How is what we learned a problem of safety and well-being for victims?**

*A problem of offender and systemic accountability?*

DV cases involving GOAs, repeat assaults, violations of OFPs, brain injury, and extensive property damage and thefts all represent high-risk situations.

How is it that this regular collection of risk information - and its reported daily usage by various players in the criminal justice system - doesn’t urgently propel these cases to the forefront of criminal justice actions? Each of these gaps presents a heightened risk to the safety of victims and allows repeat and dangerous offenders to escape accountability.

**How is this gap produced? What contributes to it?**

There is no mechanism currently in place for a certain level of risk to override the impact of the unwritten policy or practices identified in this report.

Current beliefs circulating in the system – that police don’t have the resources to pursue GOAs, that since the George Floyd case police can no longer arrest, that misdemeanors should not be investigated, that it’s not a patrol officer’s job to interview/investigate, that it’s not an investigator’s job to locate a suspect, or that prosecutors don’t pursue these cases – are impeding efforts to address high-risk DV cases.

The current DV Supplement does not incorporate attention to some of the safety and accountability issues identified in this report and provides limited space for victim’s responses.

For example, the internationally used Danger Assessment instrument has for many years included as a risk assessment question, “Has he ever avoided arrest?” which is not included on the DV supplement. Additionally, the current DV Supplement does not give the victim much

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135 Individuals who receive Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) or Family Stabilization Services (FSS) are limited to 60 months of services. This limit can be waived for an individual who files a Family Violence Waiver showing that he or she is experiencing family violence or dealing with the effects of past family violence or working toward healing. For more information, see *MFIP and FSS for Family Violence Victims*, Education for Justice: A Project of the Minnesota Legal Services Coalition, 2023. [https://www.lawhelpmn.org/sites/default/files/2022-12/G-%205%20MFIP%20and%20FSS%20for%20Family%20Violence%20Victims.pdf](https://www.lawhelpmn.org/sites/default/files/2022-12/G-%205%20MFIP%20and%20FSS%20for%20Family%20Violence%20Victims.pdf)
room to answer questions, and so it is frequently the case that victims answer with just a few words or not at all.

The DV Workgroup expressed its willingness to update the Domestic Violence Victim’s Supplement. One of the co-authors of this report created a draft that added some important questions, was easier to read, provided a brief analysis at the top for an officer to mark if high risk depending on the answers to the questions, and create more room at the end for a victim to provide more lengthy information. This was presented to the Workgroup and there was general agreement to completing this draft so that it would include questions addressing the safety/accountability gaps in this report.

The current practice of having victims fill in the DV Supplement doesn’t elicit the most complete risk information.

It is not considered best practice to hand risk or lethality instruments to victims to fill out themselves. They are meant to be guides to a conversation – a question/answer exchange – between the victim and the person administering it. Some of the experiences relayed above by survivors and others point out how victims feel they must hurry to fill out the form when someone is standing there waiting for it, as opposed to responding to a person engaging you in a conversation about your situation.

According to an individual working in the local criminal justice system, the current form of the DV Supplement was implemented in 2005. An attorney involved in the process was of the opinion the form would be discoverable by defense, and for that reason it was thought best to steer its implementation so that it would be given to victims to fill out as opposed to police asking the questions. Risk assessment procedures have been used across the country for years. It is time to revisit this issue and develop a cooperative process to gather risk assessment information effectively.

**Recommendations: How do we close the gap? What will help address it?**

A coordinated, multi-disciplinary effort to update and improve risk assessment procedures and the response to high-risk DV cases across the system is needed to close the gaps identified in this report.

The DV Workgroup wanted to ensure that readers of this report understood that current policies on collecting risk assessment information and sharing it with prosecutors in DV cases are being followed and do positively impact actions by system actors in many cases. However, they agreed that our findings indicate a need to update the instrument, improve the process of administering it, and use risk assessment information to better and more quickly direct resources to the most dangerous offenders. The DV Workgroup understands that given the status of MPD’s current severe shortage of officers, it may take one to three years to
implement some of the recommendations; but they would emphasize that rebuilding efforts must include steps to improve the response to DV cases.

The DV Workgroup recommends that a coordinating body live on beyond this Institutional Assessment to ensure implementation of these recommendations. This body could explore existing models of responses to high-risk cases, such as Domestic Violence High Risk Teams\textsuperscript{136} or the Blueprint for Safety,\textsuperscript{137} and develop an improved coordinated response that will work in Minneapolis.

\textsuperscript{136} The Domestic Violence High Risk Team (DVHRT) Model is a nationally recognized DV homicide prevention framework. The DVHRT’s goal is to reduce intimate partner homicide by monitoring specific high-risk cases and closing gaps in the DV response system. For more information, see https://geigerinstitute.org/#who-we-are.

\textsuperscript{137} The Blueprint for Safety, originally developed and implemented in Saint Paul, MN, is a prototype that can be used by any community hoping to link its criminal justice agencies together in a coherent, philosophically sound DV intervention model. For more information, see https://praxisinternational.org/blueprint-for-safety/.
Conclusion

There are gaps in the Minneapolis police response to domestic violence – gaps that impact victim safety. Victims are vulnerable to repeat violence or no-contact order violations by abusers who have learned that if they leave the scene before police arrive, no consequences will result. Victims are discouraged from calling police after receiving responses indicative of impatience, bias, or adherence to negative stereotypes. Victims increasingly bear the burden of holding offenders accountable when witnesses aren’t documented, and property loss isn’t taken in into account. Victims and responders are unaware of emerging information on the medical seriousness of assaults to the head, which are common in DV cases. System partners are not utilizing risk assessment’s potential to prioritize scarce resources to the most dangerous offenders.

The assessment revealed that generally, if the suspect was on scene when police arrived, he was arrested. If the suspect was gone on police arrival (GOA), he was not arrested or prioritized for investigation and often not prosecuted. Almost all survivors we interviewed related multiple such experiences of officers not pursuing GOA abusers. Survivors said the same was often true of abusers who violated no contact conditions of court orders. In addition, victims, victim advocates, and police officers were discouraged with lack of prosecution of OFP violation cases, even in cases where there was corroborating evidence such as video or social media. As a result, some officers and investigators appeared to be screening cases based on the perception of unlikely prosecution rather than focusing as they should on whether there is probable cause that a crime occurred.

Some victims had the experience of gender, race, or class appearing to negatively influence the police response; for example, lack of understanding or sensitivity about cultural factors, holding negative stereotypes of victims or offenders, and lack of interpreter resources. These experiences made victims reluctant to call police in the future.

In many cases where there were witnesses, police didn’t question witnesses or document witnesses’ identities and contact information, leaving any ensuing prosecution more victim-dependent which makes victims more vulnerable to witness intimidation. And in cases involving theft or damage to the victim’s property police often didn’t document replacement or repair estimates, photograph damage, or recommend property crime charges. Abusers who stole or damaged victims’ property were rarely prosecuted or convicted of property crimes, leaving cash-strapped victims suffering a financial loss as well as safety and security concerns – the stolen or damaged property was often the victim’s phone, house keys, or vehicle.

Over one-third of victims in the police reports and one-third of victims participating in focus groups or interviews experienced serious assaults about the head: kicks to the head, strikes with weapons or objects, and repeated punches. Officers regularly obtain medical attention for victims and document injuries in DV cases. However, victims themselves as well as police officers and
victim advocates are not knowledgeable about the medical seriousness of being struck in the head, or emerging policy and protocol for responding to such cases. Similarly, many victims provided police with risk factor information. However, it often wasn’t used to its full potential among police or system partners to better prioritize resources and more prompt responses to the most dangerous offenders.

The Domestic Violence Workgroup and Global Rights for Women (GRW) staff are well aware that the Minneapolis Police Department is currently experiencing a severe shortage of officers – as of the writing of this report, 510 sworn officers are currently on duty, as opposed to the authorized fully-staffed number of 888 officers.138 Everyone interviewed expressed concern about the shortage, and it was seen as the cause of many of the issues identified in this report. However, our findings also identified historical “We’ve always done it that way” or “We never do that” sorts of issues, lack of clear policy directive for patrol officers, and discouraging messages from other parts of the criminal justice system that de-prioritize domestic violence cases. This points to needed changes in written policies, supervisory practices, linkages among justice system actors, and many multi-disciplinary training needs that can be addressed while the MPD rebuilds. The findings also raise concerns that should be incorporated into restructuring plans.

We enthusiastically agree with the sentiments expressed on several occasions by Minneapolis Public Safety Commissioner, Cedric Alexander,139 “I know we don’t have enough people. That cannot be the beginning of the conversation.”

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Appendices

8 Methods of Organizing Work
   GOA Case Chart
   Call Dispositions List
   Victim Input form
   Pretrial Release Evaluation form
   MPD Victim’s DV Supplement Form
Eight Methods that Organize a Practitioner’s Work

Data collection and analysis pay attention to 8 primary methods that institutions use in standardizing actions across disciplines, agencies, levels of government, and job function.

Rules and Regulations

- Rules and Regulations include but are not limited to: laws; court rulings; legislative mandates; requirements or regulations of federal, state, county and city regulating bodies; agency policies and directives; and policies of related organizations such as insurance companies and medical facilities.
- They direct and guide management of the entity to which they apply; and are established by political processes in state legislative bodies, federal regulating commissions, local and county commissions, service agency boards of directors, and other entities.
- Rules and regulations define the scope of institutional responsibility and direct internal operations of most agencies, significant aspects of service delivery, and methods of communication between and among agencies.
- Assessment team members interviewing or observing practitioners and reading files and narrative reports see many examples of how a rule, law, regulation, or other directive influences case processing.

Administrative Practices

- Administrative Practices are methods an institution uses to standardize how practitioners carry out its policies, laws, regulations, and mandates. Most use text, such as screening forms, case documentation forms, matrices, guidelines, report writing formats, routing instructions and protocols, or what practitioners refer to as “paperwork.” Think of rules and regulations as mandates and administrative processes as instructions to practitioners on how to carry out those mandates.
- Along with instructions on case management, administrative processes embody concepts that either centralize or marginalize victims’ actual experiences and needs for safety. A child protection intake form, a pre-sentence investigation format, and a guardian ad litem’s parenting skills checklist are examples of administrative practices that prescribe ways of thinking about and acting on cases.

Resources

Resources include ways a community allocates and ensures quality of funding, materials, processes, and personnel needed to address a problem. Resources include everything necessary for:

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• Workers to do their jobs without compromising victim safety or offender accountability. In this context, resources include caseload, technology, adequate supervision, and support services.
• Victims of abuse to position themselves in safer situations, through such means as housing, skilled counseling, financial help, and adequate legal representation.
• Intervening systems to hold offenders accountable. In this context, resources include adequate jail space, enough time for probation officers to supervise their clients, high-quality rehabilitation services, and practitioners well-prepared to work with offenders of diverse economic, ethnic, and religious backgrounds.

Concepts and Theories
• Concepts and theories include language, categories, theories, assumptions, philosophical frameworks, and other ways institutions organize workers to think, talk, and write about cases and people whose experiences are being managed as cases. It’s sometimes difficult to see how conceptual practices are ingrained in use of language, assignment of categories, crafting of assessment tools, and assumptions supporting a law or rule or policy.
• Ask: What concepts operate here? How is this worker coordinated to apply this concept? What categories does this worker use and how do they shape his/her thinking about the case? What assumptions are in the form, process, or matrix?
• Watch for how the worker is connected to ways of thinking and talking about an issue.
• Concepts, theories, assumptions, and conceptual frameworks are not owned by or specific to an individual; they are embedded in institutional processes.

Linkages
• Linkages are ways that practitioners are linked to: other workers and other intervention processes; people whose cases they process; and processes and people outside their community. In an assault case, there may be over a dozen workers, in a dozen agencies at four or five levels of government. Most will never directly talk to each other about the case; in large communities many will never meet each other. Most will never meet the people whose cases are being processed. No worker acts independently from those who proceed or follow him/her in the process; each is linked in a sequence of institutional actions.
• What are the methods of linking practitioners - routing information, referrals, regular meetings, writing reports, receiving reports, and collecting information?
• How are workers linked to concepts and theories?
• How are workers connected to people whose cases are being managed - direct contact or the case file standing in for the actual person (and how accurately)?
• Are links strong or weak? This can enhance or diminish victim safety and offender accountability.
• Are there unique needs of victims requiring that institutions create new linkages and enhance existing links?
Mission, Purpose, and Function

- Mission concerns the overall process, the overarching purpose of a system such as criminal court or child protection. Presumably, every action and case-processing step within the institution or agency reflects that mission.
- Purpose refers to the institutional purpose of a specific process within that overarching mission, such as booking, arraignment, and pre-trial hearings.
- Function is the function of a practitioner in a specific context. An institutional assessment explores how the interconnected mission, purpose, and functions of practitioners within specific systems and institutions account for victim safety and offender accountability.

Accountability

The ways that institutional practices are organized to hold:

- Individuals accountable for harm they have done, as well as harm they are likely to cause without effective intervention.
- Practitioners accountable to the people whose lives are being managed.
- Practitioners accountable to other interveners in the system.

Education and Training

- The ways disciplines organize workers (e.g., criminal lawyers, civil lawyers, child protection workers, police, therapists, nurse practitioners) to understand their jobs and social phenomena related to their work, such as the abuse of women in marriages and intimate relationships.
- Formal ways that agencies train workers to think about and act on cases.
- Informal ways that workers learn their jobs via experience and training by more seasoned workers.
- Exposure to different concepts, theories, and conceptual practices.
- Ongoing skill building that enables workers to effectively intervene in assault cases involving diverse populations.
### GOA Case Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Prior Record</th>
<th>Convictions arising from incident?</th>
<th>Post-incident Record</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2018 – 4  
Reported as terroristic threats  
GOA, did ATL | None | No | 1 conviction 2022  
1 first degree crim. sex. conduct |
| 2018 – 5  
Reported as domestic assault  
GOA, no ATL | 13 convictions 2012 - 2017  
1 theft, 4 domestic assault, 1 disorderly conduct, 1 giving false info to police, 3 DANCO violations, 1 contempt of court, 1 fleeing officer, 1 drug | No | 3 convictions 2019 – 2022.  
1 drug (Ramsey), 1 threats (Crow Wing Co.), 1 forgery (Dakota Co.) |
| 2018 – 6  
Reported as: (1) Domestic Threats,  
(2) Interference with 911 Call, (3) Malicious Punishment, and (4) Assault Enhanced.  
GOA, did ATL | 2 convictions 2015 - 2016  
1 felony drug, 1 trespassing | Yes  
1 conviction 2018 for disorderly conduct | 1 conviction 2019  
1 felon in possession of a firearm |

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141 Except for fleeing an officer, traffic convictions are not included in either prior or post-incident record.
142 GRW staff reviewing police reports only checked to see if a criminal conviction arose out of these cases, which is public information, and did not request non-public information on whether a warrant had been issued, or a defendant had entered into a diversion agreement or continuance without plea.
143 Post-incident convictions not marked with an originating county are from Hennepin County.
144 Attempt to Locate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Prior Record</th>
<th>Convictions arising from incident?</th>
<th>Post-incident Record</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018 – 7&lt;br&gt;Reported as: (1) domestic assault - harm (2) terroristic threats; (3) damage to property; (4) domestic assault – fear GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>2 convictions 2006 – 2010 1 felony credit card fraud, 1 felony theft of motor vehicle</td>
<td>Yes 1 misd. conviction 2019 for damage to property</td>
<td>1 conviction 2020 1 theft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018 – 9&lt;br&gt;Reported as 1st degree arson GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>6 convictions 2011 – 2017 1 property damage, 1 terroristic threats, 1 domestic assault, 1 DANCO violation, 1 threats of violence, 1 3rd degree assault</td>
<td>6/26/18 Victim tried to break up with suspect, who got angry and took off in her car. Police stopped him shortly after for speeding and driving after revocation. Suspect called a friend to take him back to victim’s house, where he set the fire. 11/4/21 Suspect convicted of his 6/26/18 speeding and driving after revocation, but of nothing from the arson</td>
<td>1 conviction 2021 1 sexual assault (New Hope)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 3&lt;br&gt;Reported as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 4&lt;br&gt;Reported as 3rd degree domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>2 convictions in 2010. 1 felony drug and 1 disorderly conduct</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1 conviction 2022 1 OFP violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Prior Record</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 7&lt;br&gt;Reported as domestic assault&lt;br&gt;GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>2 convictions 2017 – 2018&lt;br&gt;1 misd. drug, 1 trespass</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1 conviction 2019&lt;br&gt;1 first degree agg. robbery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 10&lt;br&gt;Reported as DANCO violation&lt;br&gt;GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>1 conviction 2019&lt;br&gt;1 domestic assault strangulation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1 conviction 2020&lt;br&gt;1 domestic assault strangulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 12&lt;br&gt;Reported as domestic assault&lt;br&gt;GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>2 convictions 2013 – 2017&lt;br&gt;1 domestic assault, 1 felony theft</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 16&lt;br&gt;Reported as damage to motor vehicle&lt;br&gt;GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>10 convictions 2007 – 2016&lt;br&gt;3 traffic, 1 carrying gun w/o permit, 1 vehicle theft, 3 drug, 1 theft, 1 receiving stolen property</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 18&lt;br&gt;Reported as assault with dangerous weapon&lt;br&gt;GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>1 conviction 2017&lt;br&gt;1 drug</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 19&lt;br&gt;Reported as domestic assault strangulation&lt;br&gt;GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>3 convictions 2007 – 2017&lt;br&gt;1 agg. robbery, 1 misd. property damage, 1 disorderly conduct</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 20&lt;br&gt;Reported as domestic threats&lt;br&gt;GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>1 conviction 2007&lt;br&gt;1 felony receiving stolen property</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1 conviction 2021&lt;br&gt;1 domestic assault out of Becker Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 21&lt;br&gt;Reported as OFP violation&lt;br&gt;GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2 convictions 2019 - 2021&lt;br&gt;1 domestic assault strangulation, 1 disorderly conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Prior Record[^141]</td>
<td>Convictions arising from incident?[^142]</td>
<td>Post-incident Record[^143]</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019 – 25 Reported as domestic assault strangulation GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>6 convictions 1990 – 2019 1 domestic assault, 2 drug, 1 possession of stolen goods, 1 theft, 1 check forgery</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 27 Reported as domestic assault strangulation GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>1 convictions 2009 1 robbery</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1 conviction 2020 1 felony threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 28 Reported as domestic assault GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>3 convictions 2015 – 2017 1 possession of burglary tools, 2 felony drug</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1 conviction 2022 1 domestic assault (Richfield)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 31 Reported as 2nd degree domestic assault and property damage GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>2 convictions 2016 1 theft, 1 disorderly conduct</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 34 Reported as 3rd degree domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 36 Reported as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>1 conviction 2019 DANCO violation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5 convictions 2020 – 2022 5 DANCO violations (1 GM and 4 felony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 37 Reported as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>3 convictions 2013 - 2019 2 felony drug, 1 domestic assault</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Prior Record</td>
<td>Convictions arising from incident?</td>
<td>Post-incident Record</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOA, no ATL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 drug (1 GM and 1 felony), both out of Ramsey Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – 49 Reported as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>5 convictions 2004 - 2016 2 felony drug, 1 possession of pistol or assault weapon as ineligible person, 1 felon in possession of firearm, 1 loitering</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2 convictions 1 felony drug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 1 Reported as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>4 convictions 2014 – 2019 1 theft, 2 drug, 1 carrying pistol w/o permit</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1 conviction 2020 1 carrying pistol w/o permit (Anoka Co.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 2 Reported as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>2 convictions 2014 – 2016 1 terroristic threats, 1 DANCO violation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3 convictions 2020 1 felony domestic assault, 1 malicious punishment of child, 1 DANCO violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 3 Reported as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>1 conviction 2016 1 obstructing (gross misd.)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 4 Reported as domestic assault strangulation GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>3 convictions 2013 – 2018 1 first degree agg. robbery, 1 solicitation of juvenile to commit a crime, 1 felony fleeing an officer</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 6 Reported as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>Unknown – Suspect DOB not documented</td>
<td>Unknown – Suspect DOB not documented</td>
<td>Unknown – Suspect DOB not documented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

145 Date of Birth
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
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<th>Post-incident Record[^143]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 7 Reported as GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>1 conviction 2019 1 theft</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3 convictions 2021 – 2022 1 theft, 1 OFP violation, 1 felony escape from custody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 convictions 2011 – 2018 1 disorderly conduct, 2 DANCO violations, 1 domestic assault, 1 terroristic threats, 1 burglary</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2 convictions 2022 1 assaulting an officer, 1 felony DANCO violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 11 Reported as DANCO violation GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>4 convictions 2017 – 2020 1 carrying weapon or facsimile firearm prohibited, 2 domestic assault, 1 theft</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2 convictions 2020 – 2022 2 felony DANCO violations (1st one out of Hennepin Co., 2nd one out of Dakota Co.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014 – 2019 2 theft, 1 disorderly conduct, 1 burglary/1st degree assault</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 15 Reported as domestic assault strangulation GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>12 convictions 2004 – 2019 1 giving false info to police officer, 2 disorderly conduct, 2 fleeing an officer, 2 vehicle theft, 1 drug, 1 property damage, 1 burglary, 1 obstructing emergency vehicle, 1 possession of burglary tools</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Prior Record&lt;sup&gt;141&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Convictions arising from incident?&lt;sup&gt;142&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Post-incident Record&lt;sup&gt;143&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 20 Report as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 21 Report as domestic assault GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>9 convictions 2008 – 2020 1 disorderly conduct, 1 fleeing an officer, 1 interfere w 911 call, 2 felony domestic assault, 4 OFP violations</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5 convictions 2020 - 2021 2 OFP violations (Ramsey Co.), 1 stalking (Ramsey Co.), 1 domestic assault (Dakota Co.), 1 fleeing an officer (Mahnomen Co.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 23 Report as 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; degree domestic assault, assault with a dangerous weapon, damage to motor vehicle, and OFP violation GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>1 conviction 2019 1 felony stalking</td>
<td>Yes 1 conviction 2020 for threats of violence</td>
<td>1 conviction 2020 1 giving police officer false name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 25 Report as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>8 convictions 2002 - 2016 1 disorderly conduct, 2 domestic assault, 1 obstructing, 1 felony OFP violation, 1 DANCO violation, 1 giving police officer false name, 1 property damage</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 30 Reported as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>3 convictions 2016 – 2019 1 misd. drug, 1 felony fleeing an officer, 1 trespassing</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 33 Reported as DANCO violation GOA, no ATL</td>
<td>5 convictions 2008 – 2019 2 first degree robbery, 2 second degree assault, 1 solicitation of juveniles to commit felony, 1 loitering w/intent, 3 disorderly conduct, 1 failure to comply with peace officer</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1 conviction 2022 1 OFP violation (Scott Co.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 34 Reported as domestic assault GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 35 Reported as domestic assault GOA, did ATL</td>
<td>18 convictions 1988 – 2016 1 forgery, 2 offering forged check, 4 disorderly conduct, 4 domestic assault, 1 malicious punishment of child, 1 receiving stolen property, 1 burglary, 4 theft</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 36 Reported as domestic assault strangulation, no ATL</td>
<td>2 convictions 2009 - 2014 1 disorderly conduct, 1 second degree assault/dangerous weapon</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Prior Record[^141]</td>
<td>Convictions arising from incident?[^142]</td>
<td>Post-incident Record[^143]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 38</td>
<td>6 convictions 2008 – 2017 2 violation predatory offender registration, 2 property damage, 1 felony theft, 1 loitering w/intent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported as DANCO violation GOA, did ATL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 40</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported as domestic assault strangulation, GOA, no ATL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 41</td>
<td>4 convictions 2004 – 2018 3 disorderly conduct, 1 theft</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported as domestic assault GOA, no ATL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 – 42</td>
<td>2 convictions 2018 - 2020 1 interfere w privacy (gross misd.), 1 disorderly conduct</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2 convictions 2021 - 2022 1 domestic assault, 1 OFP violation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Call Disposition Codes and Their Meanings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADV – Advised</td>
<td>Officers advised or warned the party they responded to. Used interchangeably with RPR - Reprimand/Release.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOK – All OK</td>
<td>When officers arrived, everything was okay at the scene. Used interchangeably with AQT – All Quiet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQT – All Quiet</td>
<td>When officers arrived, everything was okay at the scene. Used interchangeably with AOK – All OK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AST – Assist</td>
<td>Officers assisted someone during the call. Used most frequently by assisting officers to clear a call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKG – Booking</td>
<td>The call ended with officers booking the arrestee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNL – Cancel</td>
<td>The reporting caller called back to cancel their request for police response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTX – Detox</td>
<td>Person was taken to detox. Used interchangeably with TRN Transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAL – False</td>
<td>The call was a false alarm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTC – Fail to Clear</td>
<td>Officer did not send disposition code to dispatcher at end of call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOA Gone on Arrival</td>
<td>Officers unable to find suspect. Used interchangeably with UTL – Unable to Locate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF – Information</td>
<td>Officer received a call that does not require a response. The call was informational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS – In-service</td>
<td>Officers use this code to clear a call. They will still check the call while responding to another call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MES – Message Left</td>
<td>When officers arrived, no one was home so they left a calling card.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOS – No Service</td>
<td>When officers arrived, did not provide service because person officers responded to refused police service and assistance. Used interchangeably with RFD – Refused.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RFD</td>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>When officers arrived, person officers responded to refused police service and assistance. Used interchangeably with NOS – No Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>Reprimand Release</td>
<td>Officers warned the party they responded to about a violation and released them. Used interchangeably with ADV – Advised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPT</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Someone committed a crime, and officers took a report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCK</td>
<td>Sick</td>
<td>A rarely used code, this can be used for helping EMS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>Secured</td>
<td>Officers made a business check or received a burglary call, and they boarded up or secured a window or door.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNT</td>
<td>Sent</td>
<td>Officers told offender to leave area. For example, if a park is closed and kids are playing loudly past curfew, neighbors might call and complain. Officers will tell the kids to go home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>Tagged</td>
<td>Officers issued a ticket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>Towed</td>
<td>Used for car accident or other incident where car must be removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRN</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Used when a person is sent by police to another location. Used interchangeably with DTX – Detox.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNF</td>
<td>Unfounded</td>
<td>Used when officers respond to a call and learn the caller made a mistake or a reported incident didn't happen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTL</td>
<td>Unable to Locate</td>
<td>Used when officers can’t find the person they are responding to. Used interchangeably with GOA – Gone on Arrival.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office – Victim Input for Level 1 Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V Informed Input not</th>
<th>Interpreter &amp; Language:</th>
<th>Court Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confidential: YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defendant’s Name:</th>
<th>DOB:</th>
<th>MNCIS #:</th>
<th>CCN#:</th>
<th>PM #:</th>
<th>Phone Number(s):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim’s Name:</th>
<th>DOB:</th>
<th>Victim Address:</th>
<th>Same as Police Report</th>
<th>Email:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim Plea Negotiation Wishes:</th>
<th>Victim Sentencing Wishes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Jail Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic 609.135</td>
<td>Stayed Jail Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly Conduct</td>
<td>Renew Diversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly 609.135</td>
<td>Domestic Abuse Programming/Batterer Intervention Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOFP/DANCO</td>
<td>Rule 25 for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>Counseling/Mental Health for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismissal</td>
<td>Restitution:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other comments/information from Victim:

☐ No Contact  ☐ Contact Ok  ☐ Contact with Children Only

3rd party contact for the children?

Does Victim have an OFP?  ☐ Yes  ☐ No  OFP #:  Service Date:  Hearing Date:

If no, is victim planning on obtaining one?  ☐ Yes  ☐ No  ☐ Maybe

When was the last time that the Victim had contact with the Defendant?  ☐ Not Since Incident

Has the Defendant called Victim from Jail?  ☐ Yes  ☐ No  ☐ N/A

What was the conversation about?

POLICE REPORT:  Victim states police report is accurate  Were any children in home?  ☐ Yes  ☐ No

Did Defendant damage any property during the incident?  ☐ Yes  ☐ No  Restitution Requested?  ☐ Yes  ☐ No

Did Victim have any injuries?  ☐ Yes  ☐ No
**Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office – Victim Input for Level 1 Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MNCIS #:</th>
<th>PM #:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant’s Name:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Where?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did Victim receive medical attention?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Already Obtained by Police</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is Victim willing to sign a medical release?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Who has them?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were pictures taken?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional witnesses not listed in police report (include name, relationship to victim, and contact information):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship:</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Former IP</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of Relationship?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Custody Arrangements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship History:</th>
<th>No Previous Assaults</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

List any concerns victim has about testifying at trial (to include scheduling issues, any safety concerns and any other concerns or barriers to testifying) and if these will prevent the victim from coming to testify as necessary for trial:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does Defendant have any guns?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How is victim aware of the guns?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How many?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What kind?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where are they stored?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was the Defendant under the influence of drugs/alcohol during the incident?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale of D's Level of Intoxication:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
# Minnesota Pretrial Release Evaluation Form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Last)</th>
<th>(First)</th>
<th>(Middle)</th>
<th>Assessment Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case #</th>
<th>County of Residence</th>
<th>Duration (yr mo)</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th># Children:</th>
<th>Have you ever been in or served in the U.S. armed forces?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Married</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Pretrial Assessment Tool Section

### Pretrial Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Charge:</th>
<th>Pretrial Factor</th>
<th>Points Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Other Charges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment/Income Sources or School Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Problematic Chemical Use (see definition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homeless or Three or More Address Changes in Past Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at First Delinquency Adjudication/Conviction</th>
<th>Age:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criminal Conviction History</th>
<th># Felony Person:</th>
<th># Other Felony:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Non-Felony Person:</td>
<td># Other Non-Felony:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bench Warrants</th>
<th># Last 3 Years:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Scale Score</th>
<th>Pretrial Score Risk Ranges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower = 0-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate = 12-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher = 26+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Current Monitoring Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pretrial Conditional Release</th>
<th>Probation</th>
<th>Revoked Probation</th>
<th>Supervised Release</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Is the defendant currently assigned to a probation or pretrial officer? | Yes | No |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|

### Does the defendant have a pending case (targeted misdemeanor or higher) that has not yet reached disposition? | Yes | No |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|

### Comments from Collateral/Victim Sources:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lethality Assessment Conducted</th>
<th>If conditions are ordered, probation recommendations for conditions of release:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT VICTIM’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SUPPLEMENT

1) Name: ___________________________ Date: ____________ CCN# ___________________________
   Home phone: ___________________________ Mobile: ___________________________ Work: ___________________________
   Is there another way to contact you? Yes / No ______ List how we can reach you: ___________________________

2) Name of the person who assaulted you:
   Your relationship to this person? (Circle all that apply): Former / Current: Boyfriend Girlfriend Husband Wife
   Length of Relationship: ___________________________ Live Together: How Long? ___________________________
   Children Together: How Many? ___________________________

3) Anyone else present during or immediately after the assault? Yes / No ______ If yes, please list them and how to reach them:
   Name ___________________________ Age ______ Address ___________________________ Phone (Home, Mobile, Work) ___________________________

4) How were you assaulted? (Check all that apply)
   Struck ______ Pushed ______ Head Butted ______
   Slapped ______ Strangled ("Choked") ______
   Punched ______ Pinched ______ Bitten ______
   Kicked ______ Scratched ______ Hair Pulled ______
   Grabbed ______
   Struck by Object (describe): ______ Other ______

5) Place an “X” on all spots where you were assaulted in this incident.

6) Were you afraid during the assault? Yes/No ______
   If yes, please explain: ___________________________

7) Did you defend yourself in any way? Yes/No ______
   If yes, please explain: ___________________________

8) Describe the assault, including what led up to the assault.
   ___________________________
   ___________________________
   ___________________________

   (If you need more space, please continue on the back of the form.)

   Risk Assessment Questions

   Do you think the defendant will seriously injure or kill you or your children? Yes/No ______ Why do you think so?
   ___________________________
   ___________________________

   How often does this person intimidate or threaten to assault you? ___________________________

   Does this person own or have access to any weapons? Yes/No ______

   Has the defendant ever harmed or threatened to harm any pets? Yes/No ______

   Do you have an Order for Protection or a No Contact Order with or against this person? Yes/No ______

   The above is true to the best of my knowledge. ___________________________ Signature of Victim ______
   ___________________________ Date ______

   Name/s of Officer/s witnessing above: ___________________________ Badge #: ______
   MP-9042 (11/08)